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Abstract
This thesis concerns the empirical relation between risk and return in equities. It studies
why the expected return on stocks as a whole varies over time and why there are predictable
cross-sectional di↵erences in the return on individual stocks. The thesis consists of three
chapters which can be read independently.
The first chapter addresses why the expected return on the market portfolio varies over
time. The market portfolio is a claim to all future cash flows earned by the firms in the
stock market. I study the expected return to these future cash flows individually. I find that
the expected return to the distant-future cash flows increases by more in bad times than
the expected return to near-future cash flows does. This new stylized fact is important for
understanding why the expected return on the market portfolio as a whole varies over time.
In addition, it has strong implications for which economic model that drives the return to
stocks. Indeed, I find that none of the canonical asset pricing models can explain this new
stylized fact while also explaining the previously documented facts about stock returns.
The second chapter, called Conditional Risk, studies how the expected return on indi-
vidual stocks is influenced by the fact that their riskiness varies over time. We introduce a
new ”conditional-risk factor”, which is a simple method for determining how much of the
expected return to individual stocks that can be explained by time variation in their market
risk, i.e. market betas. Using this new factor, we find that around 20% of the cross-sectional
variation in expected stock returns worldwide can be explained by such time variation in
market betas.
The third chapter studies why stocks with low market betas have high risk-adjusted
returns. To shed light on this low-risk e↵ect, we decompose all stocks’ market betas into their
volatility and their correlation with the market portfolio. We find that both stocks with lower
volatility and stocks with lower correlation have higher risk-adjusted returns. The last fact,
that stocks with low correlation have high risk-adjusted returns, is particularly important
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because it helps distinguish between competing theories of the low-risk e↵ect. Indeed,
the high risk-adjusted returns to low-correlation stocks are consistent with leverage based
theories of the low-risk e↵ect, but it is not immediately implied by competing behavioral
theories we consider in the paper.
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Introduction and Summaries
The starting point for this thesis is the following two empirical observations: (1) the ex-
pected return on the market portfolio of stocks varies over time,1 and (2) the expected
return on individual stocks varies cross-sectionally.2 Much of modern asset pricing is about
understanding this time series and cross-sectional variation in expected returns, which are
often referred to as discount rates (Cochrane, 2011). All three chapters in this thesis docu-
ment new empirical facts that help us understand this expected return variation in equities.
The first paper improves our understanding of the economics behind time series variation in
expected returns. The second and third paper improve our understanding of cross-sectional
variation in expected returns. The next pages provide summaries of the individual papers
in English and Danish. These summaries clarify the individual papers’ contribution.
1 Summaries in English
Time Variation of the Equity Term Structure
This paper studies the equity term structure, which is a novel way of studying the market
portfolio. Usually we study the return to buying the market portfolio as a whole, which is
really the return to buying the right to all future dividends. In contrast, when we study
the equity term structure, we study the return to buying individual dividends on their own,
which in turn allows us to get deeper insights into the economics of stock returns.
More precisely, the equity term structure refers to how the expected return to dividends
depends on how far into the future these dividends are paid out. The previous literature
focuses on the average equity term premium, which is the average di↵erence in return on
claims on long- and short-maturity dividends. This literature finds that the equity term
1See e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1988); Fama and French (1988); Campbell and Thompson (2008).
2See Bondt and Thaler (1985); Fama and French (1992, 2015); Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); Acharya
and Pedersen (2005); Novy-Marx (2013) and more.
vii
premium has historically been negative, which means that claims on dividends that are
paid out in the near future have earned a higher average return than claims on dividends
that are paid out in the distant future.3 This result is surprising, because it is inconsistent
with leading asset pricing models.4
In my paper, I document a large cyclical variation in the equity term premium: the
premium is negative in good times but positive in bad times. This counter-cyclical variation
in the equity term premium is robust across four di↵erent countries, di↵erent sample periods,
and di↵erent ways of measuring the return to buying dividends.
The counter-cyclical variation in the equity term structure is important for multiple
reasons. First, it improves our understanding of why the expected return on the market
portfolio varies over time. Previous research has documented that the expected return on
the market goes up in bad times,5 and the counter-cyclical equity term premium tells us
more about why this is the case. Indeed, the counter-cyclical equity term premium implies
that the expected return on the market goes up in bad times mainly because the expected
return on dividends that are paid out far into the future goes up. This new fact, in turn,
improves our understanding of the economics that drive stock returns.
Second, I show that the counter-cyclical equity term premium is a puzzle when combined
with the previously documented fact that the premium is negative on average. Indeed, I
show that the leading asset pricing models cannot produce an equity term premium that is
both negative on average and counter-cyclical. I therefore present a new model than can
explain both of the stylized facts.
Conditional Risk
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is one of the fundamental models in asset pricing.
The model dictates that the expected return of a stock should be a linear function of how
much market risk the stock is exposed to. But measuring market risk of a stock is chal-
lenging, particularly because it varies over time. Therefore researchers usually ignore time
variation in market risk when they implement the model, and instead they look at average
3See Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2012) and Binsbergen and Koijen (2017).
4The negative term premium is inconsistent with leading asset pricing models such as Campbell and
Cochrane (1999); Bansal and Yaron (2004); Gabaix (2012).
5Campbell and Shiller (1988); Fama and French (1988)
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(unconditional) market risk. The unconditional market risk of a stock is easy to estimate,
but using unconditional market risk when implementing the CAPM has a drawback, namely
that the estimate of the expected return becomes biased (see e.g. Jagannathan and Wang
(1996)).
We contribute to this research by introducing a new method for implementing the CAPM
that takes time variation in market risk into account. We derive a new “conditional-risk”
factor, which is a factor that can be used in factor regressions along with the market portfolio
to estimate the expected return on any given asset. We then use this new factor to study
stock returns.
Using our new conditional-risk factor, we document that time variation in risk – or, con-
ditional risk – is a pervasive feature of the data. In a global sample covering 23 developed
countries, part of the return to all the major trading strategies can be explained by our con-
ditional risk factor, which is to say that part of their return can be explained by the fact that
the strategies’ riskiness varies over time. On average, our conditional-risk factor explains
around 20% of the CAPM alpha of trading strategies. In addition, our conditional-risk
factor explains all the alpha to time-series strategies such as volatility-managed portfolios
(Moreira and Muir, 2017) or time series momentum (Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen, 2012).
Finally, we also analyze why market risk varies over time. Doing so, we find evidence
that the conditional risk arises from trading activities of constrained arbitrageurs.
Betting Against Correlation: Testing Theories of the Low-Risk E↵ect
The last chapter also takes the CAPM as the starting point. One of the major stylized
facts on the CAPM is the observation that assets with low market risk (market betas) have
high alpha (Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972). Researchers usually refer to this stylized
fact as the low-risk e↵ect. While the e↵ect is well documented empirically, the literature
o↵ers di↵erent views on the underlying economic drivers of the low-risk e↵ect and the best
empirical measures. In short, the debate is whether (a) the low-risk e↵ect is driven by
leverage constraints and risk should be measured using systematic risk vs. (b) the low-risk
e↵ect is driven by behavioral e↵ects and risk should be measured using idiosyncratic risk.
In the paper, we further test the extent to which the low-risk e↵ect is driven by leverage
constraints or behavioral demand. We do so by using broad global data, controlling for more
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existing factors, using measures of the economic drivers, and using new factors that we call
betting against correlation and scaled MAX that help solve the problem that the existing
low-risk factors are highly correlated. The results suggest that both leverage constraints
and behavioral demand may play a role in the low-risk e↵ect.
The results on the betting against correlation factor are particularly important. The bet-
ting against correlation factor buys low-correlation stocks and sells high-correlation stocks.
We find that this new factor has high risk-adjusted returns. This result has important
economic implications for the driver of the low-risk e↵ect. Indeed, the leverage constraints
theory directly implies that low-correlation stocks should, ceteris paribus, have high risk-
adjusted returns whereas the behavioral theories do not immediately imply so.6 Accordingly,
the high risk-adjusted return to the betting against correlation factor is strong evidence that
leverage constraints play a role in the low-risk e↵ect, which is something recent studies have
questioned (Bali, Brown, Murray, and Tang, 2017; Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan, 2017).
6For leverage constraints theory see Black (1972); Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). For behavioral theories
see Barberis and Huang (2008).
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2 Summaries in Danish
Time Variation of the Equity Term Structure
Denne artikel studerer egenkapitalens løbetidsstruktur, hvilket er en ny ma˚de at studere
aktier p˚a. N˚ar man køber en aktie, køber man retten til alle fremtidige dividender, der
bliver udbetalt af det p˚agældende firma, og n˚ar man studerer aktieafkast, studerer man
s˚aledes det afkast man f˚ar, hvis man køber alle fremtidige dividender. N˚ar vi studerer
egenkapitalens løbetidsstruktur, studerer vi i stedet det afkast man f˚ar, hvis man køber et
givent a˚rs dividende individuelt. P˚a den ma˚de kan man studere, om der er forskel i afkast
p˚a tværs af dividender, og man kan derved opn˚a en dybere forst˚aelse for økonomien bag
aktiepriser.
For at være mere præcis, s˚a refererer egenkapitalens løbetidsstruktur til sammenhængen
mellem en dividendes afkast, og hvor langt inde i fremtiden den bliver udbetalt. Den eksis-
terende litteratur fokuserer p˚a den gennemsnitlige løbetidspræmie for egenkapital, hvilket
er forskellen i det gennemsnitlige afkast p˚a lang- og kortsigtede dividender. Denne litteratur
finder, at den gennemsnitlige løbetidspræmie er negativ, hvilket betyder, at dividender der
udbetales i den nærmere fremtid, i gennemsnit har højere afkast, end dividender der udbe-
tales i den fjerne fremtid. Dette er overraskende, eftersom det er inkonsistent med ledende
modeller indenfor værdiansættelse.
I min artikel dokumenterer jeg en stor konjunkturvariation i egenkapitalens løbetidspræmie:
løbetidspræmien er negativ i gode tider, men positiv i d˚arlige tider. Denne konjunkturvari-
ation i løbetidspræmien er robust p˚a tværs af fire forskellige lande, forskellige tidsperioder,
og forskellige ma˚der at ma˚le dividendeafkast p˚a.
Konjunkturvariationen i løbetidspræmien er vigtig af flere a˚rsager. For det første styrker
den vores forst˚aelse af, hvorfor det forventede afkast p˚a aktier varierer over tid. Tidligere
forskning har vist, at det forventede afkast p˚a aktier g˚ar op i d˚arlige tider, og konjunktur-
variationen i løbetidspræmien fortæller os mere om, hvorfor dette er tilfældet: konjunktur-
variationen i løbetidspræmien indebærer, at det forventede afkast p˚a aktier g˚ar op i d˚arlige
tider, fordi at det forventede afkast p˚a dividender der er langt ude i fremtiden g˚ar op. Dette
nye faktum er vigtigt for at forst˚a økonomien bag aktieafkast.
Den anden a˚rsag til at konjunkturvariationen i løbetidspræmien er vigtig, er at den er
svær at forene med det faktum, at løbetidspræmien i gennemsnit er negativ. Jeg viser at
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ingen af de ledende økonomiske modeller for aktiepriser kan producere en løbetidspræmie,
der b˚ade er negativ i gennemsnit og har den konjunkturvariation, jeg dokumenter i min
artikel. Jeg præsenterer derfor en struktur for en ny model, der kan forklare begge disse
empiriske fakta.
Conditional Risk
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) er en af værdiansættelsens fundamentale mod-
eller. Modellen siger, at det forventede afkast p˚a en aktie er en lineær funktion af mængden
af markedsrisiko, som det givne aktiv er eksponeret overfor. Men det er vanskeligt at ma˚le
hvor meget markedsrisiko der er i en aktie, eftersom dette varierer over tid. Derfor plejer
forskere at ignorere tidsvariation i markedsrisiko n˚ar de implementerer CAPM modellen, og
de kigger i stedet blot p˚a den gennemsnitlige (ubetingede) markedsrisiko. Denne ubetingede
markedsrisiko er nem at estimere, men problemet ved at bruge den ubetingede markedsrisiko
n˚ar man implementerer CAPMmodellen er, at man f˚ar et bias i ens estimat af det forventede
afkast.
Vi bidrager til denne litteratur ved at introducere en ny metode for at implementere
CAPM model, som tager tidsvariation i markedsrisiko med i betragtning. Vi udleder en ny
”conditional-risk factor”, som er en risikofaktor der kan bruges i faktorregressioner sammen
markedsafkastet til at estimere det forventede afkast p˚a en aktie. Vi bruger dernæst denne
nye faktor til at studere aktieafkast.
Ved hjælp af vores nye faktor dokumenterer vi, at tidsvariation in markedsrisiko –
hvilket vi kalder betinget risiko – spillet en stor rolle i aktieafkast. Vi dokumenterer, i
et globalt datasæt der dækker 23 udviklede lande, at afkastet p˚a alle store handelsstrate-
gier kan beskrives delvist ved hjælp af vores nye risikofaktor, hvilket vil sige, at afkastet
p˚a disse strategier kan forklares delvist ved det faktum, at deres markedsrisiko varierer
over tid. I gennemsnit kan vores nye risikofaktor beskrive 20% af CAPM merafkastet
p˚a disse handelsstrategier. Derudover kan vi beskrive hele afkastet p˚a tidsrækkestrategier
s˚asom volatility-managed portfolios (Moreira and Muir, 2017) eller time series momentum
(Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen, 2012).
Afslutningsvis studerer vi hvorfor markedsrisiko varier over tid. I denne analyse kommer
vi frem til, at betinget risiko muligvis opst˚ar som et produkt af begrænsede arbitragørers
handelsaktiviteter.
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Betting Against Correlation: Testing Theories of the Low-Risk E↵ect
Det sidste kapitel i afhandlingen omhandler ogs˚a CAPM. Et af de mest kendte fakta om
CAPM er, at aktier med lav markedsrisiko (markedsbeta) har højt risikojusteret afkast
(Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972). Forskere refererer normalt til dette faktum som lavrisiko-
e↵ekten. Lavrisikoe↵ekten er empirisk veldokumenteret, men litteraturen er uenig omkring
hvad der er den underlæggende økonomiske drivkraft bag den, og omkring hvordan man
bedst ma˚ler lavrisikoe↵ekten. I hovedtræk handler debatten om, hvorvidt (a) at lavrisiko-
e↵ekten er drevet af l˚anebegrænsninger, og at risiko derfor skal ma˚les ved hjælp af beta,
versus (b) at lavrisikoe↵ekten er drevet af adfærdsmæssige e↵ekter, og at risiko derfor skal
ma˚les ved hjælp af idiosynkratisk risiko.
I denne artikel tester vi yderligere hvorvidt lavrisikoe↵ekten er drevet af l˚anebegrænsninger
eller adfærdsmæssige e↵ekter. Vi gør dette ved at bruge et globalt datasæt, ved at kon-
trollere for flere eksisterende risikofaktorer, ved at bruge ma˚l for de økonomiske drivkræfter,
og ved at bruge nye faktorer som vi kalder betting against correlation (BAC) og SMAX,
som hjælper med at løse det problem, at de eksisterende lavrisikofaktorer er højt korrelerede.
Resultaterne antyder, at b˚ade l˚anebegrænsninger og adfærdsmæssige e↵ekter potentielt set
spiller en rolle i lavrisikoe↵ekten.
Analysen af afkastet p˚a BAC er især vigtig. BAC køber aktier der har høj markedsko-
rrelation og sælger aktier der har lav markedskorrelation. Vi finder, at denne nye faktor
har højt risikojusteret afkast. Dette resultat har vigtige implikationer for hvilken økonomisk
drivkraft der ligger bag lavrisikoe↵ekten: L˚anebegrænsningsteorien indebærer at lavkorrela-
tionsaktier, alt andet lige, burde have højt risikojusteret afkast, hvorimod de adfærdsteorier
vi betragter, ikke direkte implementere dette. Derfor er det høje risikojusterede afkast for
BAC stærkt bevismateriale for, at l˚anebegrænsninger er vigtige for at forst˚a lavrisikoe↵ek-
ten, hvilket tidligere studier har sat spørgsma˚lstegn ved (Bali, Brown, Murray, and Tang,
2017; Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan, 2017).
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Chapter 1
Time Variation of the Equity Term
Structure
Abstract:
I document that the term structure of holding-period equity returns is counter-cyclical: it
is downward sloping in good times, but upward sloping in bad times. This new stylized
fact implies that long-maturity risk plays a central role in asset price fluctuations, consis-
tent with theories of long-run risk and habit, but these theories cannot explain the average
downward slope. At the same time, the cyclical variation is inconsistent with recent models
constructed to match the average downward slope. I present the theoretical source of the
puzzle and suggest a new model as a resolution. My model also shows that the counter-
cyclical term structure has implications for real activity, which I verify empirically: in bad
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I study the term structure of equity returns and document a large cyclical variation.
This cyclical variation is important for understanding which risks drive fluctuations in asset
prices. Indeed, the cyclical variation documented in this paper suggests that price fluc-
tuations are driven mainly by long-maturity risks such as persistent changes in dividend
growth, and only less by short-maturity risks such as disaster risks. As such, the results
are consistent with classical asset pricing models such as Campbell and Cochrane (1999) or
Bansal and Yaron (2004), but they are inconsistent with the newer models that are designed
to have downward sloping equity term structures. In addition, the cyclical variation of the
equity term structure has important real consequences because it directly influences when
capital flows to long-maturity firms such as biotech firms or short-maturity firms such as
automobile firms and the extent to which these firms invest in production plants, R&D, or
labor.
By way of background, the previous research on the equity term structure has focused on
its average slope, finding that it is downward sloping on average (Binsbergen, Brandt, and
Koijen, 2012), as indicated by the solid line in my Figure 1. This result is inconsistent with
traditional models of long-run risk and habit which have upward sloping term structures.
Addressing this challenge to traditional asset pricing models has become one of the most
active areas in macro-finance (Cochrane, 2017) and has led to the development of new
models with average downward sloping term structures.1
I contribute to the literature on the equity term structure by studying its time variation.
My main result is that the equity term structure of holding-period returns is counter-cyclical:
it is downward sloping in good times but upward sloping in bad times. As shown in Figure
1, this counter-cyclical variation is economically large. In good times, long-maturity equity
has 4 percent lower expected annual return than short-maturity equity, but in bad times it
has 5 percent higher expected return, meaning that the equity term premium varies by 9
percentage points between good and bad times.
As shown in Figure 2, I document this new stylized fact using several di↵erent measures
of term premia, sample periods, data sources, and by also using futures returns as opposed
1The reference model for a downward sloping term structure is Lettau and Wachter (2007), which pre-
cedes the empirical literature on the downward sloping equity term structure. More recent models include
Eisenbach and Schmalz (2013); Andries, Eisenbach, and Schmalz (2015); Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro, and
Ursu´a (2013); Belo, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2015); Croce, Lettau, and Ludvigson (2014); Hasler and
Marfe (2016). Binsbergen and Koijen (2017) review the new theoretical models that have been motivated
by the downward sloping terms structure.
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Figre 1: The Term Structure of One-Year Equity Returns
This figure shows the term structure of holding-period equity returns for the S&P 500. The figure shows
the unconditional average return (solid line), the average return in bad times (dashed line), and the average
return in good times (dash-dotted line). Good and bad times are defined by the ex ante dividend-price
ratio. Short-maturity equity claims is the average return to dividend futures of 1 to 7 years maturity. The
long-maturity claim is the average return to the market portfolio. Returns are annual spot returns, 2005 –
2016.
to spot returns. Using dividend futures with maturities up to seven years, I find a positive
relation between the ex ante dividend price ratio and the ex post one-year return di↵erence
between long- and short-maturity dividend futures (Panel A). The result also holds when
using the market portfolio as the long-maturity claim, when considering Sharpe ratios in-
stead of returns, when excluding the financial crisis, and when using other measures of bad
times such as the CAPE ratio and the cay variable. The result holds in the U.S. for the S&P
500 and it holds internationally for Nikkei 225, Euro Stoxx 50, and the FTSE 100. Going
beyond dividend futures, the result also holds when measuring the equity term structure
using option implied dividend prices (Panel B) or the cross-section of stocks (Panel C).2
As shown in the first two columns of Table 1, the counter-cyclical equity term premia
represent a puzzle for asset pricing theory: none of our canonical asset pricing models
are able to produce both the counter-cyclical variation documented in this paper and the
2I estimate a term-premium mimicking portfolio in the cross-section of stocks by projecting the excess re-
turns of characteristics-sorted portfolios onto the realized return di↵erence between long- and short-maturity
claims.
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negative slope documented by Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2012). The counter-cyclical
variation is consistent with the traditional macro-finance models such as Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004), but inconsistent with the new models with
average downward sloping term structures. Hence, traditional models explain the time-
variation in the term premium, but not its average value, and vice versa for the newer
models.
The puzzle applies more generally than just the models in Table 1. To underline the
generality of the puzzle and to identify its source, I study the cyclicality of term premia
through a simple, essentially a ne model that is su ciently general to capture most of the
dynamics of log-normal models. In the model, the term structure of returns may be either
upward or downward sloping; but I show that if it is upward sloping it is counter-cyclical
and if it is downward sloping it is pro-cyclical. To see the intuition behind this result,
consider for instance a downward sloping model. The downwards sloping term structure
suggests that short-maturity equity is riskier than long-maturity equity and commands a
premium, meaning that the equity term premium is negative. In bad times, this premium
on short-maturity equity increases because the price of risk increases and the term premium
thus becomes even more negative, not positive as is observed empirically.
To understand what is needed to resolve the puzzle and explain the stylized facts, I
introduce a new model with a term premium that is both counter-cyclical and negative on
average. In the model, investors trade o↵ a demand for hedging investment opportunities
with an aversion towards long-run risk: the required return on long-maturity equity is pushed
down by investors’ demand for hedging investment opportunities, but it is pushed up by
their aversion for long-run risk. The relative strength of the two e↵ects varies over time,
and the model is specified such that demand for hedging dominates on average, meaning
that the equity term premium is negative on average; but in bad times the aversion against
long-run risk dominates so that the equity term premium becomes positive. The model is
thus able to capture the two stylized facts of the equity term structure. The model is based
on an exogenous stochastic discount factor and rooting it in a micro-foundation remains an
interesting topic for future research.
The counter-cyclical term premia documented in this paper may be surprising given the
pro-cyclical ”equity yield curve” documented by Binsbergen, Hueskes, Koijen, and Vrugt
(2013). An equity yield is the current dividends divided by the price of future dividends of a
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given maturity, meaning that it is closely related to hold-to-maturity returns.3 The authors
document that the yield curve is steeply downward sloping in bad times, which might lead
one to believe that during bad times, long-maturity claims are expected to have low returns
relative to short maturity claims, i.e. that the one-period equity term premium is lower
than usually. However, I directly study the one-period term premium and find that it is
higher in bad times, even though the yield curve is downward sloping.
To better understand this negative relation between equity term premia and the slope
of the yield curve, I test an expectations hypothesis. The hypothesis is that equity term
premia are constant, meaning that the expected development in yields can be inferred from
the yield curve. I find that equity yields move in the direction suggested by the yield
curve, but they move by more than suggested by the expectations hypothesis. I show that
this excess movement in yields implies that the slope of the equity yield curve must be
negatively correlated with equity term premia, thus reconciling my results with Binsbergen,
Hueskes, Koijen, and Vrugt (2013). The result that yields move too much in the direction
of what the yield curve suggests is surprising because it contrasts the results from the bond
literature: for bonds, the expectations hypothesis is rejected because yields move in the
opposite direction of what the yield curve suggests4.
In addition, the test of the expectations hypothesis represents another tension between
theory and the data. As shown in the third column of Table 1, none of the asset pricing
models I consider are able to generate as strong a relation between the yield spread and
future changes in yields as that observed in the data. The models fail in this regard because
their term premium is pro-cyclical or because the models create too little predictability in
equity yields relative to term premia.
Finally, the counter-cyclical equity term structure is also important for understanding the
cost of capital and how real resources are allocated in the economy. To better understand
these real dynamics, I study firms‘ investment decisions in my model of the equity term
structure. In the model, some firms have long-maturity cash flows and some have short-
maturity. These firms are di↵erently a↵ected by the equity term structure: in bad times,
the counter-cyclical equity term structure incentivizes long-maturity firms to invest less
and to apply less capital relative to labor compared to short-maturity firms because the
long-maturity firms find capital relatively more expensive.
3Equity yields are equivalent to hold-to-maturity returns minus the hold-to-maturity growth rates.
4See e.g. Shiller (1979); Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983) and Campbell and Shiller (1991).
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I verify the real implications of the model empirically, as summarized in Figure 3. I find
that, in bad times, the long-maturity firms invest less in capital equipment and R&D than
short-maturity firms do. On the other hand, they increase spending on wages relative to
short-maturity firms. Taken together, the long-maturity firms thus decrease their capital to
labor ratio relative to short-maturity firms. This pattern is consistent with long-maturity
firms finding capital relatively more expensive than short-maturity firms do in bad times
because the equity term structure is more upward sloping.
In conclusion, this paper documents a new stylized fact that gives new insight into
the drivers of the equity risk premium. The counter-cyclical term structure implies that
the variation in the equity risk premium mainly comes from variation in long-term risk.
Together with the observation that the equity term structure is downward sloping, the
counter-cyclical term structure represents a puzzle for existing macro-finance models. I
show theoretically that the canonical models are not able to reproduce both facts, and as
a response I introduce a new model that can. Finally, I show empirically and theoretically
that the cyclicality of the equity term structure is linked to the cylicality in real investments:
in bad times where the equity term structure is upward sloping, long-maturity firms invest
less than short-maturity firms.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I introduces a model of the equity term struc-
ture with implications for firm investment. Section II describes data sources. Section III
documents the counter-cyclical equity term structure. Section IV tests the expectation hy-
pothesis. Section V studies real consequences of the equity term structure. Section VI
studies calibrations of several canonical asset pricing models individually as well as my
model introduced in section II. Section VII concludes.
1 Motivating Theory
In this section, I introduce a simple extension of the model of the equity term structure by
Lettau and Wachter (2007). In the special case of the original Lettau and Wachter model,
I show that there is a link between the sign and cyclicality of the term premium in the
sense that term premia are either positive on average and counter-cyclical or negative on
average and pro-cyclical (Proposition 1.a). In the more general version of the model, one
can capture the empirical regularities that I uncover, that is, one can have term premia that
are negative on average and counter-cyclical (Proposition 1.b). Finally, I study the link
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between the equity term structure and the investment decisions of individual firms, finding
that long-maturity firms use less capital to labor when the equity term structure is more
upward sloping (Proposition 2).
1.1 Model
The economy has an aggregate equity claim with dividends at time t denoted by Dt, where
dt = ln(Dt) evolves as
 dt+1 = µg + zt +  d✏d,t+1 (1.1)
Here µg 2 R is the unconditional mean dividend growth and zt drives the conditional mean:
zt+1 = 'zzt +  z✏z,t+1 (1.2)
where 0 < 'z < 1. Further, ✏d,t+1 and ✏z,t+1 are normally distributed mean-zero shocks with
unit variance and  d,  z are their volatilities.
The risk-free rate rf is constant and the stochastic discount factor is given by
Mt+1 = exp
✓
 rf   1
2
x2t   xt✏d,t+1   a
✓
1
2
a+ xt⇢dx + ✏x,t+1
◆◆
(1.3)
where a 2 R and the state variable xt drives the price of risk:
xt+1 = (1  'x)x¯+ 'xxt +  x✏x,t+1 (1.4)
The parameter x¯ 2 R+ is the long-run average, 0 < 'x < 1, and ✏x,t+1 is a normally
distributed mean-zero shock with unit variance and  x is the volatility. The three shocks
have correlations denoted ⇢dx, ⇢dz, and ⇢zx, where ⇢zx = 0, ⇢dx x  'x, and ⇢dz z <
 d(1 'z). The first assumption is also made by Lettau and Wachter (2007) and the latter
two hold in their empirical calibration.
To understand the intution behind the stochastic discount factor, consider first the case
where a = 0 as in Lettau and Wachter (2007). In this case, investors are averse towards
shocks to dividends, ✏d,t+1. A negative shock to dividends increases the marginal utility and
thus increases the value of the stochastic discount factor. The e↵ect of a given shock on the
stochastic discount factor depends on the price-of-risk variable xt, which in this sense can
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be interpreted as a risk aversion variable. In addition, shocks to the price of risk and the
conditional growth rate zt are only priced to the extent that they are correlated with the
dividend shock, which is consistent with, for instance, the habit model.
In the more general case where a 6= 0, the price-of-risk shock is priced even if it is
uncorrelated with the dividend shock. If, for instance, a < 0, investors are averse towards
increases in the price of risk. The intuition behind such a specification is that an increase
in the price of risk causes a capital loss today, which increases marginal utility. The shock
to the price of risk is scaled by a and not by the price of risk, meaning that the aversion
towards the price-of-risk shocks are constant over time.5
1.2 Equity Term Premia and Their Cyclicality
The analysis is centered around the prices and returns on n-maturity dividend claims.
The price of an n-maturity claim at time t is denoted P nt and the log-price is denoted
pnt = ln(P
n
t ). Since an n-maturity claim becomes and n  1 maturity claim next period, we
have the following relation for prices:
P nt = Et
⇥
Mt+1P
n 1
t+1
⇤
(1.5)
with boundary condition P 0t = Dt because the dividend is paid out at maturity. To solve
the model, I conjecture and verify that the price dividend ratio is log-linear in the state
variables zt and xt:
P nt
Dt
= exp (An +Bnz zt +B
n
xxt) (1.6)
5These dynamics are reminiscent of the long-run risk model. In the long-run risk model, the counterpart
to xt is the conditional variance of cash flow shocks; and in the long-run risk model’s stochastic discount
factor, shocks to cash flows are scaled by this conditional variance but shocks to the conditional variance
are scaled by a constant. In the long-run risk model, the shocks to the conditional mean growth rate of
dividends also enter the stochastic discount factor, scaled by the conditional variance. For simplicity, I do
not include the shock to the conditional growth rate in the stochastic discount factor, but as long as the
shock is positively correlated with the dividend shock, the terms in the expected returns on equity, which
is presented later, remain largely the same. Despite the discrepancy between the stochastic discount factor
in the long-run risk model and this paper, the cyclicality of the term-structure is similar to the models that
have a = 0 because investors are averse to all shocks in the model (i.e. a < 0).
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The price dividend ratio can then be written as
P nt
Dt
= Et

Mt+1
Dt+1
Dt
P n 1t+1
Dt+1
 
= Et

Mt+1
Dt+1
Dt
exp
 
An 1 +Bn 1z zt+1 +B
n 1
x xt+1
  
(1.7)
Matching coe cients of (1.6) and (1.7), using (1.1) and (1.4), gives
An = An 1   rf + µg   a⇢dx d +Bn 1x ((1  'x)x¯  a x) +
1
2
V n 1
Bnx = B
n 1
x ('x   ⇢dx x)   d +Bn 1z ⇢dz z
Bnz =
1  (')nz
1  'z
where B0x = 0, A
0 = 0, and
V n 1 = var
 
 d✏d,t+1 +B
n 1
z  z✏z,t+1 +B
n 1
x  x✏x,t+1
 
,
which provides the solution to the model and verifies the conjecture.
The term Bnz is positive for all values of n > 0, meaning that the price increases relative
to dividends when the expected growth rate of dividends increases. Similarly, Bnx is negative
for all values of n > 0, meaning that the price relative to dividends decrease when the price
of risk is higher.
The simple return on the n maturity claim is denoted Rnt+1 = P
n 1
t+1 /P
n
t   1 and the
log-return is rnt+1 = ln
 
1 +Rnt+1
 
. The expected excess return is
Et
⇥
rnt+1   rf
⇤
+
1
2
vart(r
n
t+1) (1.8)
=  covt(rnt+1;mt+1) (1.9)
=( d +B
n 1
x ⇢dx x +B
n 1
z ⇢dz z)xt + a
 
⇢dx d +B
n 1
x  x
 
(1.10)
The n-vs-1 term premium, ✓n,1t , is defined as the di↵erence in expected return between
the n- and the 1-period claim:
✓n,1t = Et[r
n
t+1] +
1
2
vart(r
n
t+1)  Et[r1t+1] 
1
2
vart(r
1
t+1), (1.11)
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Using (1.10), we see that
✓n,1t = aB
n 1
x  x + (B
n 1
x ⇢dx x +B
n 1
z ⇢dz z)xt (1.12)
which shows how the equity term premium arises. The term premium arises because the
short- and the long-maturity claims are di↵erently exposed to shocks to the price of risk
and to the conditional growth rate. These two channels are summarized by Bn 1x and B
n 1
z
in expression (1.12), as these govern how much more the long-maturity claim loads on these
shocks relative to the short-maturity claim. The impact of these two channels on the term
premium depends on assumptions about how the shocks covary with the dividend shock.
Having defined equity term premia and discussed how they arise, I next address how
they vary over time. The following Proposition summarizes their cyclicality:
Proposition 1 (cyclicality of equity term premia).
(a) For a = 0, positive term premia are counter-cyclical and negative term premia are pro-
cyclical. More precisely, the average sign of the term premium is the same as the sign of
minus the covariance between the term premium and the price dividend ratio of the market
portfolio:
sign
 
E[✓n,1t ]
 
= sign
 
cov(dt   pt; ✓n,1t )
 
(b) There exist values of a 6= 0 such that
sign
 
E[✓n,1t ]
  6= sign  cov(dt   pt; ✓n,1t ) 
meaning that the cyclicality of the term premium is not determined by its average sign.
Proof is in the appendix.
When a = 0, the cyclicality of the term premium is given by the sign of the average
premium (Proposition 1.a). To understand why, note that the term premium arises as a
result of the di↵erent exposures of short- and long-maturity firms to the price-of-risk shock
and the conditional-growth-rate shock. Because the size of these shocks are constant over
time, the time variation in the premium is determined by the time variation in the aversion
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towards these shocks, which is summarized by the price-of-risk variable xt. When this
aversion increases, as it does in bad times, the size of the term premium is amplified. A
negative term premium thus becomes more negative; a positive term premium becomes more
positive. The assumption a = 0 captures much of the dynamics of standard asset pricing
models and Proposition 1.a can therefore help us understand why none of the canonical
asset pricing models can generate term premia that are both negative and counter-cyclical.
In the more general version of the model where a 6= 0, the average sign of the term
premium no longer determines the premium’s cyclicality (Proposition 1.b). The important
di↵erence relative to the scenario where a = 0 is that the price-of-risk shock now also
influences the term premium by the constant a. If a is su ciently large, the price-of-
risk shocks dominates the average term premium. However, the cyclicality of the term
premium is still driven by the aversion towards the shocks to both the price of risk and
the conditional growth rate. If the conditional-growth-rate shocks dominate the price-of-
risk shocks, the cyclicality is thus driven by the aversion towards the conditional-growth-
rate shocks.6 Accordingly, the average term premium might reflect the aversion towards
the price-of-risk shock, while the cyclicality reflects the aversion towards the conditional-
growth-rate shock, and the average and the cyclicality are therefore no longer mechanically
linked.
To see this result on a more mechanical level, note that the premium in (1.12) is in-
fluenced by a, but that variation in prices of the dividends are not. Accordingly, a does
not influence the covariance between the term premium and the dividend price ratio of the
dividends:
cov(dt   pnt ; ✓n,1t ) =  Bnx(Bn 1x ⇢dx x +Bn 1z ⇢dz z)var(xt) (1.13)
Accordingly, by changing a one influences the average sign of the term premium but not
its cyclicality. In the last section of the paper, I calibrate a model with a > 0 that has
negative and counter-cyclical term premia and as such addresses the puzzle documented in
this paper. In addition, the model is also able to match the equity premium and other asset
pricing moments such as the time variation in the dividend price ratio.
6Or, if the price-of-risk shock is uncorrelated with the dividend shock, the cyclicality is driven only by
the conditional-growth-rate shock.
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1.3 Equity Term Premia and Real Investments
I next analyze how the variation in equity term premia influences the investment of firms
with di↵erent cash-flow maturities. A firm of type n produces claims to dividends with
maturity n by using labor Lnt and capital K
n
t according to the following production function
F (Knt , L
n
t ) = b⇥ (Lnt )↵(Knt )  (1.14)
where (↵,  ) 2 {x 2 R2+|x1 + x2 < 1} are the output elasticities of labor and capital and b
is the total factor productivity. The firm uses one period to produce the claim which can
be thought of as a patent that allows one to get the n-maturity dividends at time t + n.
Specifically, at time t + 1 the firm is done producing F (Knt , L
n
t ) patents, which yield a
dividend at time t+ n equal to F (Knt , L
n
t )Dt+n/Dt+1 (i.e. the dividend growth is the same
as the rest of the economy). The firm maximizes the present value of profits given labor
cost w and cost of renting capital Et[Rnt+1]:
max
Knt ,L
n
t
Et

Mt+1
P n 1t+1
Dt+1
Ft(K
n
t , L
n
t )
 
  wLnt   Et[Rnt+1]Knt (1.15)
The first order conditions for capital and labor are
Et

Mt+1
P n 1t+1
Dt+1
 
b (Lnt )
↵(Knt )
  1 = Et[Rnt+1] (1.16)
Et

Mt+1
P n 1t+1
Dt+1
 
b↵(Lnt )
↵ 1(Knt )
  = w (1.17)
The following Proposition shows the variation in capital choice for short- and long-
maturity firms, where the capital to labor ratio is defined as knt = K
n
t /L
n
t . I also define
n > m.
Proposition 2 (capital choice and the equity term structure).
(a) The term premium determines the di↵erence between the capital-to-labor ratios of long-
vs short-maturity firms
ln(knt )  ln(kmt ) =  
 
lnEt[R
n
t+1]  lnEt[Rmt+1]
 
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(b) The di↵erence in capital between an n and a one-period firm is given by (suppressing
constants)
ln(Knt )  ln(K1t ) =
1
1  ↵   
✓
(Bnz B1z )zt + (Bnx   B1x)xt
+ (↵  1)  lnEt[Rnt+1]  lnEt[Rmt+1] ◆
Proof is in the appendix.
As seen in Proposition 2.a, long-maturity firms increase their capital to labor ratio
relative to short-maturity firms when the term premium decreases because capital becomes
relatively cheaper. Accordingly, time variation in this di↵erence in the capital to labor ratio
is given by the time variation in the equity term premium: if the equity term premium is
counter-cyclical, the capital to labor ratio for long-maturity firms relative to the ratio for
short-maturity firms is pro-cyclical.
The term premium also influences the time variation in the total amount of capital ap-
plied by long-maturity firms relative to short-maturity firms. As seen in Proposition 2.b,
long-maturity firms use more capital when the term premium is lower because capital is rel-
atively cheaper. In addition, long-maturity firms also use more capital when the conditional
dividend growth rate, zt, is high or the price of risk, xt, is low. The long-maturity firms
increase capital based on these state variables because the high growth rate and low price of
risk increases the present value of producing the dividend claim, thereby incentivizing the
long-maturity firms to produce more by allocating more capital and labor to the production.
If the term premium is counter-cyclical, long-maturity firms thus use less capital relative
to short-maturity firms in bad times because the relative cost of capital increases and the
relative present value of dividends drops.
2 Data and Methodology
I use a range of di↵erent data sources for the empirical analysis:
Dividend futures: The main data source for the equity term structure is dividend
futures. I use proprietary data from a major investment bank for S&P 500, Nikkei 225,
FTSE 100, and Euro Stoxx 50. The prices are daily prices on dividend claims that are
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tied to the calendar year. The payo↵ on the contract is the declared dividends that go
ex-dividend during the given calendar year. The contracts are forward contracts, meaning
everything is settled at the expiration date. For example, on February 11th 2011, the 2013
forward contract for S&P 500 trades at $31. In this contract, the buyer agrees to pay the
seller $31 by the end of December 2013, and the seller agrees to pay the buyer the sum of the
dividends that have gone ex-dividend between January 1st 2013 and the end of December
2013.
Because the expiration dates of the contracts are fixed in calendar time, the maturity
of the available contracts varies over the calendar year. To get constant maturity prices I
thus interpolate across the prices of di↵erent contracts each month, following the norm in
the literature on dividend futures prices (see e.g. Binsbergen, Hueskes, Koijen, and Vrugt
(2013); Binsbergen and Koijen (2017); Cejnek and Randl (2016b,a)).
Option implied equity term premium: Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2012)
make their estimated time series of dividend prices and returns available online. The divi-
dend prices are for the S&P 500 and the sample runs from 1996-2009. Binsbergen, Brandt,
and Koijen (2012) estimate both the return to buying next year’s dividends and the return
to buying the dividend two years ahead, which they call the dividend steepener. The first
strategy’s returns are based on the collected dividends whereas the second strategy’s returns
are pure capital gains. Because dividend returns and capital gains are taxed di↵erently, I
use the dividend steepener because these returns are more easily compared to the returns
to the market portfolio and to the returns in the remainder of the paper (see Schulz (2016)
for an analysis of the impact of taxes on the returns to dividends).
Cross-section of equity: Stock returns are from the union of CRSP and the Xpress-
Feed Global Database. For companies traded in multiple markets, I use the primary trading
vehicle identified by XpressFeed. Fundamentals are from the XpressFeed Global Database. I
consider standard characteristics that may be related to the duration of cash-flow. I measure
book-to-market, profitability, and investment following Fama and French (2015). Portfolio
breakpoints are calculated each June using the most recent characteristics starting from
the end of the previous year. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each calendar month.
Portfolio breakpoints are based on NYSE firms and returns are equal-weighted.
Dividends: The dividends for the S&P 500 index are from Shiller’s webpage. For the
international indexes, I get dividends from Bloomberg. I measure dividends as the running
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annual dividends instead of end of year dividends. I do so to avoid omitting easily available
information about the final annual dividends.
Returns: I measure equity term premia in log-returns to mitigate measurement error
issues, as advocated by Boguth, Carlson, Fisher, and Simutin (2012). In addition, the
expectations hypothesis makes assumptions about log-returns, and using log-returns in the
entire analysis thereby ensures consistency. The results are not sensitive to this choice.
3 Counter-Cyclical Term Premia: A New Stylized Fact
In this section, I document that equity term premia are counter-cyclical. I first show this
using the full sample of dividend futures. I afterwards document the robustness using other
sample periods, other measures of cyclicality, and other measures of equity term premia.
I study the cyclicality of equity term premia by regressing the realized return di↵erence
between long- and short-maturity equity on the ex ante dividend price ratio. That is, for
each index, I run the following regression for di↵erent maturity pairs n and m, where n > m:
rnt,t+12   rmt,t+12 =  n,m0 +  n,m1 (dt   pt) + ✏t,t+12 (1.18)
where rnt,t+12 is the log-return on the n maturity claim between period t and t+12, and dt pt
is the log of the dividend price ratio of the index at time t. The regression is implemented
on the monthly level using rolling one-year log returns.7 Accordingly, I use Newey-West
standard errors corrected for 18 lags.
Panel A in Table 2 shows the estimates of  n,m1 for the S&P 500. The parameter estimates
are positive for all maturity pairs. The positive parameter estimates suggest that term
premia are larger when the dividend price ratio is high, which is to say that the term
premia are counter-cyclical. The estimates are highly significant for low n and m but the
significance becomes weaker as n and m increases.
The estimates of  n,m1 are large in magnitude. Consider for instance the premium of the
five-year claim in excess of the two-year claim. The loading on the dividend price ratio is
around 0.2, suggesting that the term premium increases by 20 percentage points annually
7Throughout the analysis I work with rolling annual returns. Working with an annual horizon allows me
to calculate realized Sharpe ratios and easily compare with the results on the expectations hypothesis. The
results are similar when using quarterly horizon (Table A2), but the statistical significance is lower partly
because of noise in the dividend futures data.
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when the log dividend price ratio increases with 1. In the sample, the log dividend price ratio
varies by 0.6, implying that this one-year term premium varies by more than 12 percentage
points over the sample.
The results in the international sample are similar to those in the U.S.. Across almost all
indexes and maturity pairs, the parameter estimates are positive. The exception is the long
premium in excess of the three-year claim for FTSE 100 and Euro Stoxx 50; the estimate
for these term premia are negative.
In the rightmost column, I include the market portfolio as the long-maturity claim.
Because the return to the market portfolio is not a futures contract, I must correct for the
e↵ect of interest rates. Following Binsbergen and Koijen (2017), I subtract from the market
portfolio the 30 year bond return over the same period. Across the four indexes, the term
premia that have the market as the long-maturity claim are all counter-cyclical, except for
the term premium in excess of the three year claim for Euro Stoxx 50. The statistical
significance is highest in the U.S. and highest at low m.
Together, the results provide both statistically and economically significant evidence
that equity term premia are counter-cyclical. Given that equity term premia are negative
on average (Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen, 2012; Binsbergen and Koijen, 2017), the results
thus reject a large class of model (see Proposition 1.a and Section VI).
I consider several robustness checks. First, one possible concern is that the results are
driven by the financial crisis during which prices on dividends may have deviated from
fundamentals. To address this concern, I run the regression again, excluding observations
starting in 2008 and 2009. Table 3 reports these results. The parameter estimates are still
positive, and they are generally larger and more statistically significant, underlining that
the results are not driven by the financial crisis.
Another way to see that the results are not driven by the financial crisis is by considering
the time series of the term premium and the dividend price ratio in Figure 4. The figure
shows on each date the dividend price ratio and the future realized return di↵erence between
long- and short-maturity claims. Consider for instance Euro Stoxx 50 in Panel C. As can
be seen on its dividend price ratio, the Euro Stoxx 50 goes through two crises: the financial
crisis in 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis in 2011. In both instances, the term premium
increases substantially. The results are similar for Nikkei 225 and FTSE 100, both of which
also see an increase in the dividend price ratio around 2011. Finally, Panel A shows the
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S&P 500, for which the time series goes all the way back to 1996. The figure shows that
the term premium also tracked the dividend price ratio through the tech bubble and the
subsequent recession, again underlining the generality of the counter-cyclical term premium.
The pre-2005 S&P 500 results are based on implied dividend prices from options, which I
analyze in depth in Section 3.1.
I next test the cyclicality of the equity term premia using the cay measure (Lettau
and Ludvigson, 2001a) instead to ensure that the cyclicality is not driven by the choice
of conditioning variable. The results, reported in Table 4, are similar: the term premia
are highly counter cyclical. The cylicality is slightly weaker in the sample excluding the
financial crisis, but term premia remain counter-cyclical.
Binsbergen and Koijen (2017) document that both expected returns and Sharpe ratios
on equity claims are downward sloping in maturity. In a similar spirit, I study how the
Sharpe ratios of the term premia vary over time. To this end, I calculate the time-varying
realized variance using 12 months of monthly returns and use it to estimate realized Sharpe
ratios as:8
SRn,mt,t+12 =
rnt,t+12   rmt,t+12
vart(r
n m
t,t+12)
=
rnt,t+12   rmt,t+12q
1
12 1
P12
i=1
 
(rnt+i   rmt+i)  (r¯nt,t+12   r¯mt,t+12)
 2 (1.19)
I next regress the Sharpe ratio on the ex ante dividend price ratio to estimate the
cyclicality. The results of this regression are reported in Table 5. For the S&P 500 in Panel
A, the term premia are all counter-cyclical. The cyclicality is statistically significant for
almost all maturity pairs, but the statistical significance decreases as m increases. Panels B
through D of Table 5 report similar results for the international indexes: the Sharpe ratios
are generally counter-cyclical, and the e↵ect is strongest for the term premia with low m.
The exception is the Sharpe ratios of term premia measured in excess of the three-year claim
for Euro Stoxx 50 and FTSE 100; these parameter coe cients are negative but statistically
insignificant.
The counter-cyclical Sharpe ratios are consistent with the model covered earlier. In the
model, changes in the term premium come from changes in the price of risk and not from
changes in volatility. Accordingly, we would expect higher term premia to be associated
with higher Sharpe ratios, which is indeed what Table 5 suggests.
8These are not technically Sharpe ratios because they are based on log-returns to ensure consistency
with the rest of the paper. The results are, however, similar when using simple returns.
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For additional robustness, I next confirm that my results are similar when using other
measures of equity term premia over other sample periods. In particular, I estimate the
equity term premium by using implied dividend prices from Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen
(2012) and by using the cross-section of stock returns. Neither of these measures are as direct
as the dividend futures, but using them allows me to consider a sample that goes as far back
as 1964.
3.1 The Equity Term Premium Implied from Options Prices
Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2012) use options prices to estimate the present value of
future dividends. The intuition behind their method is simple. When you buy the index
you get next year’s dividends plus next year’s resale price. By going short a call option
and buying a put option you can hedge the resale price such that you are certain only to
get next year’s dividends. The price of buying the stock and hedging the resale price thus
reflects the price of the dividends.
To measure the equity term premium, I compare the return to these implied dividends
with the return to the market portfolio. To measure the cyclicality, I again regress the
rolling one-year realized return di↵erence between long- and short-maturity claims onto the
ex ante dividend price ratio.
The results are shown in the first two columns of Table 6. The term premium estimated
from options prices is highly counter-cyclical. The realize return di↵erence has a loading of
1 on the dividend price ratio, which is approximately twice as large as the loadings in Table
2 that are based on the dividend futures. The results thus support the notion that term
premia are highly counter-cyclical.
The second column shows that the results are robust to controlling for the five Fama and
French (2015) factors as well as the yield spread and the short yield. Because the returns
used in this regression are spot returns and not future returns, I include the treasury yield
spread and the treasury short yield to control for potential interest rate e↵ects.
3.2 The Equity Term Premium Implied from the Cross-Section of Equities
I next use the cross-section of equities to study the cyclicality of the term premium. I
first identify a portfolio that mimicks the equity term premium that I observe in the 1996-
2015 sample. I then study the cyclicality of this portfolio in the full sample running from
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1964 to 2015. Consistent with the previous results, I find that the mimicking portfolio has
counter-cyclical abnormal returns.
I use 30 characteristics-sorted portfolios as the foundation of the mimicking portfolio.
I use characteristics-sorted portfolios rather than individual equities because the duration
of characteristics-sorted portfolios is more stable than the duration of individual stocks.9 I
use ten portfolios sorted on book-to-market, ten portfolios sorted on profitability, and ten
portfolios sorted on investment. The portfolios are based on NYSE breakpoints and returns
are equal-weighted.
To construct the mimicking portfolio, I first project the equity term premium onto the
30 characteristics-sorted portfolios. I do so by regressing the monthly excess return to these
portfolios onto the equity term premium between 1996 and 2015. Before 2005 I use option
implied dividend returns, from 2005 to 2009 I use the average of the option implied dividend
returns and the dividend futures returns, and after 2009 I use the dividend futures returns.10
I then use these betas to construct the mimicking portfolio. For each style (e.g. book-
to-market), I rank the ten portfolios based on the term premium betas. I assign the two
portfolios with highest betas to the long-duration portfolio and I assign the two portfolios
with the lowest betas to the short-duration portfolio. I then equal weight the six low-beta
portfolios into a short-duration portfolio and I equal weight the six high-beta portfolios into
a long-duration portfolio. The mimicking portfolio is then long the long-duration portfolio
and short the short-duration portfolio.
The term premium betas generally line up with expectations. For instance, the litera-
ture argues that value stocks have short cash-flow maturity, and, consistent with this, I find
that value stocks have low term premium betas and growth stocks have high term premium
betas.11 I also find that term premium betas are decreasing in profitability and increasing in
investment. The term premium betas are, however, not linearly correlated with character-
istics. For instance, the portfolio with highest book-to-market does not have a particularly
low term premium beta, which suggests that the characteristics pick up other signals than
only duration.
9Indeed, over the life-cycle, stocks may start as growth stocks with long cash flow duration and evolve
into value stocks with short cash flows duration.
10I use the (mkt, 2) premia as the monthly term premium because this term premium is available both
for dividend futures and option implied dividend prices.
11It is worth noting, however, that a long cash-flow maturity does not mean that the term premium beta
must be high (for instance, Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008) find that short-maturity value stocks behave like
long-maturity claims in the sense that they load highly on long-run consumption shocks).
19
Table 6 reports results on cyclicality of the mimicking portfolio. The third column
reports results from a regression of the mimicking portfolio on the ex ante dividend price
ratio. The parameter estimate is positive, suggesting that the returns to the mimicking
portfolio are counter-cyclical. The e↵ect is, however, statistically insignificant.
In the fourth column, I augment the regression with a series of controls. I control for
the five Fama and French (2015) factors, the one-year treasury yield, and the treasury yield
spread. I control for the five Fama and French factors to ensure that I do not pick up well-
documented cyclicality to one of the other factors. For instance, the mimicking portfolio
has a positive beta, and since the market returns are counter-cyclical, one might worry
that the counter-cyclical returns simply come from this positive beta. Controlling for the
market, and the other factors, mitigates such concerns.12 Because the returns are spot and
not forward returns, I also include the treasury yield spread and the short treasury yield to
control for potential interest rate e↵ects.
As can be seen in the fourth column, the returns to the mimicking portfolio remain
counter-cyclical even after including the controls. Including the controls mainly decrease
the standard error of the parameter estimate on the dividend price ratio. Accordingly, the
parameter estimate is now statistically significant with a t-statistic of 3.67. The parameter
estimate is, however, an order of magnitude smaller than when using the equity term pre-
mium from options (also Table 6) or when using the dividend futures (Table 2). One reason
for this could be that the actual maturity of the short-maturity firms are not as short as the
short-maturity claims in Table 2. Indeed, the average firm has a maturity above 20 years,
which is substantially higher than the maturities of the dividends futures.
In the fifth and sixth columns, I separate the sample into two parts: before and after
1996. Recall that the mimicking portfolio is identified in the 1996-2015 sample, so the returns
should be counter-cyclical in this sample almost by construction because the term premium
it mimicks is counter-cyclical. As can be seen in the fifth column, the term premium is
indeed counter-cyclical in this sample. More interestingly, the mimicking portfolio is also
counter-cyclical in the pre 1996 sample. As can be seen in the sixth column, the parameter
estimate on the dividend price ratio is the same in the early sample as it is in the full sample,
12Yogo (2006) for instance argues that the value premium can be explained by cyclical properties that
are unrelated to duration and the equity term premium. In addition, Asness, Liew, Pedersen, and Thapar
(2017) argue that the time-variation in the value premium mostly comes from potentially behavioral drivers,
which are also unrelated to duration. More generally, Gormsen and Greenwood (2017) document that most
risk factors related to fundamentals have counter-cyclical returns.
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although the statistical significance is only around half.
3.3 Measurement Error Concerns
The research on the equity term structure is based on prices of either option implied div-
idends or dividend futures, which one might worry are measured with error. One con-
cern in this regard is that potential measurement error will bias returns upwards, as ar-
gued by Blume and Stambaugh (1983): when computing returns, one divides end-of-period
price with beginning-of-period price, and if there is white noise measurement error in the
beginning-of-period price, then the average returns will be biased upwards because the in-
verse of the price is convex over positive prices. This potential upward bias is a serious
concern when working with option implied dividend prices (se e.g. Boguth, Carlson, Fisher,
and Simutin (2012)).13 One-month returns on option implied dividends are indeed highly
volatile and have negative autocorrelation, which suggest that there might be measurement
error in prices.
Such measurement error does, however, not influence the main results in this paper.
Indeed, while measurement error influence average returns, they do not influence the co-
variance with the dividend price ratio. The parameter estimate on the dividend price ratio
is thus unbiased, even when working with noisy data.14 A second advantage of the method
in this paper is related to inference in the relatively short time-series of available data. As
pointed out by Merton (1980), estimating average returns requires longer horizons than es-
timating covariances. The reason is that dividing the sample into shorter parts increases the
precision of the estimate of covariances while it generally does not improve the estimate of
the average returns. However, this advantage of estimating covariances only partly applies,
because one of the variables, the dividend price ratio, is quite persistent, thereby making
estimating the covariance more like estimating a mean.
13Schulz (2016) and Song (2016) also underline potential tax and microstructure issues related to the
option implied dividend prices.
14To see this, consider a normally distributed measurement error " ⇠ N(µ, ") in returns such that the
observed returns rˆt is equal to the true return rt plus the measurement error. Assuming the dividend price
ratio for the market portfolio is observed correctly, the observed parameter estimate is thus
 ˆ =
cov(rt+1 + ✏t+1; dt   pt)
var(dt   pt) (1.20)
=   +
cov(✏t+1; dt   pt)
var(dt   pt) =   (1.21)
where   is the true parameter coe cient in regression (1.18).
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Finally, the methodology in this paper potentially produces a Stambaugh bias. Stam-
baugh (1999) shows that regression coe cients are upwards biased when one predicts returns
with a persistent predictor that has innovations that are negatively correlated with realized
returns. The Stambaugh bias is, however, not as serious in the regressions in this paper as in
usual predictive regressions for two reasons. First, realized return di↵erences between long-
and short-maturity claims are not as strongly linked to innovations in the dividend yield as
the realizations of the market portfolio are, because the equity term premia are both long
and short an equity claim. Second, the dividend price ratio is much less persistent in this
sample compared to the full 1930-2017 U.S. sample.15 Accordingly, I find that the biases
are insu ciently small to significantly alter the inference. For the results reported in Table
2, the bias is around 20 percent for m = 1 and it quickly decays to a few percent for m = 3
(see Table A4).
4 The Expectations Hypothesis
I next address how the counter-cyclical term premia influence the relation between the equity
yield curve and the future development of equity yields. The benchmark for this relation
is the expectations hypothesis. The expectations hypothesis is that equity term premia
are constant, and that the future development of yields therefore can be inferred from the
equity yield curve. The expectations hypothesis is rejected given that term premia exhibit
cyclical variation. However, by studying the expectations hypothesis we can learn how the
counter-cyclical equity term premium influences the relation between the equity yield curve
and the expected development in yields, and we can learn how term premia are related to
the equity yield curve.
4.1 Defining Equity Yields and the Expectations Hypothesis
I define the time t equity yield ent for maturity n as the di↵erence between log-dividends dt
at time t and the log-forward price, fnt , of the time t+n dividends:
ent =
1
n
(dt   fnt ) (1.22)
15Of course, a persistent process always looks less persistent in a subsample than in the full sample
(Kendall, 1954). However, the dividend price ratio is less persistent in this subsample even when compared
to the full sample mean.
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where n is the maturity of the dividend claim.
To understand the information content in equity yields, note that equity yields can be
written as the average of future returns and future growth rates:
ent =
1
n
(dt   fnt ) =
1
n
nX
i=1
rn+1 it+i  
1
n
nX
i=1
gt+i (1.23)
where gt+1 is the log growth rate on dividends between period t and t + 1. I do not em-
pirically decompose the equity yields into expected growth rates and returns. It is possible
to test the expectations hypothesis and study its implications for equity term premia with-
out decomposing yields into growth rates and returns, and I prefer to do so to avoid the
uncertainty arising from such an empirical decomposition.
To motivate the expectations hypothesis, note that the yield of an n maturity claim can
be decomposed into future short yields and future term premia by rewriting (1.23):
ent =
1
n
n 1X
i=0
Et
⇥
e1t+i
⇤
+
1
n
n 1X
i=0
Et
⇥
rn it+1+i   r1t+1+i
⇤
(1.24)
The expression in (1.24) underlines the intuition in the expectations hypothesis: if term
premia are constant, the variation in the long yield only comes from variation in the expected
future short yields, and the long yield therefore summarizes these expectations. Before pre-
senting the next Proposition that summarizes the testable implications of the expectations
hypothesis, I define the equity yield spread sn,mt = e
n
t   emt .
Proposition 3 (The expectations hypothesis).
If equity term premia are constant, i.e. there exist constants cn,m such that Et[rnt+1]  
Et[rmt+1] = c
n,m for all m,n, then the following holds:
(a) The regression coe cient is  n,m1 = 1 in
en mt+m   ent =  n,m0 +  n,m1 sn,mt
m
n m + ✏t+m (1.25)
(b) The regression coe cient is  n,m1 = 1 in
k 1X
i=1
✓
1  i
n
◆
(emt+im   emt+(i 1)m) =  n,m0 +  n,m1 sn,mt + ⌘t+n (1.26)
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The expression in (1.25) specifies the relation between the yield spread and the development
in the yield of the long-maturity claim. The expression suggests that when the yield spread is
higher than usual, the yield on the long-maturity claim must increase over the lifetime of the
short-maturity claim. The intuition behind this relation is simple: under the expectations
hypothesis, the long and the short yields are the same period by period (up to a constant),
so the relatively high long yield must come from the fact the long yield is expected to be
high in the future, after the short yield has matured.
The expression in (1.26) specifies the relation between the yield spread and future changes
in the short yield. The expression suggests that when the yield spread is higher than usual,
the weighted average of future changes in the short yield must be positive as well. The
intuition behind this relation follows from the relation above: when the yield spread is
positive, the yield on the long-maturity claim is expected to go up, but the long-maturity
claim eventually becomes a short-maturity claim, and the short yield must therefore also
increase.
4.2 Testing the Expectations Hypothesis
Before formally testing the expectations hypothesis, it is constructive to visualize the time
variation in equity yields. Figure 6 plots the time-series of equity yields with di↵erent
maturities for the S&P 500, Nikkei 225, Euro Stoxx 50, and the FTSE 100. I consider the
two-, five-, and seven-year maturity claim.
The top left graph shows the results for S&P 500. From 2005 to the beginning of 2008,
the yield curve is upward sloping as the yield of the two-year claim is constantly below
the yield of the five-year claim which is constantly below the yield of the seven-year claim.
During 2008 and 2009 the yield curve flips and is downward sloping. Finally, from 2010 and
forward the yield curve is upwards sloping again.
The steeply downward sloping yield curve observed during the financial crisis can can
be interpreted in two ways: either yields were expected to come down or the term premium
was lower than usual. Under the expectations hypothesis, it must be the case that yields
were expected to go down because term premia are constant.
The graph does show a drop in yields following the crisis, consistent with the expectations
hypothesis. After the financial crisis, the yields on all maturities come down substantially
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from their high crisis levels. The yield curve thus suggests that investors to a large extent
expected the quick rebound in price levels that occurred after the financial crisis. More
generally, Figure 6 suggests that when the yield curve is upward sloping, yields subsequently
increase, and when the yield curve is downward sloping, yields subsequently decrease. This
relationship suggests that the expectations hypothesis has some validity: the yield curve
predicts changes in yields.
I next address the relation between the yield spread and the development in yields more
formally by testing the expressions in Proposition 3.a and 3.b. In 3.b, each observation lasts
for n years, whereas each observation only lasts for m years in 3.a. When studying the
spread between, for instance, an n = 7 and a m = 2 year claim, the regression in 3.b thus
requires that one disposes of seven years of observations whereas the regression in 3.a only
requires that one disposes of two years of observations. This fact makes the regression in
3.a better suited for the short sample of dividend futures.
Panel A of Table 7 presents the results from regression 3.a for the S&P 500. The first
row shows estimates of  n,m1 for m = 1. The parameter estimate is 1.00 at the short horizon
(n = 2) and it increases steadily to 1.5 at the long horizon. The parameter estimates are
all statistically indi↵erent from 1. The next rows show the parameter estimates for the
spread in excess of the two- and three-year yields. These are all above one and they are all
statistically significant at the five percent level, which is evidence against the expectations
hypothesis.
Panels B through D in Table 7 show the estimates of  n,m1 in the international samples.
For all three indexes, the estimates of  n,m1 tend to be bigger than one. The estimates
are generally statistically indi↵erent from one, but for all indexes, at least one estimate is
statistically di↵erent from one.
The positive gammas reported in Table 7 suggest that yields on long-maturity claims
move in the direction suggested by the yield curve, but the fact that the gammas are higher
than one suggests that the yields go up by more than the expectations hypothesis can justify.
In addition, the large gammas have direct implications for the relation between the yield
spread and term premia. To see this, note that the expression for yields in (1.23) can be
written as
rnt,t+m   rmt,t+m = m(ent   emt )  (n m)(en mt+m   ent ) (1.27)
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which inserted in (1.25) gives (suppressing constants):
Et[r
n
t,t+m   rmt.t+m]
1
m
= (1   ˆn,m1 )sn,mt (1.28)
From (1.28) it is evident that when  n,m1 is larger than one, the term premium is nega-
tively related to the yield spread. Accordingly, the high estimates of  n,m1 in Table 7 suggest
that a higher yield spread predicts lower equity term premia.
The negative relation between the yield spread and the term premium is a result of
the counter-cyclical term structure. Indeed, the yield curve is naturally pro-cyclical: in
bad times, yields are high and expected to mean-revert back down, and the yield curve is
therefore downward sloping (Binsbergen, Hueskes, Koijen, and Vrugt, 2013). The fact that
equity term premia are counter-cyclical and the yield curve is pro-cyclical implies that the
yield spread is negatively related to term premia.
While, as explained earlier, the regression in Proposition 3.a allows for the longest sam-
ple, it is also subject to bias in the presence of measurement error. For any given maturity,
the yield ent is on both the right and the left hand side but with di↵erent signs. When there
is measurement error in the yields, the parameter estimate  n,m1 is thus biased downwards
as shown by Stambaugh (1988). Because I calculate yields based on prices that are interpo-
lated across maturities, the yields are likely subject to at least some measurement error. It
is thus likely that the true  n,m1 are larger than the ones reported in the Table 7. I therefore
next consider the results of the regression in Proposition 3.b, which do not su↵er from this
bias.
Table 8 reports the parameter estimates  n,m1 from the regression in Proposition 3.b. For
the S&P 500 in Panel A, the parameter estimates are higher than 1 for all m and n except
one, and around half the estimates are statistically di↵erent from 1. The high estimates of
 n,m1 imply that future short yields increase when the yield spread is high, as dictated by
the expectations hypothesis. But the fact that the parameter estimates are higher than one
implies that the short yields increase by more than dictated by the expectations hypothesis.
Panels B to D of Table 8 report similar results in the international sample:  n,m1 is higher
than one and generally statistically significant. The exception is for Nikkei 225 in Panel B, as
the estimates do not provide evidence against the expectations hypothesis – the parameter
estimates are all close to one.
The results of the test of the expectations hypothesis are in direct contrast to the re-
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sults from the bond literature. For U.S. treasuries, Shiller (1979), Shiller, Campbell, and
Schoenholtz (1983), and Campbell and Shiller (1991) find  n,m1 to be negative in general.
Accordingly, for U.S. treasuries, a higher yield spread predicts a higher return on long-term
bonds in excess of the return on short-term bonds (see also Fama and Bliss (1987)). This
positive relationship between yields and excess returns is also seen elsewhere in the litera-
ture. Indeed, in most cases in asset pricing, low prices (that is, high yields) predict high
excess returns and not changes in fundamentals. Cochrane (2011) refers to this tendency as
a pervasive phenomenon: for the cross-section of stocks, the time-series of the stock indexes,
fixed income, currencies, and commodities, a low price predicts high relative returns.16
In conclusion, the counter-cyclical term structure causes the expectations hypothesis
to be rejected. More precisely, the counter-cyclical term structure causes the equity yield
curve to underestimate the future development in equity yields. For S&P 500, this e↵ect
is statistically significant for almost all maturity pairs n, m. In the international sample,
the statistical significance is weaker, but for all exchanges, the expectations hypothesis is
rejected for at least one maturity pair.
5 Real E↵ects: Cyclicality in the Relative Investments by Long-
and Short-Maturity Firms
In this section, I test if firm investments are related to the term structure of equity returns.
As shown in Proposition 2, the counter-cyclical term structure causes short-maturity firms
to employ more capital and higher capital-to-labor ratios in bad times. Consistent with this,
I find that, in bad times, short-duration firms have a higher capital-to-labor ratio, invest
more, and do more R&D than long-duration firms.
I analyze investment in the cross-section of stocks by using the short- and long-duration
portfolios constructed earlier in Section 3.2. I calculate di↵erent investment characteristics
for the short- and long-duration portfolio and analyze how they covary with the dividend
price ratio in the following regression:
X it = b0 + b1(dt   pt) + controls + et (1.29)
16For the time-series of the market portfolio see Fama and French (1988), for the cross-section of equities
see the literature on the value premium (Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Fama and French, 1992), for curren-
cies see Hansen and Hodrick (1980). Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) summarize evidence from
commodities, fixed income, currencies, and international stock indexes.
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where X it is the investment characteristic at time t, measured in cross-sectional percentiles.
I consider five di↵erent investment characteristics: (1) the capital to labor ratio; (2)
capital expenditures relative to the value of plant, property, and equipment; (3) change
in capital expenditure; (4) change in research and development costs; (5) change in total
salary expenses. I particularly focus on the capital to labor because the di↵erence between
in capital to labor between a short- and a long-duration firm is determined by the equity
term premium alone (Proposition 2.a).
Panel A in Table 9 presents the results on the capital to labor ratio. The first two
columns show the cyclicality of the capital-to-labor ratio of short- and long-duration firms.
Consistent with the short-duration firms having a relatively cheaper cost of capital, the
short-duration firms apply more capital to labor in bad times. Similarly, long-duration
firms apply less capital to labor in bad times. The third column considers the net capital
to labor ratio of the long-short portfolio. Consistent with Proposition 2.a, the long-short
portfolio applies less capital to labor in bad times, which is to say that the ratio is pro-
cyclical. In the fourth column, I control for the treasury yield, the treasury yield spread,
and a regression dummy. None of these are statistically significant on their own.
In the fifth and the sixth column I split the sample into pre and post 1996. The capital to
labor of the long-short portfolio is pro-cyclical in both samples. Recall that the mimicking
portfolio is estimated only based on the late sample. The use of the mimicking portfolio
in the early sample is thus based on the assumption that the term premium betas are
constant for the characteristics-based portfolios. The fact that the investment cyclicality
of the portfolio remains pro-cyclical in both samples brings confidence that his assumption
indeed holds and that the portfolio is indeed mimicking the term premium in both the late
and the early sample.
In addition, the sample split suggests that some of the cyclicality comes from a time-
series trend. Indeed, the parameter estimate on the dividend price ratio is larger in the
full sample than in either of the subsamples, suggesting that part of the large e↵ect in the
full sample comes from the fact that, over the sample, the dividend price ratio has trended
down and the capital to labor ratio has trended up. The trend is not too problematic if
it is a prolonged change in the equity term premium that has caused the capital to labor
ratio to increase. But to the extent that the trend reflects secular changes in production
technology, the results might overstate the e↵ect of the equity term premium on the capital
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to labor ratio.
One way to address this problem is by detrending the dividend price ratio and the
capital to labor ratio. I do so using either the HP filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) or
first di↵erences. The results of these regressions are reported in Panel B of Table 9. The
sign of all the parameter estimates remains the same, which means that the capital to labor
ratio for the long-short portfolio remains pro-cyclical. For the HP filter, the results remain
statistically significant on the five-percent level in the full sample and on the ten percent
level in the two subsamples. For the regression in first di↵erences, however, the parameter
estimate only appears to be statistically significant in the late sample from 1996-2015.
Panel C of Table 9 considers the cyclicality of two investment characteristics. The first
three columns show the cyclicality of the investment rate measured as capital expenditure to
property, plant, and equipment. Consistent with Proposition 2.b, the short duration firms
invest more in bad times and the long-duration firms invest less. The e↵ect is statistically
significant even after controlling for the treasury yields and a regression dummy. The fourth
to sixth column reports similar results when using the change in capital expenditure as
measure of investments: relative to the cross-sectional average, short-duration firms increase
their capital expenditure and long-duration firms decrease their capital expenditure.
Panel D of Table 9 considers two labor-related measures of real activity, namely the
change in R&D related salary and the change in total salary expenses. The cyclicality of
the R&D salary is di↵erent for long- and short-duration firms. Relative to the cross-sectional
average, short-duration firms increase their R&D related salaries and long-duration firms
decrease it. The fourth through sixth columns show that the change in total salary is not
strongly related to the duration of the firms, suggesting that much of the dynamics in the
capital to labor ratio comes from the capital side.
Taken together, the results show that the real activities of short- and long-duration
firms have di↵erent cyclical properties and that these properties are potentially driven by
the equity term structure. Indeed, the cyclical properties of the real activities are consistent
with Proposition 2 and with the idea that the equity term premium increases in bad times
and causes long-duration firms to apply less capital.
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6 Testing Asset Pricing Models: Theory vs. Stylized Facts
In this section, I relate my empirical findings to canonical asset pricing models individually.
I calculate, either analytically or through simulations, the parameters from the regressions
in the empirical analysis and compare these theoretical parameters to those observed em-
pirically.
The results are summarized in Table 10. The main challenge for the models is, as
mentioned, that they cannot produce an equity term premium that is both negative on
average and counter-cyclical. Rather, if the equity term premium is positive on average, it
is counter-cyclical; if the term premium is negative on average, it is pro-cyclical. In addition,
none of the models are able to get the test of the expectations hypothesis right: none of
them have parameter estimates that are higher than one. The parameter estimates are too
low because the equity term premia are positively related to the yield spread, not negatively
as in the data.
While much of the paper has focused on the qualitative results – that is, whether the
sign on the cyclicality is correct – the results in Table 10 highlight another problem for
the models: none of the models are quantitatively close to matching the observed time
variation. Indeed, the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) model and the Bansal and Yaron
(2004) model both have counter-cyclical slopes, but the cyclicality is not su ciently strong.
Empirically, the parameter estimates for the regression of the (Mkt, 2) premium on the
dividend price ratio,  Mkt,21 , is around 0.35. However, in the habit and the long-run risks
model, the estimate of  Mkt,21 is only around 0.1 and 0.03.
In the end of this section, I propose a model that addresses the main challenge to existing
models, but before doing so I address the canonical models individually.
6.1 The Habit Model by Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
In the habit model by Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the term structure arises because the
short- and long-maturity claims are di↵erently exposed to discount rate risk. In the habit
model, discount rate risk requires a premium because discount rate shocks are conditionally
perfectly negatively correlated with consumption. The negative correlation arises because
a negative shock to consumption increases risk aversion and therefore the required rate of
return.
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The dynamics of the habit model are largely captured by setting a = 0 in the model from
the theoretical section, meaning that Proposition 1.a applies to the model. Given the fact
that the term structure is upward sloping on average, it is therefore also counter-cyclical.
The economic intuition is that, in bad times, the higher price of risk causes investors to
increase the required compensation for the discount rate risk inherent in long-maturity
dividends, thereby making the term structure more upward sloping.
This economic intuition is confirmed in simulation studies. As can be seen in Table
10, the paramamter estimate for  Mkt,2 in simulation studies is 0.12. This estimate is
positive, as is the empirically observed value. While the parameter estimate is well below
the empirical estimate, it is still large in absolute terms. Indeed, the model is calibrated
to have a standard deviation of the dividend price ratio of 0.26, which means that a one
standard deviation change in the dividend price ratio changes the term premium by around
3 percentage points. Finally, the model has the wrong sign on the parameter estimates in
the expectations hypothesis. Both   and   are negative, which is evidence that equity yields
spread positively predicts equity term premia.
6.2 The Long-Run Risk Model by Bansal and Yaron (2004)
I analyze the long-run risk model by Bansal and Yaron (2004). Alternatively, using Bansal,
Kiku, and Yaron (2012) does not fundamentally change the results. The long-run risk model
has a non-degenerate treasury term structure, and I therefore subtract the corresponding
bond return to get forward returns (see Binsbergen and Koijen (2017) for a decomposition
of spot returns into forward and bond returns).
The Bansal and Yaron model has an upward sloping equity term structure. The term
structure arises because long-maturity dividends are more exposed to the long-run dividend
growth risk and discount rate risk. Investors are averse towards both shocks, and long-
maturity claims therefore require a premium to compensate for the additional discount rate
and dividend growth rate risk.
The long-run risk model is captured by setting a < 0 in the model from the theory
section, meaning that Proposition 1.b applies to the long-run risk model. As such, the model
could in principle have a positive and pro-cyclical equity term premium, but the model’s
parameters imply that it has a counter-cyclical equity term premium. In the model, periods
with a high dividend price ratio are generally periods with a high price of risk, and this high
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price of risk causes investors to require a higher premium on the long-run risk inherent in
long-maturity dividends.
Again, the counter-cyclical term structure is confirmed in simulations. Table 10 shows
that the parameter estimate for  Mkt,2 is 0.03. The parameter estimate is again well below
the empirical estimate, but it is economically large. The reason   is lower for long-run risk
than for the habit model is not that the term structure dynamics are less volatile for the
long-run risk model, but rather that the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio is not
determined solely by the price of risk; rather, in the long-run risk model, the dividend price
ratio may be low because long-run growth rates are high, and these growth rates do not
influence the term structure of expected returns.17 Finally, the long-run risk model also
has the wrong signs for   and  . The negative signs suggest that the equity yield spread
positively predicts equity premia, not negatively as in the data.
6.3 The Model by Lettau and Wachter (2007)
The model by Lettau and Wachter (2007) has a downward sloping term structure of expected
returns and as such it has so far been the most successful model in explaining the equity term
structure. The model has a downward sloping term structure because a negative shock to
dividends causes a positive shock to dividend growth rates. This long-run insurance makes
long-maturity dividends less risky than short-maturity dividends, because a negative shock
to dividends over time is canceled out by a higher growth rate.
The Lettau and Wachter model is captured by setting a = 0 in the theory section,
meaning that Proposition 1.a applies to the model. Given that the equity term structure
is downward sloping on average, it is therefore also pro-cyclical. When the dividend price
ratio is low, the price of risk is on average high and investors therefore require a higher
premium for holding the risky short-maturity dividends. The term premium thus increases
in absolute size which is to say that it becomes more negative and the slope becomes more
downward sloping. Consistent with this intuition, the value of  Mkt,2 is  0.08 in the model.
With regards to   and   from the test of the expectations hypothesis, the model by
Lettau and Wachter (2007) does better than the habit model and the long-run risk model.
The reason is that, unlike for the two latter, the term premium and the expected changes
in the yields have the same impact on the yield curve in the Lettau and Wachter (2007)
17See Beeler and Capmbell (2012) for a discussion of the relationship between the dividend price ratio
and future dividend growth in the long-run risk model.
32
model. Accordingly, both   and   are positive.
6.4 The Disaster Model by Gabaix (2012)
The spot term structure of equity returns is flat and constant in the disaster model by
Gabaix (2012). The equity term structure is flat because a disaster hits all equity claims
similarly. The treasury term structure is, however, upward sloping because long-maturity
bonds are exposed to inflation risk. Accordingly, the forward term premium on equity is
downward sloping and the slope varies over time as the slope of the bond term structure
varies.
For the Gabaix model, I report in Table 10 the results for the spot equity term structure
instead of the results for the forward equity term structure. I do so because the spot
dynamics are more representative of the risk-dynamics in the Gabaix model and because
the empirical results for  ,  , and   qualitatively are the same irrespectively of whether
I consider spot or forward prices on dividend strips. Under the spot dynamics, the term
structure of equities is constant and flat, which implies that the expectations hypothesis
holds and   and   are equal to 1.
6.5 Reconciling the Facts: A Model with Negative and Counter-Cyclical Term
Premia
In this section, I calibrate the earlier model such that it can explain the two most important
stylized facts, i.e. that equity term premia are negative on average and counter-cyclical. The
model does so by having two competing drivers of term premia: long-run risk in dividend
growth and a demand for hedging investment opportunities. Investors dislike long-maturity
stocks because they are exposed to long-run risk in dividend growth, but they also like them
because they hedge deteriorations in investment opportunities. The strength of these two
competing forces varies over time in such a way that term premia are negative on average
but counter-cyclical.
More concretely, I assume that a > 0, ⇢dx = 0, and ⇢dz > 0. The assumptions imply
that price-of-risk shocks are uncorrelated with dividend shocks and enter the stochastic
discount factor negatively. In addition, the positive correlation between shock to dividend
and growth rates imply that there is long-run risk in dividends.
The positive value of a implies a high demand for hedging deteriorations in investment
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opportunities. Indeed, the high a means that states where the price of risk drops are bad
states where the stochastic discount factor is high. Intuitively, investors consider the drop in
the price of risk a bad thing because their investment opportunities deteriorate. Investors
are therefore willing to accept lower return on assets that hedge such deteriorations in
investment opportunities. Long-maturity assets are such assets, because these realize a
large capital gain when the price of risk drops.
A demand for hedging deteriorations in investment opportunities features in many mod-
els in financial economics.18 The idea in these models is exactly that investors find losses
that occur due to discount rate shocks less unpleasant than losses that occur due to cash
flow shocks. They do so because losses that occur due to discount rate shocks are partly
o↵set by higher future expected returns. However, these models rarely have a positive value
of a. Indeed, while losses that occur due to discount rate shocks are less unpleasant than
losses that occur due to cash flow shocks, they are nonetheless still unpleasant. Accordingly,
a is negative, but less so than the coe cient in front of cash flow shocks. Indeed, Campbell
(1993) shows that Epstein-Zin investors generally dislike discount rate shocks, although they
dislikes them less than cash flow shocks if they have a risk aversion paramter   > 1. Consis-
tent with this insight, shocks to the price of risk (or, equivalently, the conditional variance
of dividends), enter the stochastic discount factor of Bansal and Yaron (2004) scaled by
a constant, but the constant is positive which is to say that a < 0 in the long-run risk
model. The positive a is also di cult to align with the habit model because its price of
risk is conditionally perfectly negatively correlated with consumption. Indeed, Santos and
Veronesi (2010) show that habit models imply a high premium on discount rate risk.
A positive a could, however, arise from underfunded pension funds. Indeed, if an un-
derfunded pension fund plans to hold its assets to maturity, the fund is not worried about
losses that occur due to discount rate shocks. However, when the discount rate goes up, the
underfunded pension fund needs less additional funding to become fully funded because the
additional funding o↵ers a higher return. Accordingly, states where the price of risk goes
up are considered good states for underfunded pension funds, which means that a could be
positive.
Given the positive value of a, and the additional assumptions above, the term premia
18See Merton (1973); Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) for the original ICAPM and Bansal, Kiku, Shalias-
tovich, and Yaron (2014); Campbell, Giglio, Polk, and Turley (2017) for an ICAPM with stochastic volatility.
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are given by:
✓n,1t = aB
n 1
x  x| {z }
negative (demand for hedging)
+ Bn 1z ⇢dz z| {z }xt
positive (long-run risk in dividends)
(1.30)
The first term in the term premium reflects that investors are willing to accept a lower
return on long-maturity equity because it hedges deteriorations in investment opportuni-
ties. The second term reflects that investors want a higher return on long-maturity equity
because it is more exposed to long-run risk. The net e↵ect can be either positive or negative
depending on the specification of the model.
In the term premium, the e↵ect of the demand for hedging is constant but the e↵ect of
long-run risk depends on the price of risk: when the price of risk increases, the compensation
demanded for long-run risk increases as well. Accordingly, the equity term premium is
counter-cyclical.
I calibrate the model to fit the 1996-2016 sample where I have data on dividend prices.
In this sample, the annual dividend growth rate is 3.57 percent per year with an annualized
quarterly standard deviation of 0.05. I use those inputs and specify the following quarterly
variables to fit the data:  x = 0.022,  z = 0.001, ⇢dz = 0.16, 'x = 'z = 0.65, x¯ = 0.85, and
a = 0.2.
The moments of the model are summarized in Table 11. Qualitatively, the model has the
right regression coe cients in the three tests covered in this paper: it has a counter-cyclical
term structure and it has regression coe cients in the tests of the expectations hypothesis
above 1. In addition, the equity term premium is negative on average. The results of the
model is summarized in Figure 7.
7 Conclusion
I document a new stylized fact about the equity term structure, namely that the equity term
premium is counter-cyclical. The result is robust: (1) it holds in the post-2005 sample across
four di↵erent indexes when measuring the equity term premia using dividend futures; (2)
it holds when excluding the financial crisis from the sample; (3) it holds in the U.S. sample
from 1996 when using equity term premia implied from options prices; and (4) it holds in
the U.S. from 1963 when using the cross-section of equities to measure equity term premia.
In addition, the variation in the equity term premia is large: in the post 2005 sample, the
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equity term premium varies with nine percentage points between good and bad times.
A series of recent studies documents the importance of short-maturity risks in under-
standing average risk premia in equities, bonds, variance-swaps, housing markets, and cur-
rencies (Binsbergen and Koijen, 2017; Du↵ee, 2011; Dew-Becker, Giglio, Le, and Rodriguez,
2017; Giglio, Maggiori, and Stroebel, 2015; Giglio, Maggiori, Stroebel, and Weber, 2015;
Lustig, Stathopoulos, and Verdelhan, 2013). Given these previous studies, the counter-
cyclical equity term structure is surprising because it suggests that long-maturity risks are
the main drivers of variation in risk premia. Accordingly, the short-maturity risk appears
important for explaining average risk premia, but long-maturity risk appears the most im-
portant for explaining the variation in these risk premia, at least for equities. This pattern
is puzzling. Indeed, none of the standard asset pricing models that I study can generate this
pattern, i.e. a term premium that is negative on average and counter-cyclical: the recent
downward sloping models have pro-cyclical term premia; the traditional upward sloping
models have counter-cyclical term premia.
I present a new model as a potential solution to the puzzle. In my model, investors trade
o↵ a demand for hedging investment opportunities with an aversion towards long-run risk in
dividend growth. In good times, investors require a lower return on long-maturity dividends
than on short-maturity dividends because they want to hedge deteriorations in investment
opportunities. In bad times, investors require a higher return on long-maturity dividends
than on short-maturity dividends because they are averse to the increased long-run risk in
dividend growth. The model is, however, not grounded in a utility function, and doing so
remains an interesting avenue for future research.
In addition to having strong implications for macro-finance models, the counter-cyclical
term structure also has real e↵ects. The equity term structure influences the di↵erence in
cost of capital between firms with di↵erent cash-flow maturity. In bad times, when the
equity term premia are higher, long-maturity firms find capital relatively more expensive
than short-maturity firms and therefore use relatively more labor and less capital. In this
sense, the equity term structure has important consequences for individual firms and for
workers in di↵erent industries.
8 Proofs
Proof of proposition 1.a
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Note first that the price-dividend ratio of the market portfolio is given by the following
sum:
Pt
Dt
=
1X
i=1
P it
Dt
=
1X
i=1
exp
 
Ai +Bizzt +B
i
xxt
 
(1.31)
where Pt is the price of the market portfolio at time t.
We first establish that the price dividend ratio and the negative of the price of risk,  xt,
are positively quadrant dependent (Lehmann, 1966) and have positive covariance. To see
this, define first the random variable yt =  xt and note that the dividend price ratio Pt/Dt
is an increasing, monotone function of zt and yt, i.e.
Pt
Dt
= f(zt, yt)
where f : R2 ! R is nondecreasing in both zt and yt. Similarly, define the function g(yt) =
 xt where g : R ! R is nondecreasing in yt. Because zt and yt are independent, f(zt, yt)
and g(yt) have positive covariance and the two are positively quadrant dependent. The
positive quadrant dependence means that the positive covariance between the two functions
caries over through monotonic transformations of the two variables (see e.g. Oliveira, 2012).
Accordingly, we can write
cov(P/Dt; xt) = cov
✓
f(zt, yt); g(yt)
◆
> 0 (1.32)
and
cov(pt   dt; xt) = cov
✓
ln
 
f(zt, yt)
 
; g(yt)
◆
> 0 (1.33)
The sign of the covariance between the dividend price ratio and the term premium is there-
fore determined as
sign
 
cov(dt   pt; ✓n,1t )
 
= sign
 
(Bn 1x ⇢dx x +B
n 1
z ⇢dz z)
 
(1.34)
Next, the average term premium is given by:
E[✓n,1t ] = (B
n 1
x ⇢dx x +B
n 1
z ⇢dz z)x¯ (1.35)
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Because x¯ is positive, the sign is given by
sign
 
E[✓n,1t ]
 
= sign
 
(Bn 1x ⇢dx x +B
n 1
z ⇢dz z)
 
(1.36)
which proves the proposition.
Proof of proposition 1.b
The asset pricing model in this paper is an example where a 6= 0 and sign  E[✓n,1t ]  6=
sign
 
cov(dt   pt; ✓n,1t )
 
which proves the proposition.
Proof of proposition 2.a
Note first that taking the natural logarithm of (1.16) and (1.17) and subtracting (1.17)
from (1.16) gives the following expression for the capital to labor ratio:
ln(knt ) =   ln(Et[Rnt+1]) + lnw + ln     ln   (1.37)
Subtracting (1.37) for an m-maturity claim from (1.37) for an n-maturity claim gives
ln(knt )  ln(kmt ) =  
 
ln(Et[R
n
t+1]  Et[Rmt+1])
 
Proof of proposition 2.b
Note first that
Et

Mt+1
P n 1t+1
Dt+1
Ft(K
n
t , L
n
t )
 
= exp(A˜n + (Bnx +  d)xt +B
n
z zt)Ft(K
n
t , L
n
t ) (1.38)
where A˜n is a constant. Inserting this expression in (1.16) and (1.17), taking the natural
logarithm, and solving for Knt gives (supressing constants):
ln(Knt ) =
1
1  ↵   
✓
Bnz zt + (B
n
x +  d)xt + (↵  1)
 
lnEt[R
n
t+1]
 ◆
(1.39)
Subtracting a one-period claim from the expression in (1.39) gives the expression in propo-
sition 2.b.
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Table 1 
The Equity Term Structure: Stylized Facts versus Theory 
The equity term premium 𝐸௧[𝑇𝑃௧] = 𝐸௧[𝑟௧ାଵ
௟௢௡௚ − 𝑟௧ାଵ
௦௛௢௥௧] is the conditional expected annual return to long-maturity 
equity minus the annual return to short maturity equity. The cyclicality of the equity term premium is measured by a 
linear projection of the realized term premium on the ex ante dividend price ratio of the market portfolio. The 
expectations hypothesis refers to the relation between the equity yield spread and future equity yields. The hypothesis 
is evaluated in a regression of future yield changes on the yields spread multiplied by a maturity modification. A 
parameter estimate of one implies that the yields develop exactly as the yield curve suggests under the expectations 
hypothesis. The habit model refers to the Campbell & Cochrane (1999) model. The long-run risk model refers to the 
Bansal & Yaron (2004) model.  
 Average slope Cyclicality Expectations Hypothesis 
Paper (van Binsbergen, Brandt, Koijen, 2012) (this paper) (this paper) 
Data 
   
   Measured as 𝐸[𝑇𝑃] = 𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵ
௟௢௡௚ − 𝑟௧ାଵ
௦௛௢௥௧] 
 
𝑇𝑃௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐷௧/𝑃௧ + 𝑒௧ ∆yield௧ାଵ 
= 𝛾଴ + 𝛾ଵyield spread௧ +ϵ௧ାଵ 
 
   Result Downward sloping 
𝐸[𝑇𝑃] < 0 
Counter-cyclical 
𝛽ଵ > 0 
Yield spread predicts change in 
yield 
 𝛾ଵ > 1 
Theories  
   
   Habit Upward Counter-cyclical 𝛾ଵ < 0 
   Long-run risk Upward Counter-cyclical 𝛾ଵ < 0 
   Lettau Wacther (2007) Downward Pro-cyclical 𝛾ଵ ∈ (0; 1) 
   Gabaix (2012) Flat Constant 𝛾ଵ = 1 
   Hasler Marfe (2016) Downward Pro-cyclical 𝛾ଵ ∈ (0; 1) 
   My model Downward Counter-cyclical 𝛾ଵ > 1 
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Table 2 
 Counter-Cyclical Equity Term Premia 
This table shows the relation between term premia and the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio. The table 
reports the parameter estimate from the following regression: 
𝑟௧;௧ାଵଶ
௡ − 𝑟௧;௧ାଵଶ
௠ = 𝛽଴
௡,௠ + 𝛽ଵ
௡,௠(𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧) + 𝜖௧,௧ାଵଶ 
where 𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧ is the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio and 𝑟௧,௧ାଵଶ
௡  is the twelve-month forward return to the 
dividend claim with n year maturity. The regression is based on monthly rolling regressions. The t-statistics are based 
on Newey and West (1987) standard errors corrected for 18 lags. The maturities n and m are both measured in years. 
The row m=mean(1-7) refers to the average return to the one- through seven-year maturity dividend claim. The 
sample is from 2005 to 2016. 
 
Maturity of long-maturity claim (n) 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mkt 
Panel A: S&P 500 
       
      m=1 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.34 0.41 0.45 0.59 
 (1.95) (2.61) (3.35) (3.97) (4.24) (4.50) (4.39) 
      m=2  0.05 0.12 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.35 
  (2.41) (3.64) (4.26) (4.19) (3.98) (2.40) 
      m=3   0.05 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.27 
   (1.96) (1.33) (1.21) (1.28) (1.99) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.25 
       (1.89) 
Panel B: Nikkei 225 
       
      m=1 0.40 0.69 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.75 
 (5.15) (3.54) (3.19) (2.92) (2.69) (2.57) (2.58) 
      m=2  0.21 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.43 0.39 
  (2.95) (2.61) (2.44) (2.27) (2.13) (1.83) 
      m=3   0.06 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.04 
   (1.46) (1.24) (0.94) (0.57) (0.28) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.40 
       (0.52) 
Panel C: EuroStoxx 50 
       
      m=1 0.23 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.37 
 (1.98) (2.63) (2.69) (2.76) (2.68) (2.39) (2.33) 
      m=2  0.07 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 
  (0.95) (0.67) (0.43) (0.23) (0.05) (0.22) 
      m=3   -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.05 
   (-1.13) (-1.51) (-1.89) (-2.32) (-0.49) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.04 
       (0.41) 
 
      
continued… 
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Panel D: FTSE 100 
       
      m=1 0.30 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.52 
 (2.61) (3.32) (3.69) (3.38) (2.92) (2.48) (2.34) 
      m=2  0.07 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.12 
  (1.12) (0.96) (0.61) (0.28) (0.01) (0.48) 
      m=3   0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.01 
   (0.15) (-0.32) (-0.64) (-0.87) (0.03) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.09 
       (0.53) 
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Table 3 
 Counter-Cyclical Equity Term Premia: Excluding the Financial Crisis 
This table shows the relation between term premia and the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio. The table 
reports the parameter estimate from the following regression: 
𝑟௧;௧ାଵଶ
௡ − 𝑟௧;௧ାଵଶ
௠ = 𝛽଴
௡,௠ + 𝛽ଵ
௡,௠(𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧) + 𝜖௧,௧ାଵଶ 
where 𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧ is the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio and 𝑟௧,௧ାଵଶ
௡  is the twelve-month forward return to the 
dividend claim with n year maturity. The regression is based on monthly rolling regressions. The t-statistics are based 
on Newey and West (1987) standard errors corrected for 18 lags. The maturities n and m are both measured in years. 
The row m=mean(1-7) refers to the average return to the one- through seven-year maturity dividend claim. The 
sample is from 2005 to 2016 excluding the years 2008 and 2009. 
 
Maturity of long-maturity claim (n) 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mkt 
Panel A: S&P 500 
       
      m=1 0.33 0.67 0.84 1.05 1.23 1.34 2.24 
 (4.24) (9.21) (9.42) (8.69) (8.25) (7.59) (3.60) 
      m=2  0.25 0.43 0.60 0.70 0.77 1.29 
  (3.70) (5.22) (5.46) (4.23) (3.66) (2.12) 
      m=3   0.06 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.82 
   (0.59) (0.13) (0.08) (0.19) (1.63) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.97 
       (2.05) 
Panel B: Nikkei 225 
       
      m=1 0.34 0.66 0.82 0.92 0.98 1.05 0.92 
 (10.24) (6.00) (5.05) (4.55) (4.16) (4.02) (2.17) 
      m=2  0.25 0.41 0.50 0.57 0.61 0.53 
  (5.00) (4.44) (4.23) (4.00) (3.74) (1.86) 
      m=3   0.10 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.06 
   (2.25) (1.90) (1.53) (1.08) (0.27) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.05 
       (0.34) 
Panel C: EuroStoxx 50 
       
      m=1 0.08 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.46 
 (1.20) (1.94) (2.20) (2.41) (2.30) (1.92) (1.99) 
      m=2  0.11 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.19 
  (1.30) (1.17) (0.89) (0.67) (0.45) (0.91) 
      m=3   -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.12 0.05 
   (-0.39) (-0.75) (-1.03) (-1.41) (0.32) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.15 
       (1.06) 
 
      
Continued… 
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Panel D: FTSE 100 
       
      m=1 0.38 1.09 1.45 1.60 1.68 1.73 2.13 
 (4.02) (4.50) (5.94) (7.12) (8.26) (9.16) (5.99) 
      m=2  0.45 0.70 0.81 0.86 0.89 1.19 
  (2.34) (2.64) (2.76) (2.76) (2.80) (2.18) 
      m=3   0.20 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.57 
   (2.30) (2.10) (1.94) (1.95) (1.38) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.56 
       (1.62) 
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Table 4 
 Counter-Cyclical Equity Term Premia: Using cay as Measure of Cyclicality 
This table shows the relation between term premia and the ex ante value of cay (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001). The 
table reports the parameter estimate from the following regression: 
𝑟௧,௧ାସ
௡ − 𝑟௧,௧ାସ
௠ = 𝛽଴
௡,௠ + 𝛽ଵ
௡,௠cay௧ + 𝜖௧,௧ାସ 
where  𝑟௧,௧ାସ
௡  is the four-quarter forward return to the dividend claim with n year maturity. The regression is based on 
quarterly rolling regressions. The t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors corrected for 6 
lags. The maturities n and m are both measured in years. The row m=mean(1-7) refers to the average return to the 
one- through seven-year maturity dividend claim. The sample is from 2005 to 2016. 
 
Maturity of long-maturity claim (n) 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mkt 
Panel A: S&P 500 
       
      m=1 1.47 2.69 3.98 5.26 6.26 6.32 8.22 
 (1.25) (1.91) (2.76) (3.60) (4.20) (4.57) (4.36) 
      m=2  1.01 2.34 3.65 4.42 4.45 5.12 
  (2.27) (4.55) (5.29) (5.31) (3.89) (2.73) 
      m=3   1.28 2.47 3.19 3.20 4.08 
   (4.92) (3.82) (3.63) (2.74) (2.30) 
      m=mean(1-7)       2.96 
       (1.54) 
Panel B: S&P 500 (excluding 2008-2009) 
    
      m=1 2.94 5.00 6.27 7.55 8.53 8.15 9.47 
 (3.06) (5.53) (6.36) (6.09) (5.52) (4.32) (4.31) 
      m=2  1.78 3.07 4.41 5.12 4.75 4.78 
  (3.35) (4.33) (4.01) (3.56) (2.38) (1.92) 
      m=3   1.32 2.72 3.46 3.10 3.10 
   (3.99) (2.72) (2.48) (1.66) (1.34) 
      m=mean(1-7)       2.28 
       (0.89) 
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Table 5 
 Counter-Cyclical Sharpe Ratios 
This table shows the relation between the sharpe ratios for term premia and the dividend price ratio of the market 
portfolio. The table reports the parameter estimate from the following regression: 
𝑆𝑅௧;௧ାଵଶ
௡,௠ = 𝛽଴
௡,௠ + 𝛽ଵ
௡,௠(𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧) + 𝜖௧,௧ାଵଶ 
where 𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧ is the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio and 𝑆𝑅௧,௧ାଵଶ
௡,௠  is the one-year log-Sharpe ratio of the 
log-return to the n maturity claim minus the return to the m maturity claim. The regression is based on monthly rolling 
regressions. The t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors corrected for 18 lags. The maturities 
n and m are both measured in years. The sample is from 2005 to 2016. 
 
Maturity of long-maturity claim (n) 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mkt 
Panel A: S&P 500 
       
      m=1 3.18 3.27 3.70 4.19 4.15 3.74 3.43 
 (2.84) (3.44) (4.47) (5.43) (5.58) (5.79) (6.69) 
      m=2  1.54 2.87 3.67 3.67 3.10 1.78 
  (2.65) (5.27) (6.60) (5.51) (6.19) (2.61) 
      m=3   2.17 2.13 1.83 1.46 1.40 
   (3.10) (2.20) (1.54) (1.52) (2.11) 
      m=mean(1-7)       1.57 
       (2.16) 
Panel B: Nikkei 225 
       
      m=1 5.28 5.43 5.91 6.04 5.79 5.41 4.65 
 (6.91) (5.88) (5.35) (4.84) (4.34) (3.91) (2.81) 
      m=2  3.66 4.31 4.34 4.02 3.59 2.48 
  (3.55) (3.03) (2.74) (2.43) (2.12) (1.77) 
      m=3   2.89 2.48 2.00 1.46 0.50 
   (1.63) (1.41) (1.19) (0.88) (0.60) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.71 
       (1.09) 
Panel C: EuroStoxx 50 
       
      m=1 1.92 2.38 2.61 2.54 2.64 2.46 2.00 
 (2.42) (2.45) (2.64) (2.59) (2.78) (2.70) (2.89) 
      m=2  1.52 0.92 0.48 0.63 0.55 0.50 
  (1.18) (0.93) (0.53) (0.62) (0.57) (0.63) 
      m=3   -0.68 -0.93 -0.76 -0.74 0.35 
   (-0.79) (-1.09) (-0.85) (-0.87) (0.58) 
      m=mean(1-7)       1.06 
       (1.72) 
 
      
Continued… 
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Panel D: FTSE 100 
       
      m=1 4.02 4.32 4.64 4.60 4.43 4.12 3.20 
 (3.81) (3.80) (3.81) (3.88) (4.03) (3.83) (3.85) 
      m=2  2.17 2.11 1.75 1.57 1.25 0.88 
  (1.47) (1.27) (1.01) (0.99) (0.78) (0.74) 
      m=3   0.57 0.17 -0.05 -0.30 0.22 
   (0.38) (0.11) (-0.04) (-0.22) (0.24) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.77 
       (0.99) 
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Table 6  
Counter-Cyclical Equity Term Premia: Alternative Measures 
This table shows the relation between term premia and the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio. The term 
premia are measured in two different ways: (1) as the implied term premium from equity options (van Binsbergen, 
Brandt, and Koijen, 2012) and (2) as the return to a term premium mimicking portfolio from the cross-section of 
equities. The term premium mimicking portfolio is long a portfolio with long duration firms and short a portfolio 
with short duration firms. To construct the long and short duration portfolios, I run a regression of the excess return 
to 30 portfolios sorted on book-to-market, profitability, and investment onto the realized return difference between 
long- and short-maturity equity claims between 1996 and 2015. For each style, I rank portfolios in ascending order 
based on their beta with respect to long- minus short-maturity return difference. I assign the two portfolios with 
highest (lowest) beta to the long (short) duration portfolio. Within the long (short) duration portfolio I equal weight 
the excess return. I include as independent variables the ex ante dividend price ratio of the market portfolio, the five 
Fama and French (20015) factors, the ex ante one-year treasury yield, and the ex ante treasury yield spread (five-year 
yield in excess of one-year yield). The yields are from Fama and Bliss (1987). All returns are measured in rolling 
one-year log returns. I report t-statistics below the parameter estimates. The t-statistics are based on Newey and West 
(1987) standard errors corrected for 18 lags.  The results are from the U.S.  
Panel A: Alternative measures of the equity term premium 
 Option implied term premium Cross-sectional term premium 
Period 1996-2009 1996-2009  1963-2015 1963-2015 1996-2015 1963-1996 
        
dt - pt   1.04 0.90   0.04 0.07 0.13 0.07 
 (2.55) (5.93)   (0.92) (3.68) (1.54) (1.68) 
Mkt  0.30   0.10 -0.03 0.11 
  (0.91)   (3.23) (-0.51) (3.09) 
SMB  -0.65   0.25 0.23 0.25 
  (-2.41)   (7.09) (2.85) (4.83) 
HML  -0.45   -0.34 -0.20 -0.38 
  (-1.32)   (-7.41) (-3.14) (-7.03) 
RMW  -0.79   -0.59 -0.89 -0.43 
  (-1.44)   (-9.24) (-9.46) (-5.01) 
CMA  0.26   -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 
  (0.55)   (-1.13) (-0.20) (-0.51) 
Bond yield  0.05   -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
  (1.31)   (-2.92) (-0.19) (-3.76) 
Bond yield 
spread  0.10   -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
  (1.28)   (-3.40) (-0.86) (-3.00) 
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Panel B: Alternative measures of cyclicality 
 Option implied term premium  Cross-sectional term premium 
Period 1996-2009 1996-2009 1996-2009 1996-2009  1963-2015 1963-2015 
        
CAPEt   0.59 0.96      0.05   
 (1.46) (5.17)      (2.42)   
cayt       3.07 -2.78    0.81 
     (0.61) (-0.61)    (1.99) 
Mkt  0.30  0.98  0.10 0.10 
  (0.88)  (1.78)  (3.02) (3.28) 
SMB  -0.73  -1.14  0.26 0.18 
  (-2.51)  (-1.64)  (7.09) (2.37) 
HML  -0.64  -0.81  -0.32 -0.13 
  (-2.35)  (-1.50)  (-6.48) (-1.12) 
RMW  -0.77  0.22  -0.62 -0.08 
  (-1.43)  (0.48)  (-9.66) (-0.55) 
CMA  0.15  0.69  -0.15 0.13 
  (0.37)  (0.55)  (-1.74) (0.72) 
Bond yield  0.11  -0.03  -0.01 0.00 
  (2.11)  (-0.52)  (-2.01) (-0.96) 
Bond yield 
spread  0.13  0.04  -0.02 -0.02 
  (1.39)  (0.33)  (-3.09) (-1.74) 
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Table 7 
 The Expectations Hypothesis: The Yield Spread and Long-Yield Changes 
This table shows the relation between long-yield changes and the equity yield spread. The table reports the parameter 
estimate from the following regression:  
𝑒௧ା௠
௡ି௠ − 𝑒௧
௡ = 𝛾଴
௡,௠ + 𝛾ଵ
௡,௠𝑠௧
௡,௠ 𝑚
𝑛 − 𝑚
+ 𝜖௧ା௠ 
The expectations hypothesis is that 𝛾ଵ
௡,௠ = 1 for all maturity pairs n,m. The t-statistics for this hypothesis are reported 
below the parameter estimates. The t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors corrected for 
1.5m lags. The maturities n and m are both measured in years. The sample is from 2005 to 2016. 
 
Maturity of long-maturity claim (n) 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Panel A: S&P 500 
      
      m=1 1.00 1.08 1.18 1.27 1.36 1.38 
 (-0.00) (0.17) (0.46) (0.70) (0.93) (1.07) 
      m=2  1.61 1.77 1.87 1.95 2.04 
  (2.08) (2.16) (2.51) (2.91) (3.32) 
      m=3   1.73 1.94 2.09 2.15 
   (3.04) (3.25) (3.09) (3.29) 
Panel B: Nikkei 225 
      
      m=1 1.62 1.59 1.30 1.17 1.07 0.99 
 (1.02) (0.92) (0.53) (0.32) (0.14) (-0.02) 
      m=2  1.05 0.97 0.85 0.79 0.74 
  (0.11) (-0.07) (-0.33) (-0.46) (-0.59) 
      m=3   1.23 1.29 1.19 1.14 
   (0.34) (0.37) (0.26) (0.19) 
Panel C: EuroStoxx 50 
      
      m=1 2.72 3.86 3.10 2.79 2.62 2.53 
 (2.03) (5.37) (5.91) (5.92) (5.76) (5.58) 
      m=2  1.61 1.58 1.46 1.36 1.33 
  (2.80) (2.05) (1.78) (1.59) (1.52) 
      m=3   1.04 1.13 1.01 0.93 
   (0.09) (0.25) (0.03) (-0.19) 
Panel D: FTSE 100 
      
      m=1 -1.20 1.71 2.04 2.03 1.96 1.88 
 (-3.50) (0.85) (1.55) (2.05) (2.41) (2.56) 
      m=2  1.56 1.71 1.59 1.52 1.47 
  (1.90) (1.74) (1.70) (1.68) (1.66) 
      m=3   1.26 1.19 1.03 0.95 
   (1.06) (0.58) (0.10) (-0.17) 
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Table 8 
 The Expectations Hypothesis: The Yield Spread and Short-Yield Changes 
This table shows the relation between short-yield changes and the equity yield spread. The table reports the parameter 
estimate from the following regression: 
෍ ൬1 −
𝑖
𝑛
൰ ൫𝑒௧ା௠
௠ − 𝑒௧ା(௜ିଵ)௠
௠ ൯
௞ିଵ
௜ୀଵ
= 𝜙௢
௡,௠ + 𝜙ଵ
௡,௠𝑠௧
௡,௠ + 𝜂௧ା௡ 
The expectations hypothesis is that 𝜙ଵ
௡,௠ = 1 for all maturity pairs n,m. The t-statistics for this hypothesis are reported 
below the parameter estimates. The t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors corrected for 
1.5m lags. The maturities n and m are both measured in years. The sample is from 2005 to 2016. 
 
Maturity of long-maturity claim (n) 
 2 3 4 5 6 
Panel A: S&P 500 
     
      m=1 1.00 1.23 1.23 1.25 1.26 
 (-0.00) (1.41) (1.98) (2.58) (2.02) 
      m=2   1.38  1.37 
   (2.24)  (3.60) 
Panel B: Nikkei 225 
     
      m=1 1.31 1.15 0.98 1.06 1.07 
 (0.92) (0.70) (-0.10) (0.35) (0.37) 
      m=2   0.98  1.13 
   (-0.07)  (0.63) 
Panel C: EuroStoxx 50 
     
      m=1 1.86 2.07 1.49 1.30 0.72 
 (3.07) (6.18) (3.81) (3.55) (-3.82) 
      m=2   1.29  1.12 
   (2.66)  (2.09) 
Panel D: FTSE 100 
     
      m=1 -0.10 1.43 1.37 1.34 1.17 
 (-4.58) (1.45) (1.84) (2.68) (1.69) 
      m=2   1.36  1.20 
   (1.79)  (2.07) 
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Table 9  
Cyclicality of the Investment Duration 
This table reports the results from a regression of investment characteristics on the dividend price ratio of the market 
portfolio plus controls. I consider the investment rates for three portfolios: a portfolio with short-duration firms, a 
portfolio with long-duration firms, and a long/short portfolio. To construct the long- and short-duration portfolio, I 
run a regression of the excess return to 30 portfolios sorted on book-to-market, profitability, and investment onto the 
realized return difference between long- and short-maturity equity claims between 1996 and 2015. For each style, I 
rank portfolios in ascending order based on their beta with respect to long- minus short-maturity return difference. I 
assign the two portfolios with highest (lowest) beta to the long (short) duration portfolio. Within the long (short) 
duration portfolio I equal-weight the characteristics. Capital to labor is measured as capital expenditures to total 
salary. Investment is measured as capital expenditure to plant, property, and equipment. Change in Capex is the 
change in capital expenditure. R&D is the annual change in salary spend on R&D activities. Total salary expenses is 
the annual change in total salaries. All characteristics are measured in cross-sectional percentiles. In the regressions, 
I use as the independent variables the ex ante dividend price ratio of the market portfolio, the one-year treasury yield, 
the treasury yield spread (five-year in excess of one-year), and a dummy variable for NBER recessions. I report t-
statistics below the parameter estimates. The t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors 
corrected for 18 lags. The sample is U.S. equities from 1963-2015.  
Panel A: Capital to labor  
Portfolio Short 
duration 
Long 
duration Long- minus short duration 
Period 1963-2015 1963-2015  1963-2015 1963-2015 1996-2015 1963-
1996 
        
dt - pt   2.85 -4.03   -6.88 -6.86 -0.54 -4.08 
 (10.93) (-9.09)   (-10.56) (-5.50) (-2.64) (-1.76) 
Bond yieldt     0.01 -0.31 0.38 
     (0.04) (-8.99) (1.96) 
Bond yield spreadt     0.91 -0.57 1.38 
     (1.52) (-4.27) (2.92) 
Recession dummyt     1.35 0.22 0.20 
   (1.70) (1.74) (0.23) 
Panel B: Detrended capital to labor  
 
Capital to labor (HP filter) Capital to labor (first difference) 
Portfolio Long-short Long-short Long-short Long-short Long-short Long-short 
Period 1963-2015 1996-2015 1963-2015 1963-2015 1996-2015 1963-1996 
dt - pt  (HP filter) -2.00 -0.45 -3.78       
 (-2.02) (-1.70) (-1.92)       
dt - pt  (first differenced)       -1.14 -0.97 -1.33 
       (-0.95) (-2.18) (-0.60) 
Bond yieldt 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.14 
 (0.67) (-1.58) (0.39) (1.36) (-0.62) (1.47) 
Bond yield spreadt -0.16 -0.26 -0.26 0.10 -0.24 0.21 
 (-0.93) (-1.63) (-1.12) (0.49) (-1.60) (0.73) 
Recession dummyt 0.35 -0.01 0.51 0.21 0.21 0.11 
 (1.13) (-0.03) (1.16) (0.44) (0.83) (0.16) 
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Panel C: Investment     
Investment measure Investment (Capex to PPE) Change in CapEx 
Portfolio  
Short 
duration 
Long 
duration 
Long-short              
Short 
duration 
Long 
duration 
Long-
short                
Period 1963-2015 1963-2015 1963-2015 1963-2015 1963-2015 1963-
2015 
       
dt - pt   1.84 -3.48 -9.13 2.54 -4.17 -10.14 
 (3.27) (-4.13) (-4.16) (4.86) (-4.85) (-4.51) 
Bond yieldt   0.74   0.66 
   (2.12)   (1.91) 
Bond yield spreadt   1.68   1.10 
   (1.87)   (1.11) 
Recession dummyt   2.58   1.90 
   (2.64)   (1.57) 
Panel D: R&D and Salary   
Characteristic: R&D Total Salary Expenses 
Portfolio  
Short 
duration 
Long 
duration 
Long-short              
Short 
duration 
Long 
duration 
Long-
short                  
Period 1963-2015 1963-2015 1963-2015 1963-2015 1963-2015 1963-2015 
       
dt - pt   2.74 -5.85 -9.26 0.07 0.83 0.82 
 (6.37) (-9.96) (-6.12) (0.22) (2.15) (1.21) 
Bond yieldt   0.10   0.06 
   (0.40)   (0.53) 
Bond yield spreadt   0.67   0.77 
   (1.01)   (2.60) 
Recession dummyt   1.88   -0.38 
   (1.77)   (-0.75) 
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Table 10 
Asset Pricing Theories versus Stylized Facts 
This table shows the result of simulations of different asset pricing models. I simulate the models and estimate the 
following regressions: 
𝑟௧;௧ାଵଶ
௡ − 𝑟௧;௧ାଵଶ
௠ = 𝛽଴
௡,௠ + 𝛽ଵ
௡,௠(𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧) + 𝜖௧,௧ାଵଶ 
𝑒௧ା௠
௡ି௠ − 𝑒௧
௡ = 𝛾଴
௡,௠ + 𝛾ଵ
௡,௠𝑠௧
௡,௠ 𝑚
𝑛 − 𝑚
+ 𝜖௧ା௠ 
෍ ൬1 −
𝑖
𝑛
൰ ൫𝑒௧ା௠
௠ − 𝑒௧ା(௜ିଵ)௠
௠ ൯
௞ିଵ
௜ୀଵ
= 𝜙௢
௡,௠ + 𝜙ଵ
௡,௠𝑠௧
௡,௠ + 𝜂௧ା௡ 
where 𝑟௧ାଵଶ
௡  is the forward log-return on the n maturity claim between month t and t+12, 𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧ is the log dividend 
price ratio of the market portfolio, 𝑒௧
௡ is the yield on the n maturity dividend at time t, and 𝑦௧
௡,௠ is the yield spread 
between the n and the m maturity dividend at time t. Maturities n and m are measured in years. The habit model is 
the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) model. The model is simulated using the series method of Wachter (2005). The 
long-run risk model is the model by Bansal and Yaron (2004) that features stochastic volatility.  
 𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵଶ
௠௞௧ − 𝑟௧ାଵଶ
ଶ  ] 𝛽ଵ
௠௞௧,ଶ 𝛾ଵ
ହ,ଵ 𝜙ଵ
ହ,ଵ 
Data 
    
   Empirical observation -0.035 0.35 1.27 1.25 
Theories  
    
   Habit 0.038 0.12 -1.32 -0.80 
   Long-run risk 0.029 0.03 -0.95 -0.03 
   Lettau & Wacther (2007) -0.067 -0.08 0.32 0.72 
   Disaster (Gabaix, 2012) 0 0 1 1 
   My model 
 
-0.01 0.10 2.4 1.6 
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Table 11 
Reconciling Theory with the Empirical Facts: Simulated Results in an Asset Pricing Model 
This table shows results of simulations in my model. The results are based on 100,000 years of artificial data. The 
model is simulated to fit the U.S. data in the 1996-2016 period. The model is simulated on the quarterly horizon. 
Expected returns and standard deviations are annualized (multiplied by 4 and 2).  
 
 
Data Model  
Stock market moments   
 𝐸[𝑅௧ାଵ
௠ − 𝑅௙] 0.07 0.07 
 𝜎[𝑅௧ାଵ
௠ − 𝑅௙] 0.18 0.23 
 𝐸[𝑃௧/𝐷௧] 
57.3 49.7 
 𝜎(𝑝௧ − 𝑑௧) 
0.22 0.28 
 AR1(𝑝௧ − 𝑑௧) 
0.92 0.90 
Term structure of equity results   
 𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵଶ
௠௞௧ − 𝑟௧ାଵଶ
ଶ  ] -0.035 -0.01 
 𝛽ଵ
௠௞௧,ଶ 0.35 0.10 
 𝛾ଵ
ହ,ଵ 1.27 2.4 
 𝜙ଵ
ହ,ଵ 1.25 1.6 
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Figure 1 
The Term Structure of One-Year Equity Returns 
This figure shows the term structure of holding-period equity returns for the S&P 500. The figure shows the 
unconditional average return (solid line), the average return in bad times (dashed line), and the average return in good 
times (dash-dotted line). Good and bad times are defined by the ex ante dividend price ratio. Short-maturity equity 
claims is the average return to dividend futures of 1 to 7 years maturity. The long-maturity claim is the average return 
to the market portfolio. Returns are annual spot returns, 2005 – 2016. 
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Figure 2 
The Equity Term Structure in Good and Bad Times 
This figure shows the term structure of one-year equity returns in good and bad times. Panel A shows the equity term 
structure estimated using dividend futures. The short-maturity return is the return to the one- and two-year dividend 
claims and the long-maturity return is the return to the six- and seven-year claims – all measured in excess of the 
cross-sectional and time-series averages. Panel B shows the equity term structure estimated using option implied 
dividends. The short-maturity claim is the return to the two-year dividend and the long-maturity claim is the return 
to the market portfolio, measured in excess of the cross-sectional and time-series averages. Panel C shows the term 
structure estimated using the cross-section of stocks. The duration of stocks is measured by a regression of excess 
returns on the realized long- minus short-maturity return in the 1996-2016 sample. Returns are measured as annual 
alpha in the five-factor model. Good (bad) times are months where the dividend price ratio is below (above) the 
median.  
Panel A: Estimated using dividend futures (2005-2016) 
 
 
Panel B: Estimated using option implied dividend prices (1996-2009) 
 
 
Panel C: Estimated using the cross-section of stocks (1963-2015) 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Bad times
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Short duration Long DurationF
ut
ur
es
 r
et
ur
n 
in
 e
xc
es
s 
of
 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
(a
nn
ua
l p
er
ce
nt
)
Good times
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Short maturity Long maturity
R
et
ur
n 
in
 e
xc
es
s 
of
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
(a
nn
ua
l p
er
ce
nt
)
Good times
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Short maturity Long maturity
Bad times
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Short duration firms Long duration firms
Bad times
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Short duration firms Long duration firms
A
nn
ua
l a
lp
ha
Good times
57 
 
Figure 3 
Real Effects of the Equity Term Structure 
This figure shows average firm characteristics in good and bad times for firms with different duration of cash flows. 
Panel A shows the investment rate measured as CAPEX over the value of property, plant, and equipment. Panel B 
shows the annual change in capital expenditure. Panel C shows the capital to labor ratio measured as CAPEX to 
salaries. All characteristics are measured as cross-sectional percentiles in excess of the given portfolios time-series 
average. Duration is measured by sensitivity to the equity term premium. Good (bad) times are months where the 
dividend price ratio is below (above) the median. The sample is from 1964-2015.  
Panel A: Investment (CAPEX/PPE) 
 
Panel B: Investment (increase in capital expenditure) 
 
Panel C: Capital to Labor Ratio 
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Figure 4 
Realized Long-minus-Short Return and Dividend Price Ratios 
This figure shows, for four different indexes, the ex ante log dividend price ratio and the realized return difference 
between long- and short-maturity claims. The future long-minus-short return is the average two-year log-return to the 
six- and seven-year dividend claim minus the average two-year log-return to the one- and two-year dividend claim. 
The graph indicates the starting date of the two-year period. After 2005 returns are based on dividend futures. Before 
2005, the U.S. term premium is the two-year return difference between the two- and the one-year option implied 
dividend returns.  
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Figure 5 
Realized Long-minus-Short Return 
This figure shows for four different indexes the ex ante value of the cay variable and the realized return difference 
between long- and short-maturity claims. The future long-minus-short return is the average two-year log-return to the 
six- and seven-year dividend claim minus the average two-year log-return to the one- and two-year dividend claim. 
The graph indicates the starting date of the two-year period. After 2005 returns are based on dividend futures. Before 
2005, the U.S. term premium is the two-year return difference between the two- and the one-year option implied 
dividend returns. The figure shows the U.S. cay variable for all indexes.  
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Figure 6 
Time Variation in The Term Structure of Equity Yields 
This figure shows the time variation in the term structure of equity yields. The figure shows the yield for the two-, 
five-, and seven-year dividend claim. The equity yield for dividends that are paid out at time t+n are defined as: 
 
where 𝑑௧ is the rolling annual dividends at time t and 𝑓௧
௡ is the forward price of the n maturity claim at time t.   
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Figure 7 
Reconciling the Facts in an Asset Pricing Model: Equity Term Premia in Good and Bad 
Times 
This figure shows equity term premia 𝜃௧
௡,ଵ in the asset pricing model on average, in good times, and in bad times. 
The term premia are plotted as a function of the long-maturity claims (the x-axis). Good (bad) times are periods where 
the ex ante dividend price ratio of the market portfolio is below (above) the time series median. The results are based 
on 100,000 years of artificial quarterly data.   
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Table A1 
Summary Statistics on Dividend Futures 
This table provides summary statistics for dividend futures. Returns and standard deviations are for annualized claims. 
The loading on the dividend price ratio refers to the regression coefficient in a regression of realized excess returns 
on the ex ante log dividend price ratio of the market portfolio. Good and bad times are based on the median dividend 
price ratio. 
 
Maturity of dividend claim (years) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mkt 
Panel A: S&P 500 
        
     Average futures returns 0.015 0.012 0.021 0.021 0.024 0.028 0.037 -0.024 
     Variance annual returns 0.002 0.017 0.027 0.031 0.038 0.044 0.048 0.077 
     Variance quarterly returns 0.006 0.023 0.025 0.030 0.037 0.041 0.046 0.080 
     Loading on d୲ − p୲ 0.059 0.275 0.328 0.404 0.489 0.548 0.575 0.677 
     Average good times 0.017 -0.006 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.012 -0.080 
     Average bad times 0.013 0.029 0.034 0.045 0.053 0.062 0.067 0.041 
     Average yields -0.038 -0.044 -0.044 -0.042 -0.041 -0.038 -0.035  
     Standard dev. of yield 0.115 0.077 0.052 0.042 0.036 0.033 0.029  
Panel B: Nikkei 225 
        
     Average futures returns 0.109 0.071 0.048 0.077 0.081 0.084 0.089 -0.040 
     Variance annual returns 0.006 0.071 0.117 0.135 0.150 0.161 0.170 0.121 
     Variance quarterly returns 0.018 0.084 0.107 0.113 0.119 0.121 0.123 0.117 
     Loading on d୲ − p୲ 0.088 0.611 0.855 0.953 1.015 1.055 1.086 1.002 
     Average good times 0.055 -0.051 -0.083 -0.011 -0.004 0.004 0.017 -0.097 
     Average bad times 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.02 
     Average yields 0.020 0.004 -0.013 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 -0.012  
     Standard dev. of yield 0.160 0.131 0.097 0.077 0.065 0.056 0.048  
Panel C: Euro Stoxx 50 
        
     Average futures returns 0.033 0.044 0.019 0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.062 
     Variance annual returns 0.005 0.044 0.091 0.100 0.100 0.099 0.099 0.099 
     Variance quarterly returns 0.010 0.063 0.080 0.083 0.084 0.082 0.084 0.090 
     Loading on d୲ − p୲ 0.096 0.500 0.605 0.604 0.587 0.570 0.549 0.560 
     Average good times -0.004 -0.015 -0.035 -0.047 -0.050 -0.050 -0.045 -0.120 
     Average bad times 0.033 0.126 0.110 0.089 0.075 0.064 0.056 0.035 
     Average yields 0.056 0.046 0.031 0.025 0.020 0.015 0.012  
     Standard dev. of yield 0.128 0.124 0.086 0.066 0.053 0.045 0.038  
Panel D: FTSE 100         
     Average futures returns 0.018 0.038 0.027 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.020 -0.035 
     Variance annual returns 0.005 0.030 0.064 0.072 0.073 0.071 0.070 0.063 
     Variance quarterly returns 0.009 0.043 0.054 0.058 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.062 
     Loading on d୲ − p୲ 0.151 0.763 0.853 0.876 0.854 0.823 0.787 0.917 
     Average good times -0.012 -0.018 -0.013 -0.023 -0.026 -0.023 -0.018 -0.089 
     Average bad times 0.069 0.089 0.071 0.069 0.065 0.063 0.064 0.025 
     Average yields 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  
     Standard dev. of yield 0.098 0.099 0.069 0.053 0.042 0.035 0.030  
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Table A2 
 Counter-Cyclical Equity Term Premia: Quarterly Returns 
This table shows the relation between term premia and the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio. The table 
reports the parameter estimate from the following regression: 
𝑟௧;௧ାଷ
௡ − 𝑟௧;௧ାଷ
௠ = 𝛽଴
௡,௠ + 𝛽ଵ
௡,௠(𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧) + 𝜖௧,௧ାଷ 
where 𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧ is the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio and 𝑟௧,௧ାଷ
௡  is the three-month forward return to the 
dividend claim with n year maturity. The regression is based on monthly rolling regressions. The t-statistics are based 
on Newey and West (1987) standard errors corrected for 8 lags. The maturities n and m are both measured in years. 
The row m=mean(1-7) refers to the average return to the one- through seven-year maturity dividend claim. The 
sample is from 2005 to 2016. 
 
Maturity of long-maturity claim (n) 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mkt 
Panel A: S&P 500 
       
      m=1 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.23 
 (0.50) (1.07) (1.63) (1.91) (2.00) (2.09) (3.23) 
      m=2  0.01 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 
  (1.33) (2.66) (2.57) (2.29) (2.06) (1.03) 
      m=3   0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08 
   (1.13) (0.84) (1.15) (1.03) (1.22) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.08 
       (1.18) 
Panel B: Nikkei 225 
       
      m=1 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.23 
 (2.33) (2.27) (2.07) (2.17) (2.15) (2.30) (1.31) 
      m=2  0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.16 
  (0.49) (0.72) (0.96) (0.95) (0.97) (1.39) 
      m=3   0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 
   (0.53) (0.56) (0.30) (-0.05) (0.68) 
      m=mean(1-7)       1.20 
       (0.19) 
Panel C: EuroStoxx 50 
       
      m=1 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 (1.08) (0.75) (0.65) (0.49) (0.41) (0.31) (0.37) 
      m=2  -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 
  (-1.33) (-1.50) (-1.65) (-2.18) (-2.36) (-0.59) 
      m=3   -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 
   (-1.69) (-1.38) (-1.55) (-1.63) (0.38) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.03 
       (0.90) 
 
      
continued… 
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Panel D: FTSE 100 
       
      m=1 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.19 
 (1.62) (1.29) (1.48) (1.51) (1.65) (1.59) (2.02) 
      m=2  -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.00 
  (-1.48) (-1.42) (-1.50) (-1.31) (-1.33) (-0.04) 
      m=3   -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 
   (-0.84) (-0.99) (-0.63) (-0.66) (0.66) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.08 
       (1.17) 
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Table A3 
 Counter-Cyclical Difference in Sharpe Ratios 
This table shows the relation between the difference in Sharpe ratios for equity claims with different maturity and the 
dividend price ratio of the market portfolio. The table reports the parameter estimate from the following regression: 
𝑆𝑅௧,௧ାଵଶ
௡ − 𝑆𝑅௧,௧ାଵଶ
௠ = 𝛽଴
௡,௠ + 𝛽ଵ
௡,௠(𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧) + 𝜖௧,௧ାଵଶ 
where 𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧ is the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio and 𝑆𝑅௧,௧ାଵଶ
௡  is the one-year log-Sharpe ratio of the 
log-return to the n maturity claim. The regression is based on monthly rolling regressions. The t-statistics are based 
on Newey and West (1987) standard errors corrected for 18 lags. The maturities n and m are both measured in years. 
The sample is from 2005 to 2016. 
 
Maturity of long-maturity claim (n) 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mkt 
Panel A: S&P 500 
       
      m=1 1.47 2.07 2.64 3.31 3.64 3.04 3.51 
 (2.63) (4.11) (5.56) (5.85) (5.65) (6.15) (12.89) 
      m=2  0.42 0.98 1.55 1.69 1.18 1.18 
  (2.24) (2.83) (2.97) (2.45) (2.70) (1.29) 
      m=3   0.63 0.95 0.87 0.51 1.08 
   (3.68) (2.85) (1.54) (1.26) (1.43) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.93 
       (1.47) 
Panel B: Nikkei 225 
       
      m=1 0.63 1.24 1.59 1.74 1.47 1.23 2.27 
 (0.64) (1.11) (1.22) (1.20) (0.90) (0.69) (1.48) 
      m=2  0.49 0.94 1.19 1.15 1.02 0.99 
  (3.64) (2.57) (2.24) (1.80) (1.43) (1.09) 
      m=3   0.35 0.47 0.35 0.03 0.12 
   (1.79) (1.39) (0.83) (0.07) (0.19) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.25 
       (0.51) 
Panel C: EuroStoxx 50 
       
      m=1 1.45 1.83 2.01 2.12 2.29 2.22 2.00 
 (5.73) (3.85) (3.71) (4.04) (4.75) (4.42) (2.43) 
      m=2  0.19 0.44 0.49 0.65 0.59 0.72 
  (0.77) (1.53) (1.75) (2.66) (2.52) (1.17) 
      m=3   0.17 0.31 0.44 0.44 0.69 
   (2.04) (4.56) (5.40) (3.77) (1.42) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.61 
       (1.23) 
 
      
Continued… 
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Panel D: FTSE 100 
       
      m=1 2.76 3.52 4.00 4.17 4.10 3.87 3.62 
 (4.32) (3.94) (3.64) (3.60) (3.58) (3.25) (3.31) 
      m=2  0.23 0.65 0.71 0.77 0.63 0.70 
  (0.56) (1.17) (1.12) (1.39) (1.14) (1.09) 
      m=3   0.49 0.42 0.45 0.24 0.29 
   (2.52) (1.79) (2.13) (0.90) (0.62) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.47 
       (1.19) 
        
 
  
67 
 
Table A4 
 Counter-Cyclical Equity Term Premia: Stambaugh Correction 
This table shows the relation between term premia and the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio. The table 
reports the parameter estimate from the following regression: 
𝑟௧;௧ାଵଶ
௡ − 𝑟௧;௧ାଵଶ
௠ = 𝛽଴
௡,௠ + 𝛽ଵ
௡,௠(𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧) + 𝜖௧,௧ାଵଶ 
where 𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧ is the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio and 𝑟௧,௧ାଵଶ
௡  is the twelve-month forward return to the 
dividend claim with n year maturity. The regression is based on monthly rolling regressions. The parameter estimate 
is corrected for the Stambaugh (1999) bias. The t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors 
corrected for 18 lags. The maturities n and m are both measured in years. The row m=mean(1-7) refers to the average 
return to the one- through seven-year maturity dividend claim. The sample is from 2005 to 2016. 
 
Maturity of long-maturity claim (n) 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mkt 
Panel A: S&P 500 
       
      m=1 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.49 
 (1.59) (1.97) (2.75) (3.41) (3.71) (3.94) (3.63) 
      m=2  0.02 0.10 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.27 
  (1.26) (2.94) (3.67) (3.66) (3.44) (1.83) 
      m=3   0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.21 
   (1.84) (1.15) (1.00) (1.02) (1.54) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.20 
       (1.46) 
Panel B: S&P 500 (using cay) 
       
      m=1 1.30 2.26 3.51 4.72 5.66 5.63 6.54 
 (1.10) (1.61) (2.44) (3.23) (3.80) (4.07) (3.47) 
      m=2  0.77 2.09 3.32 4.01 3.95 3.64 
  (1.74) (4.05) (4.82) (4.81) (3.45) (1.94) 
      m=3   1.22 2.31 2.90 2.82 2.93 
   (4.72) (3.56) (3.31) (2.41) (1.65) 
      m=mean(1-7)       1.93 
       (1.01) 
Panel C: Nikkei 225 
       
      m=1 0.39 0.63 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.65 
 (4.91) (3.23) (2.89) (2.64) (2.42) (2.31) (2.29) 
      m=2  0.17 0.25 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.32 
  (2.42) (2.17) (2.05) (1.91) (1.80) (1.52) 
      m=3   0.05 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 
   (1.08) (0.86) (0.57) (0.21) (-0.02) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.05 
       (0.38) 
 
      
continued… 
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Panel D: EuroStoxx 50 
       
      m=1 0.20 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.26 
 (1.70) (2.02) (2.05) (2.09) (2.02) (1.75) (1.65) 
      m=2  0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 
  (0.19) (-0.03) (-0.23) (-0.41) (-0.60) (-0.31) 
      m=3   -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 
   (-1.52) (-1.83) (-2.17) (-2.61) (-0.67) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.02 
       (0.23) 
Panel E: FTSE 100 
       
      m=1 0.26 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.43 
 (2.29) (2.52) (2.81) (2.53) (2.14) (1.75) (1.89) 
      m=2  -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 0.06 
  (-0.14) (-0.02) (-0.20) (-0.40) (-0.59) (0.23) 
      m=3   -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 0.01 
   (-0.16) (-0.55) (-0.80) (-0.99) (0.07) 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.09 
       (0.56) 
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Table A5 
 Predictability of Term Premia: R2 
This table shows the adjusted R2 from the following regression of realized term premia on the dividend price ratio: 
𝑟௧;௧ାଵଶ
௡ − 𝑟௧;௧ାଵଶ
௠ = 𝛽଴
௡,௠ + 𝛽ଵ
௡,௠(𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧) + 𝜖௧,௧ାଵଶ 
where 𝑑௧ − 𝑝௧ is the dividend price ratio of the market portfolio and 𝑟௧,௧ାଵଶ
௡  is the twelve-month forward return to the 
dividend claim with n year maturity. The regression is based on monthly rolling regressions. The maturities n and m 
are both measured in years. The row m=mean(1-7) refers to the average return to the one- through seven-year maturity 
dividend claim. The sample is from 2005 to 2016. 
 
Maturity of long-maturity claim (n) 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mkt 
Panel A: S&P 500 
       
      m=1 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.17 
      m=2  0.02 0.11 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.07 
      m=3   0.10 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.05 
        
Panel B: Nikkei 225        
      m=1 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.21 
      m=2  0.14 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.09 
      m=3   0.12 0.09 0.06 0.02 -0.01 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.01 
        
Panel C: Euro Stoxx 50        
      m=1 0.40 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.25 
      m=2  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
      m=3   -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.01 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.02 
        
Panel D: FTSE 100        
      m=1 0.41 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.21 
      m=2  0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
      m=3   0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.00 
      m=mean(1-7)       0.01 
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Chapter 2
Conditional Risk
with Christian Skov Jensen
Abstract:
We present a new direct methodology to study conditional risk, that is, the extra return
compensation for time-variation in risk. We show theoretically that the conditional part of
the CAPM can be captured by augmenting the standard market model with a conditional-
risk factor, which is a specific market timing strategy. Both in the U.S. and global sample
covering 23 countries, all major equity risk factors load on our conditional-risk factor, imply-
ing that each factor has a higher conditional market beta when the market risk premium is
high or the market variance is low. Accordingly, these factor returns can be partly explained
by conditional risk. Studying the economic drivers of these results, we find evidence that
conditional risk arises from variation in discount rate betas (not cash flow betas) due to the
endogenous e↵ects of arbitrage trading.
Keywords: asset pricing, conditional CAPM, factor models, time-varying discount rates.
JEL classification: G10, G12.
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According to the conditional CAPM, assets should have higher average returns if they
have high market betas during times where the market risk premium is high or the variance
is low. It is well known that such conditional risk cannot fully explain the return to the major
cross-sectional risk factors (Lewellen and Nagel, 2006), but exactly how much of the cross-
section of stock returns can be explained by conditional risk? Which is to say, how many of
the major risk factors load on conditional risk and exactly how much of the factor returns
does conditional risk explain? These questions have important implications for the economic
magnitude of equity risk factors and for market e ciency more generally. In addition, such
conditional risk is important for understanding the cost of capital of di↵erent firms and
investment projects and for evaluating the performance of professional asset managers. In
this paper, we therefore estimate and analyze the global impact of conditional risk on stock
returns.
We find that conditional risk is a pervasive feature of the data. In a global sample
covering 23 developed countries, all the major equity risk factors load on conditional risk.
This conditional risk explains a non-negligible part of these factors’ alpha: in the global
sample, conditional risk explains around 20% of the CAPM alpha of the average cross-
sectional risk factor. In addition, conditional risk explains all the alpha to time-series
strategies such as volatility-managed portfolios (Moreira and Muir, 2017) or time series
momentum (Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen, 2012). In testing for the economics behind this
pervasive influence of conditional risk, we find evidence that the conditional risk arises from
trading activities of constrained arbitrageurs.
Before we explain our method and results in detail, recall that the basic concern in the
conditional CAPM is that assets may have higher betas when the expected return is high or
variance is low, meaning that these assets derive alpha from market timing. Previous tests
of the conditional CAPM have accounted for such market timing by estimating time-varying
betas either using instruments (Jagannathan and Wang, 1996) or rolling short-horizon re-
gressions (Lewellen and Nagel, 2006) or both (Boguth, Carlson, Fisher, and Simutin, 2011;
Cederburg and O’Doherty, 2016). But these approaches leave some uncertainty about the
exact impact of conditional risk: instruments are unlikely to pick up all variation in betas
(Hansen and Richard, 1987), and rolling short-horizon betas are backward looking and may
miss some short-horizon variation.
Instead of using time-varying betas, we estimate the e↵ect of conditional risk by using a
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new conditional-risk factor. We show theoretically that if we know the conditional market
risk premium and variance, we can easily capture conditional risk in a factor regression
by using a conditional-risk factor. This factor is a dynamic investment strategy that in-
vests more in the market when the conditional market risk premium is high relative to the
variance. If an asset loads positively on this conditional-risk factor in factor regressions,
it means that the asset has a higher conditional market beta when either the market risk
premium is high or the variance is low, and that the asset therefore should have a higher
return than its unconditional market beta suggests.
The first step of our analysis is to construct this conditional-risk factor. To do so, we
need to estimate the conditional market risk premium and variance. Recent research o↵ers
a series of estimators of the conditional market risk premium,1 some of which are limited to
the U.S. or the recent sample. In our main analysis, we rely on the three-stage estimator of
Kelly and Pruitt (2013) because this estimator can be implemented in all the countries in
our sample and over the full sample length, and because it is proven to forecast returns well
both in- and out-of-sample. As to variance, we estimate this based on the assumption that
it follows an AR(1) process. Our results are not sensitive to these choices: we document in
the Appendix that our results are qualitatively the same when using other estimators of the
conditional market risk premium and variance.
We next use our conditional-risk factor to study conditional risk in the cross-section of
U.S. and global equities. As an example of this analysis, consider first the global value
factor. To estimate the conditional risk in the value factor, we regress the time series of its
excess return onto the market portfolio and our conditional-risk factor. Doing so, we find
that the value factor has an unconditional market beta of -0.09 and a conditional risk beta
of 0.03. The positive conditional risk beta implies that the conditional market beta for the
value factor increases when the market risk premium is high or the variance is low, meaning
that the factor is more risky than its unconditional market beta suggests. According to our
conditional-risk factor, this conditional risk justifies a 1.56 percentage points annual return.
These 1.56 percentage points represent 36% of the unconditional CAPM alpha for the value
strategy, suggesting that conditional risk cannot explain the full alpha to the value strategy,
but nonetheless explains a meaningful part.
More generally, we find in our long U.S. sample that the risk factors value, profitability,
1(e.g. Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001a; Campbell and Thompson, 2008; Binsbergen and Koijen, 2010; Kelly
and Pruitt, 2013; Martin, 2016)
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investment, momentum, and betting against beta all load positively on conditional risk.
Among these factors, conditional risk explains on average 11% of the unconditional alpha.
In our broad global sample from 1986-2016, we find qualitatively similar but quantitatively
stronger results: the risk factors value, profitability, investment, momentum, and betting
against beta all load on conditional risk, and this positive loading explains on average 20%
of the alpha to these strategies. We obtain similar results in the individual countries in our
sample: in 22 out of the 23 countries we study, the average cross-sectional equity risk factor
loads positively on conditional risk.
Another class of risk factors that we suspect load on conditional risk is time series
strategies. These are dynamic trading strategies that vary their position in the market
portfolio based on certain signals, meaning that they have time-varying betas and potentially
load on conditional risk. One such time series strategy is the volatility-managed portfolios
by Moreira and Muir (2017), which is a strategy that increases its position in the market
portfolio when the variance of the market is low. We study the strategy empirically and
find that conditional-risk explains all of its unconditional alpha, both in the U.S. and global
sample. Similarly, we find that conditional-risk helps explain the time-series momentum
strategy by Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012).
As the next part of the analysis, we ask why all the major risk factors load on conditional
risk. Which is to say, why do the cross-sectional risk factors all have higher conditional
betas when when the price of risk is high? As a first step in understanding the conditional
risk in the cross-sectional risk factors, we analyze whether the conditional-risk loadings
come from conditional cash flow- or discount rate risk. Similarly to how the return to the
market portfolio can be decomposed into discount rate news and cash flow news, we show
theoretically that one can decompose the conditional risk factor into a conditional cash-flow-
risk factor and a conditional discount-rate-risk factor. Using these two factors, we find that
the cross-sectional risk factors load primarily on conditional discount rate risk. This result
implies that the conditional risk in these factors comes from time-variation in conditional
discount rate betas, not conditional cash flow betas.
Motivated in part by this conditional discount rate risk, we next propose and test the
hypothesis that the conditional risk comes from arbitrage trading. The arbitrage trading
hypothesis, put forth by Cho (2017), argues that arbitrage trading creates betas because
funding shocks to arbitrageurs cause the assets in their portfolios to correlate. Indeed,
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these funding shocks force arbitrageurs to trade large proportions of their di↵erent assets
simultaneously. If the arbitrageurs are su ciently large, this trading has a price impact and
pushes the price of these assets in the same direction. If such a price impact occurs period
after period, the assets thus become correlated. To the extent that arbitrageurs trade both
the cross-sectional risk factors and the conditional-risk factor, these factors may thus be
correlated because of such arbitrage trading. We test the hypothesis and find consistent
empirical evidence. Indeed, we find that there is more conditional risk when there is more
arbitrage capital invested in the strategies.
In summary, we introduce a new factor to study conditional risk, and, using this factor,
we document that conditional risk is a pervasive feature in the data: all the major risk
factors load on conditional risk. These conditional risk loadings imply that the conditional
market betas of these strategies are higher when the conditional market risk premium is
high or variance low. Going beyond regular betas, we find that this variation in market
betas is driven by conditional discount rate betas, not conditional cash flow betas. Finally,
we find evidence that the time-variation in betas, and thus the conditional risk, comes from
arbitrage trading activities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 covers the theory behind conditional risk
in factor models and shows how it relates to the concepts of discount rate and cash flow
risk. Section 2 covers data and identification of expected return and variance. Section 3
studies conditional risk in stock returns. Section 4 studies the e↵ect of arbitrage trading
on conditional risk. Section 5 studies the robustness of the results. Section 6 discusses
the results in relation to previous implementations of conditional factor models. Section 7
concludes.
1 Conditional Risk Theory
1.1 A Simple Example: The CAPM
The CAPM is the following statement:
Et[r
i
t+1] =
covt(rit+1; r
m
t+1)
vart(rmt+1)
Et[r
m
t+1] =  tEt[r
m
t+1] (2.1)
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where rit+1 is the excess return to asset i between period t and t + 1, with m indexing the
market, and Et is the conditional expectation at time t.
To quantify the conditional risk in the CAPM, note first that taking unconditional
expectations of (2.1) gives
E[rit+1] = E[ t]E[r
m
t+1] + cov
 
 t;Et[r
m
t+1]
 
(2.2)
We show in the Appendix that the average beta can be written as
E[ t] =  ˜   cov
✓
 t;
vart(r˜mt+1)
var(r˜mt+1)
◆
(2.3)
where r˜mt+1 = r
m
t+1   Et[rmt+1] is the shock to the market portfolio and
 ˜ =
cov(rit+1; r˜
m
t+1)
var(r˜mt+1)
(2.4)
is the asset’s unconditional shock-beta. Inserting (2.3) into (2.2) gives
E[rit+1] =  ˜E[r
m
t+1] + cov
 
 t;Et[r
m
t+1]  b vart(r˜mt+1)
 | {z }
Conditional Risk
(2.5)
where the covariance term summarizes the conditional risk and
b =
E[rmt+1]
var(r˜mt+1)
(2.6)
is the unconditional price of risk. The above definition of conditional risk is almost identical
to the one reported in equation (3) in Lewellen and Nagel (2006); the only di↵erence is
that conditional risk holds with equality in the above definition whereas it holds only as
an approximation in Lewellen and Nagel. This di↵erence comes from the fact that we are
working with shock-betas whereas Lewellen and Nagel are working with traditional betas.
The expression (2.5) intuitively conveys what conditional risk is: conditional risk is the
tendency for an asset to have higher conditional beta when either the conditional market
risk premium is high or the conditional market variance is low. Lewellen and Nagel (2006),
and the literature in general, refers to these terms as market and volatility timing.
The expression for conditional risk in (2.5) features conditional betas, but we do not
76
need to observe these conditional betas to calculate conditional risk: we only need the part
of conditional betas that is spanned by the conditional market risk premium and variance.
In fact, there is an intuitive factor representation that captures the e↵ect of time-varying
betas. We first define the conditional risk factor as
ct+1 = r˜r+1(bt   b) (2.7)
where
bt =
Etrmt+1
vart(r˜r+1)
is the conditional price of risk. We can then rewrite the expression in (2.5) as
E[rit+1] =  ˜E[r
m
t+1] + cov(r
i
t+1; ct+1)| {z }
Conditional Risk
(2.8)
The covariance term in (2.8) captures conditional risk in another simple and intuitive
way. The conditional risk is positive if the asset in question tends to covary more with the
market when the price of risk is high, and the conditional risk is negative if the asset tends
to covary more with the market when the price of risk is low.
The shock to the market is part of the conditional risk factor but the market portfolio
is actually orthogonal to the conditional risk factor. To see why, note that the sign with
which the shock to the market influences the conditional risk factor is determined by the
conditional price of risk: when the price of risk is high, a positive shock to the market
increases the value of the conditional risk factor, and when the conditional price of risk is
low, a positive shock to the market decreases the value of the conditional risk fact. This
time-varying e↵ect of the shock to the market is what causes the market to be orthogonal
to the conditional risk factor: sometimes the market portfolio correlates positively with
the conditional risk factor and sometimes it correlates negatively with the conditional risk
factor; on average, the two e↵ects cancel out and the unconditional covariance with the
conditional risk factor is therefore zero. We formally summarize all the properties of the
conditional risk factor in Proposition 2.
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Example continued: The SDF Approach
We can arrive at the results above easily if we use the stochastic discount factor language
instead of the beta language. The stochastic discount factor approach is also useful when
generalizing the results to a multi-factor model.
The stochastic discount factor of the CAPM2 is
mt+1 =
1
Rft
  1
Rft
btr˜
m
t+1 (2.9)
which can be written as
mt+1 =
1
Rft
  1
Rft
br˜mt+1  
1
Rft
(bt   b)r˜mt+1 (2.10)
The law of one prices implies that
0 = Et[mt+1r
i
t+1] = Et[R
f
tmt+1r
i
t+1] (2.11)
By the law of iterated expectations we have
0 = E[Rftmt+1r
i
t+1)] (2.12)
= E[rit+1] + cov(r
i
t+1;R
f
tmt+1) (2.13)
meaning that
E[rit+1] =  cov(rit+1;Rftmt+1) (2.14)
=  ˜E[rmt+1] + cov(r
i
t+1; ct+1)| {z }
Conditional Risk
(2.15)
which is the same expression as in (2.8). In the following section we use the stochastic
2The notation for the stochastic discount factor for the CAPM in expression (2.9) di↵ers slightly from
the one usually used. Cochrane (2001) uses
mt+1 = At +BtR
M
t+1
where At = 1/R
f
t  BtEtRMt+1 and Bt =  bt/Rft . But this expression is of course the same as ours:
mt+1 = At +BtR
M
t+1 =
1
Rft
+Bt(R
M
t+1   Et[RMt+1]) =
1
Rft
  1
Rft
btr˜
m
t+1
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discount factor language to more formally derive a multi factor model with conditional risk.
1.2 Conditional Risk in Factor Models
We now derive a general statement for conditional risk in factor models. Consider the class
of factor models captured by the following stochastic discount factor for k = 1, . . . , K traded
risk factors:
mt+1 =
1
Rft
  1
Rft
KX
k=1
bkt r˜
k
t+1 (2.16)
where
r˜kt+1 = r
k
t+1   Et[rkt+1] (2.17)
and
bkt =
Et[rkt+1]
vart(r˜kr+1)
is the time t shock and price of risk for factor k. The expression in (2.16) can be rewritten
as
mt+1 =
1
Rft
  1
Rft
KX
k=1
bkr˜kt+1  
1
Rft
KX
k=1
(bkt   bk)r˜kt+1 (2.18)
where bk is the unconditional price of risk for factor k
bk =
E[rkt+1]
var(r˜kr+1)
By applying the law of one price and taking unconditional expectations, we can state
an unconditional model that incorporates conditional risk. Before doing so, we define the
conditional risk factors ckt+1 = r˜
k
r+1(b
k
t   bk).
Proposition 1 (conditional risk in factor models)
The unconditional expected excess return on an asset i is given by
E[rit+1] =
KX
k=1
 ˜k k +
KX
k=1
 kc  
k
c (2.19)
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where
 ˜k =
cov(rit+1; r˜
k
t+1)
var(r˜kt+1)
,  k = E[rkt+1], (2.20)
 kc =
cov(rit+1; c
k
t+1)
var(ckt+1)
,  kc = var(c
k
t+1) (2.21)
In the factor model above, each factor k is represented by two betas: one for its uncon-
ditional risk and the other for its conditional risk. These two orthogonal factors capture all
of the unconditional implications of the stochastic discount factor in (2.16). The following
proposition summarizes the properties of the two factors and their betas.
Proposition 2 (properties of conditional risk factors and betas)
2.a (zero mean factors): The means of all factors are zero:
E[r˜kt+1] = E[c
k
t+1] = 0 (2.22)
2.b (uncorrelated factors): For each factor k, the return and shock to the risk factor is
uncorrelated with the conditional risk factor:
cov(rkt+1; c
k
t+1) = cov(r˜
k
t+1; c
k
t+1) = 0 (2.23)
2.c (shock betas for the factors): The factor k has a loading of one on its own shock:
cov(rkt+1; r˜
k
t+1)
var(r˜kt+1)
= 1 (2.24)
2.d (constant-beta equivalence): If an asset j has a constant conditional beta, the expected
return is given by the usual unconditional beta. That is, if
 kt =
covt(r
j
t+1; r
k
t+1)
vart(rkt+1)
= c (2.25)
then
 ˜k =  k and  kc = 0 (2.26)
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While Proposition 1 allows for the estimation of a k factor model, we will focus on the
one factor CAPM model in the empirical section. We do so because conditional risk with
respect to the market portfolio has the most tangible interpretation and because the market
factor is the most widely used factor.
1.3 Conditional Cash Flow and Discount Rate Risk
Conditional market risk arises because conditional market betas are higher when the price
of risk is higher. As shown by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), conditional market betas
are the sum of the given asset’s conditional cash flow and discount rate betas. Accordingly,
the conditional risk must come from either conditional cash flow or discount rate betas
being high when the price of risk is high. In this section, we show how to estimate these
two sources of conditional risk by decomposing the conditional risk factor into two.
First note that shocks to the market portfolio, r˜t+1, are given by cash flow news and
discount rate news (Campbell and Shiller, 1988):
r˜mt+1 = NCF,t+1 +NDR,t+1 (2.27)
The beta of an individual stock can then be expressed as:
 t =
covt(rit+1;NCF,t+1)
vart(r˜t+1)
+
covt(rit+1;NDR,t+1)
vart(r˜t+1)
(2.28)
 t ⌘  CFt +  DRt (2.29)
Similarly, the market’s conditional risk factor can be decomposed into two parts:
cmt+1 = r˜
m
r+1(b
m
t   bm) (2.30)
= NCF,t+1(b
m
t   bm) +NDR,t+1(bmt   bm) (2.31)
⌘ cCFt+1 + cDRt+1 (2.32)
where cCFt+1 is the conditional cash-flow-risk factor and c
DR
t+1 is the conditional discount-rate-
risk factor. Loading on conditional cash flow risk and conditional discount rate risk has a
tangible economic interpretation. The unconditional covariance with the two risk factors
summarizes the covariance of cash flow- and discount rate betas with the expected return
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and variance:
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2 Methodology
2.1 Identifying Conditional Moments
In order to estimate our factor model, we must estimate the conditional mean and variance
of the factors. In this section, we outline the identifying assumptions we rely on in doing
so.
To estimate the conditional market risk premium, we use the three pass estimator sug-
gested by Kelly and Pruitt (2013). The estimator uses the cross-section of valuation ratios
to estimate the expected return. By using the cross-section of valuation ratios rather than
just the valuation ratio for the market, it is possible to separate the e↵ect of expected growth
rates and expected discount rates. Accordingly, the methodology consistently recovers the
conditional market risk premium based on two simple identifying assumptions: (1) the ex-
pected log return and log growth rates are linear in a set of latent factors, and (2) these
factors evolve according to a first-order vector autoregression.
We rely on the Kelly and Pruitt estimator for multiple reasons. Most importantly, the
method is proven to predict the one-month expected market return well both in- and out-
of-sample, and it is proven to work in both the U.S. and internationally. Indeed, Kelly
and Pruitt (2013) show that the estimator predicts the one-month expected return on the
U.S. market portfolio with an R2 of 2.38 in-sample and 0.93 out-of-sample; and it predicts
the global market portfolio with an R2 of 1.5 out-of-sample. In addition, the estimator
consistently recovers the market risk premium under assumptions that are consistent with
the null-hypothesis we test against when we are testing for conditional risk.
With respect to the variance, we similarly assume that the market variance evolves ac-
cording to a first-order autoregression. We rely on this assumption because it is transparent
and in line with recently published papers revolving around time-varying variance, such as
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Campbell, Giglio, Polk, and Turley (2017).
Our results in the empirical section are highly robust to other measures of expected
return and variance. We verify in the Appendix that the results are robust to estimating
expected returns based on the measures of Campbell and Thompson (2008). We also verify
that the results are robust to using the variance estimated in Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou
(2009) or calculating variance based on SVIX.
In order to estimate conditional cash flow and discount rate risk, we need to decompose
returns into cash flow news and discount rate news. For simplicity, we rely on the quarterly
time series estimated by Campbell, Giglio, Polk, and Turley (2017). The authors make the
time series available online.
2.2 Data
Our sample consists of equities from 23 di↵erent countries between August 1963 and De-
cember 2016. The 23 markets in our sample correspond to the countries belonging to the
MSCI World Developed Index as of December 31, 2016. Stock returns are from the union
of the CRSP tape and the XpressFeed Global Database. All returns are in USD and do not
include any currency hedging. All excess returns are measured as excess returns above the
U.S. Treasury bill rate. We report summary statistics in Table 1.
We study conditional risk in each country in our sample and in a broad global sample.
Our broad sample of global equities contains all available common stocks on the union of
the CRSP tape and the XpressFeed Global database. For companies traded in multiple
markets we use the primary trading vehicle identified by XpressFeed. Our global sample
runs from January 1986 to December 2016 because XpressFeed’s Global coverage starts in
1986 for most countries (see Table 1).
The Kelly and Pruitt (2013) estimator takes as input portfolios sorted on size and book-
to-market. In the U.S., we use 100 portfolios sorted unconditionally on size and book-to-
market from Ken French’s website. In the global sample, we similarly create 100 portfolios
sorted unconditionally on size and book-to-market. In the individual international countries,
we create 25 portfolio sorted first on size and then conditionally on book-to-market. We
use only 25 portfolios and conditional sorts because some of the countries have few firms
in the beginning of the sample and the conditional sorts into 25 portfolios helps ensure an
adequate number of firms in each portfolio.
83
We calculate monthly variance as the sum of squared daily residuals over the month
with a degree of freedom adjustment for the estimation of the mean.
cvart(r˜mt+1) = nn  1
nX
i=1
(rmi   r¯m)2 (2.35)
where n is the number of trading days in the month. The estimation assumes that the
expected return is constant during each month.
The expected time t variance is then calculated as:
vart(r˜
m
t+1) = ✓ˆ0 + ✓ˆ1cvart 1(r˜mt ) (2.36)
where ✓ˆ0 and ✓ˆ1 are parameter estimates from the following regression:
cvart(r˜mt+1) = ✓0 + ✓1cvart 1(r˜mt ) (2.37)
We rely on in-sample estimations for the expected variance, but the results are robust to
using out-of-sample estimates of the variance as in Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009).
3 Conditional Risk in Stock Returns
Table 1 o↵ers summary statistics of the 24 exchanges in our sample. The first three columns
show the time-series median market capitalization of the firms listed in a given country, the
time-series median number of firms, and the time-series average weight of the given country
in the global portfolio. The U.S. has a high average weight in the global portfolio, but
this is largely driven by the early years 1986-1990 where the U.S. constitutes the most of
the sample. The weight of the U.S. market is downward trending throughout the sample
and towards the end of the sample the weight of the U.S. is around .2. The fifth and the
sixth columns in Table 1 show the average standard deviation and market risk premium in
annualized terms.
The last three columns of Table 1 shows the R2 of the expected variance and return to
the market portfolio. Regarding the variance, the R2 is generally around 30% to 50%, with
the U.S. and the global portfolio being in the low end. This high R2 corresponds to previous
studies on predicting variance (Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou, 2009; Bollerslev, Hood, Huss,
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and Pedersen, 2016), suggesting that our simple method for predicting variance works well.
The two last columns of Table 1 summarize the R2 of the expected return on the market
portfolio. The first column shows the R2 of the expected log return to the market portfolio,
which is what the Kelly Pruitt estimator extracts. The last column shows the expected
excess returns, which is calculated under the assumption of log-normally distributed returns
by adding one-half the conditional log-variance to the log-return, taking the exponential,
and subtracting the risk-free rate.
The table shows that the R2 for the log-returns in the U.S. and the global sample is 1.6%
and 2.4%, which is around the same as reported by Kelly and Pruitt (2013). Internationally,
the R2 vary between 0.5% to 3.3%, with the median being 2.2%. The results reported by
Kelly and Pruitt for the U.S. and global sample thus appear to extend to most individual
exchanges. The R2 for the expected excess return are similar to those for the log-return.
The expected variance and market return is used to calculate the relative price of risk
bt  b, which is an important input for the conditional-risk factor. Figure 1 visually inspects
this relative price of risk in the U.S. (Panel A) and the global sample (Panel B). The price of
risk varies substantially on both the short and long horizon. The substantial short horizon
variation in the price of risk underlines the importance of using a forward looking measure
of the price of risk. Indeed, an alternative to our approach is to implement the conditional
CAPM over short horizons for which the price of risk is assumed to be constant. If daily
data are available, the horizon is often around three to six months, and if daily data are
not available, the horizon is substantially longer. The price of risk in Figure 1 exhibits
substantial variation over these horizons, which, if statistically significant and not driven by
forecast errors, invalidates this unparemetric approach.
The price of risk in Figure 1 also shows substantial long-run variation that appears
closely linked to economic conditions. In the U.S. in particular, the price of risk tends to
increase in the years following economic recessions: the price of risk increases in the years
following the recessions in 1973-1975, 1981-1982, 1990-1991, 2001, and 2007-2009. On the
other hand, the price of risk is lowest during the tech bubble. The price of risk is also low
during the onset of the financial crisis. This result is similar to the findings in Moreira and
Muir (2017). Moreira and Muir argue that in the beginning of the financial crisis, and crises
more generally, the variance increases by more than the market risk premium which causes
the price of risk to go down.
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Another way to visualize conditional risk is by looking at the realizations of the conditional-
risk factor. Doing so gives us a rough idea of which kinds of assets that have positive condi-
tional risk: an assets with a return that net of the market mimics the conditional-risk factor
would has a high level of conditional risk. Panel A in Figure 2 plots the two-year cumulative
realization of the conditional-risk factor in the U.S.. The two-year realization shows distinct
patterns. In particular, the cumulative value decreases during the tech bubble, indicating
that an asset that performed poorly during the tech bubble has a high level of conditional
risk. The value factor (HML) is a prominent example of such an asset: value stocks lost
heavily to growth stocks during the tech bubble. Accordingly, we would expected HML to
be an asset with high conditional risk. Consistent with this logic, and previous research3,
we find empirically that HML has substantial conditional risk.
More generally, Panel B in Figure 2 plots, along with the two-year realization of the
conditional-risk factor, the two-year realization to an average cross-sectional risk factor
which we call the composite risk factor. The composite risk factor is the average return
to the factors value (HML), profitability (RMW), investment (CMA), momentum (UMD),
and betting against beta (BAB). The figure shows that the two-year realizations of the
composite risk factor and the conditional-risk factor are correlated. For instance, both
factors earn high return during the 1980s, lose substantially during the tech bubble, earn
high returns again during the 2001-2003 stock market contraction, and lose substantially
during the market rebound after the financial crisis. This visual evidence suggests that the
composite risk factor might load on conditional risk. We next address formally whether the
risk factors load on conditional risk through factor analysis.
3.1 Conditional Risk in the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
In this section, we analyze conditional risk in the cross-sectional of equities by implementing
the conditional CAPM as an unconditional two-factor model following Proposition 1. Table
2 summarizes the results for seven cross-sectional risk factors: size (SMB), value (HML),
profitability (RMW), investment (CMA), momentum (UMD), and betting against beta
(BAB), and a composite factor (COMP) which is the average return to the last five major
risk factors. Panel A shows the results in the U.S. The first row shows the monthly alpha
in percent. The alpha is statistically significant for all the strategies except the size factor.
3For previous research on conditional risk in HML, see Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b); Lewellen and
Nagel (2006).
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The positive two-factor alphas mean that the well-documented unconditional CAPM alphas
of these factors cannot be explained by conditional risk. For HML and UMD, this result
is similar to those found by Lewellen and Nagel (2006) and Boguth, Carlson, Fisher, and
Simutin (2011), but for betting against beta our results di↵er from previous findings in
Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016). We compare our results more closely to the literature
later in the paper.
The third row of Panel A, which shows the loading on the conditional risk factor, reveals
a striking relationship between alpha and loading on conditional risk: all the risk factors that
have positive alpha are positively exposed to conditional risk. Indeed, value, profitability,
investment, momentum, and betting against beta all have positive loadings on conditional
risk. The only factor that does not have a positive loading is size, for which the loading is
statistically insignificant.
The fourth row summarizes how large a compensation the conditional risk loadings
warrant. As mentioned, conditional risk cannot explain the full alpha of the strategies, but
it does explain a meaningful amount. Indeed, conditional risk explains between between .03
and .12 percentage point of monthly return, equivalent to 0.39 to 1.41 percentage point of
annual return. This is a large amount in absolute terms, considering it arises simply from a
failure to implement the CAPM correctly in the first place. It is also a large amount relative
to the unconditional CAPM alpha, as can be seen in the sixth row. Indeed, conditional risk
explains 8% to 15% of the unconditional CAPM alpha for these strategies; for the average
factor COMP, conditional risk explains 11% of CAPM alpha.
Panel B reports the results from the global sample. Qualitatively, the results are similar:
value, profit, investment, momentum, betting against beta, and the composite factor are all
positively exposed to conditional risk; but the e↵ect of conditional risk is not large enough to
render the two-factor alphas insignificant. Furthermore, the size factor is negatively exposed
to conditional risk but the exposure is close to zero and statistically insignificant, as in the
U.S.
The economic magnitude of conditional risk is larger in the global sample than in the
U.S.. Indeed, conditional risk explains as much as 0.17 percentage points of monthly return,
equivalent to 2.03 percentage point of annual return. This larger absolute e↵ect of condi-
tional risk, combined with the fact that the average risk factor has lower alpha in the global
sample, means that conditional risk explains a larger fraction of the unconditional CAPM
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alpha. Indeed, conditional risk explains betwen 10% and 36% of the unconditional CAPM
alpha to the di↵erent strategies; for the average factor COMP, conditional risk explains 20%
of CAPM alpha, which is twice as much as in the U.S..
In absolute magnitude, the largest e↵ect of conditional risk is found in betting against
beta, both in the U.S. and the global sample. This large e↵ect of conditional risk on betting
against beta may, however, partly come from di↵erences in the methodology underlying the
factors, as the betting against beta factor uses the more aggressive rank-weighted method-
ology whereas the other factors use the traditional Fama and French approach. Measured
in percent of unconditional CAPM alpha, the e↵ect of conditional risk is more nuanced. In
the U.S., the factor for which conditional risk explains the largest fraction of unconditional
CAPM alpha is the profitability factor. In the global sample, the factor for which condi-
tional risk explains the largest fraction of unconditional CAPM alpha is the value factor, as
conditional risk explain 36% of the conditional CAPM alpha to value.
Table 3 shows ten portfolios sorted on aggregate characteristics. We rank all stocks
based on size, book-to-market, profitability, investment, momentum, and beta, and assign a
standardized z-score for each of the characteristics to each stock. We then take the average
of these z-scores and form portfolios based on this average. This method is similar to that
used by Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2013) when measuring the quality of stocks. We
set up all characteristics such that they are positively related to expected return, meaning
that a higher average z-score leads to a higher expected return.
Panel A shows the results for the portfolios sorted on average characteristics in the
U.S.. The first row shows the monthly alpha which, as expected, increases monotonically
in the average characteristic. The long-short portfolio in the rightmost column has a large
monthly alpha of 1.06% which is highly significant, again underlying that conditional risk
cannot fully explain the characteristics.
More importantly, the conditional risk loading also increases almost monotonically in the
aggregate characteristic, meaning that the long-short portfolio has a large and statistically
significant loading on conditional risk. The conditional risk loading explains 0.13 percentage
points of monthly return for the long-short portfolio. The 0.13 monthly percentage points
correspond to 11% of the unconditional CAPM alpha.
The results in the global sample are similar to the U.S. results, but again the economic
magnitude is larger in the global sample. As seen in Panel B, the alpha and conditional
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risk loading both increase monotonically in the average characteristic. As to the economic
size, conditional risk explains 0.19 percentage points of monthly return to the long-short
portfolio, which corresponds to 18% of the unconditional CAPM alpha.
We next analyze the conditional risk in the average COMP factor in all the individual
exchanges in our sample. Figure 3 summarizes the results. In 22 out of the 23 countries,
the COMP factor loads positively on the conditional risk factor. The conditional risk factor
explains the largest absolute amount of return in Germany and Finland where it explains
0.16 percentage point of monthly return (1.92 annually). In general, the e↵ect appears
stronger on the larger exchanges: the five largest exchanges in our sample are the U.S.,
Japan, Germany, Great Britain, and France, for which the loading on conditional risk is
positive.
We next address whether the conditional risk in the equity risk factors comes from
conditional cash flow risk or conditional discount rate risk. We do so by splitting the
conditional risk factor into a cash flow and a discount rate part, as shown in the theory.
Table 5 reports the results. Except for SMB, all factors load positively on the factor for
conditional discount rate risk. The loadings on the factor for cash flow risk are more varied
and do not have as pervasive a pattern. These results suggest that conditional risk comes
from time-variation in conditional discount rate betas.
All in all, we find a strong relationship between expected returns and conditional risk
loadings in the cross-section of stocks, both in the U.S. and internationally. The pervasive
relationship between conditional risk and expected returns suggests that a fundamental
economic mechanism might be driving the results. We look closer into such an economic
mechanism in the next section, but before doing so we study conditional risk in time-series
strategies.
3.2 Conditional Risk in Time-Series Strategies
In this section, we use our two-factor model to evaluate time-series strategies that try to
time the market by increasing the position in the market portfolio when the price of risk is
high. In doing so, the strategies may load on conditional risk, and it is therefore natural to
test if our two-factor model can explain the return to the two strategies.
The two strategies we consider are ”volatility-managed portfolios” (Moreira and Muir,
2017) and ”time-series momentum” (Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen, 2012). The volatility-
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managed portfolio by Moreira and Muir increases the position in the market portfolio when
the volatility is lower. The authors argue that, because volatility and expected return is far
from perfectly correlated, volatility timing also causes price-of-risk timing. Consistent with
this, Moreira and Muir show that the volatility-managed portfolios indeed are associated
with positive CAPM alphas.
The time-series momentum strategy goes long or short the market portfolio dependent
on the momentum of the market portfolio. If the average return over the last year (skipping
the most recent month) is positive, the strategy goes long the market portfolio, and vice
versa. In addition, the position in the market portfolio is scaled to have a constant volatility.
Therefore, to the extent that the momentum captures the expected return, the strategy is
timing both expected return and variance, or equivalently, the price of risk. Moskowitz,
Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) verify that the strategy delivers a highly significant alpha across
60 di↵erent indices.4
Table 6 reports the results from evaluating the time-series strategies in our two-factor
model. The two leftmost columns show the results for the volatility-managed portfo-
lios. Conditional risk explains the alpha associated with volatility-managed portfolios: the
volatility-managed portfolio has a monthly alpha of 0.02% (t-stat of 0.22) in the U.S. and
0.00% (t-stat of 0.06) in the global sample, meaning that conditional risk explains 89%
and 100% of the unconditional CAPM alpha. Regarding time-series momentum in the two
rightmost columns, the alpha is insignificant in the global sample but remains significant
in the U.S., which is surprising. The positive alpha in the U.S. ultimately comes from the
fact that the time-series momentum strategy picks up a signal about expected return that
is not captured by our measure of expected return.
Tables 7 and 8 report the global pervasiveness of this pattern. Across 23 of the 24
exchanges, the volatility-managed portfolio loads on conditional risk. Similarly, the time
series momentum portfolio loads on conditional risk in 23 of the 24 exchanges.
4Month by month, both of these strategies are only taking a position in the market portfolio, meaning
that by definition they cannot have any conditional alpha. It is clear, however, that if they successfully
time the market portfolio and thus load on the conditional risk factor, the strategies will have unconditional
alpha when measured only against the market portfolio.
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4 Arbitrage Trading as the Source of Conditional Risk
Section 3 documents that the five largest cross-sectional risk factors all load on condi-
tional risk. In this section, we investigate the driver behind this pervasive pattern. In our
framework, understanding the driver of conditional risk amounts to understanding why the
cross-sectional risk factors are correlated with the conditional-risk factor. One way this cor-
relation can arise is through arbitrage trading. Indeed, when arbitrageurs trade they create
correlation between the assets that they trade (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Cho, 2017). In
particular, Cho (2017) argues that the funding shocks to arbitrageurs cause the assets in
their portfolios to correlate because these funding shocks force arbitrageurs to trade large
fractions of their assets. If the arbitrageurs are su ciently large, this trading has a price
impact and pushes the price on these assets in the same direction. If such price impact oc-
curs period after period, the assets thus become correlated. To the extent that arbitrageurs
trade both the cross-sectional risk factors and the conditional-risk factor, these factors may
thus be correlated because of such arbitrage trading.
This arbitrage trading hypothesis o↵ers clear, testable implications. First, the arbi-
trageurs must trade both the cross-sectional risk factors and the conditional-risk factor.
Second, the loading of the cross-sectional risk factors on the conditional-risk factor should
be larger when the arbitrageurs are more sensitive to funding shocks. Finally, the loadings
on the conditional-risk factor should also be larger when the arbitrageurs trade the factors
more intensively.
We first verify that arbitrageurs indeed trade the conditional-risk factor. Trading the
conditional risk factor amounts to following a market timing strategy where one enters and
exists the market based on the conditional price of risk. One can interpret this literally as
some arbitrageurs following such market timing strategies, which they indeed do (Pedersen,
2015). But one can also interpret their market timing as simply being changes in the market
tilt in their portfolio. For instance, a discretionary money manager might be inclined to be
long more stocks when the price of risk is high, and fewer when the price of risk is low. One
way to address if arbitrageurs are more long the market when the price of risk high is by
studying their net position in S&P 500 futures. Following Bessembinder (1992); De Roon,
Nijman, and Veld (2000); Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012), we estimate the net specu-
lative demand in S&P 500 futures. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
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requires large traders to identify themselves as commercial or non-commercial traders. We
interpret the position of commercial traders as the arbitrageurs and, following the above
literature, estimate their net demand as
NSDt =
Speculator long positions  Speculator short positions
Open interest
(2.38)
In Panel A of Table 9, we regress the price of risk, bt, on the NSDt. NSDt is positively
correlated with the price of risk, bt, in both the U.S. and global sample. The correlation
between NSDt and the U.S. price of risk is 0.21 and the correlation with the global price
of risk is 0.28 (in both samples we use the position in S&P 500 futures as our measure of
NSDt). These results suggest that the arbitrageurs indeed trade the conditional-risk factor.
We next consider how leverage influences the amount of conditional risk in the cross-
sectional risk factors. There are two reasons to believe that leverage should increase the
amount of conditional risk. First, arbitrageurs are likely to be more sensitive to funding
shocks when they are more levered. Second, when arbitrageurs are more levered they hold a
larger fraction of the available assets and therefore have a larger price impact, meaning that
their trading has larger impact on betas. We therefore test if the cross-sectional risk factors
load more on the conditional-risk factor when leverage is higher by running the following
regression:
COMPt+1 = ✓0 + ✓1ct+1 + ✓2 (ct+1 ⇥ LEVt) + ✏t+1 (2.39)
where LEVt is the amount of intermediary leverage at time t as estimated by He, Kelly, and
Manela (2016). A positive ✓2 in the regression means that the loading on the conditional
risk factor is higher when leverage is larger.
Panel C of Table 9 reports the results on how leverage influences conditional risk. As
can be seen in the table, the composite factor loads positively on the interaction term in
(2.39), which means that the composite factor loads more on the conditional-risk factor
when financial intermediaries are more levered.
We next test how the exposure of the arbitrageurs to the composite risk factor influences
the factor’s loading on conditional risk. One of the main drivers of how much arbitrageurs
hold of a risk factor is the factor’s expected return. We therefore test if the composite
factor loads more on conditional risk when its expected return is higher. As the measure of
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expected return, we use the average value spread of the five factors in the composite risk
factor. We measure the value spread of an individual factor as the di↵erence in log-book-
to-market in the long- and the short leg of the factor.
Accordingly, Table 10 reports the results of the following regression of the composite
risk factor on the conditional-risk factor and the conditional-risk factor interacted with the
ex-ante value spread:
COMPmt+1 =  
m
0 +  
m
1 c
m
t+1 +  
m
2
 
cmt+1 ⇥ V Smt
 
+ ✏mt+1 (2.40)
where m denotes country and V Smt is the value spread for the composite risk factor in
countrym at time t. A positive  k2 in the regression means that the loading on the conditional
risk factor is larger when the value spread is larger.
As can be seen in column 6 in Table 10, the composite risk factor loads more on condi-
tional risk when the value spread is larger. This result holds in 22 out of the 24 samples.
The e↵ect is statistically significant in the U.S. and global sample. These results are con-
sistent with the conditional risk being driven by arbitrageurs who are more exposed to the
risk factors when the expected return on the factors is high.
Finally, Cho (2017) argues that the arbitrage capital in the cross-sectional risk factors
is substantially larger in the post-1994 period. If conditional risk is a result of arbitrage
trading, we should thus expect to mainly find it in this late sample. Accordingly, Table
11 splits the U.S. sample into pre- and post-1994. As can be seen in the table, conditional
risk is almost exclusively a feature of the late sample. In the post-1994 sample, the e↵ect
of conditional risk is substantially larger than in the full U.S. sample reported in Table 2
Panel A. In contrast, conditional risk is hardly present in the pre-1994 sample. The results
are thus consistent with our arbitrage trading hypothesis: without any arbitrage capital,
there is no conditional risk.5
Cho (2017) also shows that the factors that have larger alphas in the early sample attract
more arbitrage capital. Accordingly, we should expect the factors that have larger alphas
(or information ratios) in the pre-1994 sample to have more conditional risk in the post-1994
sample. Consistent with this prior, we see that the factor with the largest pre-1994 alphas,
namely betting against beta, also has the most conditional risk in the late sample. Similarly,
momentum and value are the second and third most profitable pre-1994 factors, and these
5The results reported in Table 11 are not sensitive to the choice of 1994 as the cut-o↵ year.
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have the second and third most conditional risk in the late sample.
Finally, it is worth providing a simple example of how the arbitrage trading actually
creates time-variation in the conditional betas. Consider an economy with two states: a
high and a low price-of-risk state. In the high price-of-risk state, the arbitrageurs are long
the market and in the low price-of-risk state they are short the market. In both states, they
hold the composite risk factor. In the good state, funding shocks to the arbitrageurs create
a positive correlation between the composite risk factor and the market factor because they
are long both factors, which means that the conditional beta of the composite factor is
high in this high state. Similarly, funding shocks create negative correlation between the
composite risk factor and the market when the price of risk is low because the arbitrageur
is short the market. Accordingly, the arbitrage trading creates low conditional betas for the
composite risk factor in this low state. Taken together, the funding shocks and the resulting
arbitrage trading thus create high conditional betas when the price of risk is high and low
conditional betas when the price of risk is low, which is to say that it creates conditional
risk.
In conclusion, we find strong evidence that conditional risk is driven in part by arbitrage
activity. If arbitrageurs trade both the cross-sectional risk factors and the conditional-
risk factor, these become correlated and the cross-sectional risk factors therefore load on
conditional risk. This e↵ect is stronger the more the arbitrageurs are present in the factors.
Consistent with this, we find that the conditional risk in the cross sectional risk factors is
stronger when: (1) the factors have higher expected return and arbitrageurs therefore are
trading them more; (2) there is more leverage in the economy and arbitrageurs therefore
are likely to hold larger positions; and (3) there is more arbitrage capital. In addition, using
the net speculative position in S&P 500 futures, we find evidence that arbitrageurs trade
the conditional-risk factor.
5 Robustness
In this section we consider how robust our results are to using other measures of the con-
ditional market risk premium and variance. Tables A1 to A10 report a range of robustness
checks where we redo our analysis using di↵erent measures of these conditional estimates.
Tables A1 through A4 show the results of using the measures of expected return reported
in Campbell and Thompson (2008). Campbell and Thompson show how the dividend price
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ratio, earnings price ratio, and book-to-market are linked to the expected market return
through accounting identities. Using these identities, we calculate the expected market risk
premium and estimate the conditional risk factor and the market shock factor. The results
are robust to using these measures of expected returns. The composite risk factors load
on the conditional risk factor in both the U.S. and global sample for all three measures of
expected return. In addition, the composite risk factor loads on conditional risk in at least
18 of the 22 other samples. The economic e↵ect of conditional risk is, however, smaller than
when using the Kelly-Pruitt measure of expected return.
Tables A5 and A6 report results where the market risk premium is assumed to be con-
stant, such that only the expected variance varies. The results are also robust to this
specification: the composite risk factor loads on conditional risk in all samples. However,
the economic e↵ect is smaller, with conditional risk only explaining about 4% of the alpha.
Tables A7 and A8 report results where the variance is assumed constant, such that
only the expected market risk premium varies. We again extract the conditional market
risk premium using the Kelly-Pruitt method. The results are robust, with all risk factors
loading on conditional risk in the U.S. sample (except SMB), and with the composite risk
factor loading on conditional risk in all but two of the 24 samples. In addition, the economic
e↵ect is close to as large as when using time-varying variance.
Finally, Table A9 reports results in the U.S. sample when using more sophisticated
methods for estimating expected variance. Panel A reports results of using the expected
variance in Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009). The results are robust. Similarly to our
baseline case, all the major risk factors load on conditional risk. The economic e↵ect is
slightly larger than in the baseline case. Panel B reports the results of using the risk neutral
variance SVIX. These results are also robust, with all risk factors loading on conditional
risk.
Finally, in Table A10 we report results based on using an index of multiple estimators
for the conditional market risk premium. We calculate the index of expected returns as
the average of the expected return in Campbell and Thompson (2008); Kelly and Pruitt
(2013); Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) and Martin (2016). The results are robust to using
this index of expected returns: both in the U.S. and globally, the factors have the same
conditional-risk loadings as when using just the Kelly and Pruitt (2013) estimate for the
conditional market risk premium.
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In conclusion, we find that our results are robust to various di↵erent methods for iden-
tifying and estimating the conditional market risk premium and variance. The results are
stronger than the baseline results if we use more sophisticated measures of conditional vari-
ance, but weaker if we assume constant variance. The results are robust to, but weaker,
when using simpler measures of the conditional market risk premium.
6 Relation to the Literature
Our results relate to and extend a long strand of literature on the conditional CAPM. Jagan-
nathan and Wang (1996) show that the conditional CAPM helps explain asset returns when
using instruments to measure betas. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) show that using the cay
variable variable as instrument explains the returns to size and value sorted portfolio, but
Lewellen and Nagel (2006) argue that the e↵ect is overestimated and that the conditional
CAPM cannot explain the cross-section of stocks. Lewellen and Nagel further advocate
the use of short-horizon regressions as an instrument-free way of testing the conditional
CAPM. However, Boguth, Carlson, Fisher, and Simutin (2011) argue that the short-horizon
regressions has certain small-sample issues, and instead advocate the use of an instrumental
approach that uses past betas and state variables as instruments. Using this approach, they
show that momentum portfolios load on conditional risk. More recently, Cederburg and
O’Doherty (2016) argue that the conditional CAPM explains the low risk anomaly doc-
umented by Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). Going
beyond unconditional expected returns, Nagel and Singleton (2011) test the additional im-
plication that conditional expected returns must be consistent with the conditional factor
models. In the following, we address more closely the two papers most closely related to
ours.
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b): Our approach is most closely related to the study by
Lettau and Ludvigson. Similarly to Lettau and Ludgivson, we estimate the price of risk
rather than time-variation in betas and use this estimate of the price of risk to implement
the conditional CAPM. The di↵erence in our approaches is that we explicitly estimate the
price of risk by estimating the expected return and variance, whereas Lettau and Ludvigson
assume that it is a function of the cay variable. To estimate the risk premium on their
conditional risk factor, they must estimate the variance of the price of risk, which they
do in a second-stage regression in the cross-section of stocks. However, this second-stage
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regression may estimate unrealistically high variance of the price of risk, leading to an
overestimation of the ability of the conditional CAPM to explain the cross-section of stock.
Indeed, Lewellen and Nagel (2006) argue that the results do not hold under reasonable
estimates of the variance of expected return and variance.
We avoid this problem by instead estimating the price of risk in first-stage regressions.
This approach ensures that we rely on reasonable estimates of the variance of expected
return and variance. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 1, the R2 of the expected return is a
few percent, which is generally believed to be a meaningful variability in expected returns
on short horizons (see e.g. Ross (2015)).
Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016): Our results on the low-risk e↵ect di↵er substantially
from those by Cederburg and O’Doherty, as they find that the low-risk e↵ect is statistically
insignificant once controlling for conditional risk. There are two potential reasons for this
discrepancy.
First, Cederburg and O’Doherty use instruments to pick up variation in betas. These
instruments are unlikely to pick up all the variation in betas. The instruments may therefore
miss variation in betas that is either negatively correlated with the expected return or
positively correlated with volatility. If this is the case, the estimate of conditional risk in
Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016) too high. Alternatively, the instruments may have picked
up variation in expected return or variance that was not expected ex ante, in which case
the estimate of conditional risk may also be too high.
Second, we study the returns to the monthly betting against beta factor and not quarterly
beta sorted portfolios as Cederburg and O’Doherty do. The advantage of studying the
betting against beta factor is that the factor is hedged ex ante to have a conditional beta of
zero, mitigating the risk of missing variation in conditional betas. In addition, the fact that
the factor is hedged conditionally to have a beta of zero, and has an alpha of 10 percentage
points per year, means that it is unlikely that the conditional CAPM can explain its average
return in the first place: it would require the estimated conditional betas to be far from the
true betas.
7 Conclusion
We document a global pattern of conditional risk in stock returns: across 23 developed
countries, the five largest risk factors are exposed to conditional risk. The conditional risk
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explains around 20% of the alpha to these strategies. In addition, conditional risk explains
all of the alpha of time-series strategies such as volatility-managed portfolios.
This conditional risk has broad economic implications. For instance, a CFO of a value
firm who discounts cash flows using the unconditional CAPM would use the company’s
beta of, say, 1 times the global market risk premium, which gives an annual discount rate
of around 5 percent. However, given the conditional risk in global value firms, the CFO
should in fact use an annual discount rate of 6.5 percent to also reflect the conditional-risk
premium. In addition to NPV analysis, the conditional risk is also important for judging
the economic importance of di↵erent anomalies, understanding market e ciency, evaluating
the performance of asset managers, and in financial analysis more generally.
We document the global pattern in conditional risk by using a new, simple method
for estimating conditional risk. The method augments the unconditional CAPM with a
conditional-risk factor, which is a precisely defined market timing factor. This conditional-
risk factor is su cient to capture all of the implications of the conditional CAPM and can
easily be applied in future factor analysis, performance analysis of money managers, or by
CFOs to determine their company cost of capital.
We also address the economic source of the conditional risk. Previous explanations
of why conditional risk arises are often unique to a single factor. However, the fact that
all the major risk factors load on conditional risk hints at a common explanation for all
the factors. We find evidence of such a common explanation, namely that the conditional
risk in all the factors arises from arbitrage trading. Consistent with this arbitrage trading
hypothesis, we find that there is more conditional risk in the the cross-sectional risk factors
when arbitrageurs trade these more intensely and when the abitrageurs are more levered.
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8 Appendix
Proof of (2.3). Note that we can write the conditional beta as  t = E[ ] + ⌘t. We can
then write the unconditional covariance between the excess return to asset i and the shock
to the market portfolio as
cov(rit+1; r˜t+1) = cov(E[ ]r˜t+1 + ⌘tr˜t+1; r˜t+1)
= E[ ] var(r˜t+1) + cov(⌘t; var(r˜t+1))
given that cov(⌘tr˜t+1; r˜t+1) = E[⌘tr˜2t+1] = cov(⌘t; r˜
2
t+1) and using that r˜
2
t+1 = Et[r˜
2
t+1]+✏t+1 =
vart(r˜2t+1) + ✏t+1 where cov(⌘t; ✏t+1) = 0. By dividing both sides by the unconditional vari-
ance of r˜t+1 we obtain the expression in (3).
Proof of (2.8). Note that the covariance term in (2.5) can be written as
cov
 
 t;Et[r
m
t+1]  b vart(r˜mt+1)
 
=E
⇥
 t(Et[r
m
t+1]  b vart(r˜t+1))
⇤
   E [ t]E ⇥(Et[rmt+1]  b vart(r˜t+1))⇤ 
where the first term is equal to
E

rit+1r˜t+1
vart(r˜t+1)
(Et[r
m
t+1]  b vart r˜t+1)
 
=E
⇥
rit+1
⇤
E [r˜t+1(bt   b)] + cov(rit+1; r˜t+1(bt   b))
= cov(rit+1; ct+1),
given that E[ct+1] = 0 (shown later), and the second term is equal to zero:
E [ t]E
⇥
(Et[r
m
t+1]  b vart r˜t+1)
⇤
= E [ t]
 
E[rmt+1]  b var(r˜t+1)
 
= 0
Finally, to see that E[ct+1] = 0, note that
E[ct+1] = E [r˜t+1]E[bt   b] + cov(r˜; bt   b)
which is equal to zero because the shock to the market portfolio has a zero mean and is
uncorrelated with (unpredictable by) the ex ante price of risk, bt.
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Proof of Proposition 2.b. The covariance between the conditional-risk factor and the
shock to the market is
cov(r˜t+1; ct+1) = E[r˜t+1ct+1] = E
⇥
r˜2t+1(bt   b)
⇤
= E
⇥
rmt+1
⇤  E ⇥rmt+1⇤ = 0
100
  101 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the 24 exchanges in our sample. Our sample consist of the union of all U.S. 
common stocks on CRSP tape (“shrcd” equal to 10 or 11) and all global stocks in the Xpressfeed global databse 
(“tcpi” equal to 0). The expected market risk premium is calculated using the Kelly and Pruitt (2013) method. 
Expected variance is calculated using an AR(1) regression. All returns are in USD. The standard deviation of the 
market risk premium is annualized. The market risk premium is in annual percent. The R2 is based on monthly 
regressions. Returns are total log returns. Excess returns are simple returns in excess of the risk-free rate. 
Exchange 
Starting 
year 
Median 
number 
of firms 
Mean 
weight 
in global 
portfolio 
  
Market risk 
premium   R2 in predictive regressions 
  St. dev Average   Variance Returns 
Excess 
returns 
AUS 1990 1178.5 0.020  0.195 7.9%  0.487 0.005 0.005 
AUT 1992 88 0.002  0.199 2.3%  0.510 0.029 0.029 
BEL 1991 164 0.009  0.181 7.7%  0.444 0.015 0.019 
CAN 1986 574.5 0.025  0.160 6.3%  0.571 0.019 0.019 
CHE 1991 267 0.027  0.171 7.5%  0.337 0.031 0.030 
DEU 1991 1002.5 0.080  0.181 3.0%  0.379 0.036 0.034 
DNK 1991 175 0.005  0.183 8.8%  0.426 0.021 0.022 
ESP 1991 151 0.017  0.208 3.9%  0.391 0.019 0.018 
FIN 1991 135.5 0.005  0.254 9.2%  0.540 0.041 0.038 
FRA 1991 739.5 0.050  0.194 5.0%  0.460 0.014 0.014 
GBR 1987 2045.5 0.113  0.170 5.8%  0.454 0.019 0.019 
HKG 1991 932 0.035  0.217 10.9%  0.429 0.022 0.021 
IRL 1995 52 0.003  0.237 5.7%  0.344 0.032 0.025 
ISR 1996 246 0.003  0.217 6.8%  0.350 0.026 0.023 
ITA 1992 273 0.019  0.218 2.9%  0.422 0.020 0.022 
JPN 1989 3578 0.169  0.204 1.9%  0.214 0.014 0.021 
NLD 1991 181.5 0.022  0.176 6.3%  0.452 0.034 0.028 
NOR 1991 179.5 0.004  0.233 7.0%  0.496 0.037 0.037 
NZL 1991 126 0.003  0.204 7.6%  0.466 0.014 0.018 
PRT 1997 57 0.003  0.216 4.1%  0.472 0.042 0.039 
SGP 1991 480.5 0.012  0.184 7.9%  0.367 0.035 0.038 
SWE 1991 328 0.014  0.223 9.0%  0.444 0.015 0.015 
USA 1964 4789 0.450  0.173 5.8%  0.305 0.016 0.018 
WOR 1986 18366 NA  0.147 5.0%  0.259 0.024 0.023 
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Table 2 
Conditional Risk in Equity Factors 
This table reports results from evaluation of different equity strategies in the conditional CAPM. We regress the 
monthly excess returns of different factors on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor and 
evaluate returns in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸ൣ𝑟௧ାଵ
௜ ൧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
௜  is the excess return to the risk factor i, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, 
and 𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped to account for generated regressors. The U.S. and global samples run from 1964-2015 and 
1986-2015.  
 SMB HML RMW CMA UMD  BAB  COMP         
Panel A: U.S. Sample        
Alpha 0.13 0.36 0.26 0.29 0.71 0.90 0.50  
(1.00) (3.24) (2.45) (3.63) (3.19) (4.71) (5.12) 
Market beta 0.21 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 -0.05 -0.12 
 
(6.36) (-5.05) (-4.88) (-7.86) (-2.15) (-0.97) (-5.37) 
Conditional risk beta 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.04 
 
(-0.23) (2.08) (1.94) (2.66) (1.46) (2.36) (2.23) 
Compensation for conditional risk 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.06 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk 
-0.03 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Observations 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.19  
       
Panel B: Global Sample        
Alpha 0.08 0.24 0.27 0.21 0.66 0.65 0.39  
(0.64) (1.81) (2.88) (2.58) (2.80) (3.82) (4.32) 
Market beta 0.06 -0.09 -0.18 -0.08 -0.22 -0.13 -0.14 
 
(2.01) (-3.17) (-9.53) (-4.50) (-3.27) (-2.34) (-6.51) 
Conditional risk beta 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 
 
(-0.25) (2.29) (1.43) (3.36) (1.19) (2.40) (3.01) 
Compensation for conditional risk -0.01 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.10 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk 
-0.09 0.36 0.10 0.28 0.12 0.21 0.20 
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 306 354 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.25 
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Table 4 
Conditional Risk around the World 
This table reports results from evaluation of the composite risk factor (COMP) in the conditional CAPM across 
different exchanges. For each exchange, we regress the monthly excess returns COMP on the shock to the market 
factor and the conditional risk factor for the given exchange. For each exchange, we evaluate returns in the following 
two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵ
஼ைெ௉] = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
େ୓୑୔ is the excess return to COMP, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, and 
𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped to account for generated regressors. The U.S. and global samples runs from 1964-2015 and 
1986-2015.  
Exchange Alpha Market Beta 
Conditional Risk 
Beta 
Compensation 
for conditional 
risk 
Fraction of alpha 
explained by 
conditional risk 
AUS 0.73 (6.04) -0.06 (-3.24) 0.03 (1.77) 0.04 0.05 
AUT 0.36 (2.43) -0.08 (-2.07) 0.01 (0.72) 0.03 0.07 
BEL 0.43 (3.45) -0.11 (-3.84) 0.02 (0.57) 0.03 0.06 
CAN 0.88 (6.06) -0.13 (-4.43) 0.01 (0.84) 0.04 0.04 
CHE 0.48 (3.85) -0.11 (-3.69) 0.00 (0.40) 0.01 0.03 
DEU 0.64 (3.63) -0.18 (-5.19) 0.03 (1.44) 0.16 0.20 
DNK 0.49 (3.57) -0.11 (-2.99) 0.02 (2.87) 0.09 0.15 
ESP 0.41 (3.07) -0.11 (-4.82) 0.01 (0.59) 0.07 0.14 
FIN 0.45 (1.77) -0.23 (-5.49) 0.03 (0.82) 0.16 0.26 
FRA 0.53 (3.66) -0.12 (-3.74) 0.02 (0.92) 0.04 0.07 
GBR 0.49 (5.36) -0.05 (-2.28) 0.02 (1.98) 0.04 0.08 
HKG 0.50 (3.24) -0.10 (-3.52) 0.00 (-0.33) -0.02 -0.04 
IRL 0.83 (2.73) -0.14 (-2.76) 0.02 (1.18) 0.06 0.06 
ISR 0.62 (3.61) -0.05 (-1.78) 0.01 (0.29) 0.02 0.03 
ITA 0.18 (1.41) -0.02 (-0.73) 0.02 (1.27) 0.05 0.22 
JPN 0.21 (2.43) -0.05 (-2.73) 0.02 (0.91) 0.01 0.03 
NLD 0.51 (3.87) -0.10 (-3.69) 0.01 (1.41) 0.06 0.10 
NOR 0.51 (3.00) -0.05 (-2.63) 0.01 (1.46) 0.09 0.15 
NZL 0.43 (3.24) -0.02 (-0.74) 0.01 (1.80) 0.04 0.09 
PRT 0.18 (1.03) -0.10 (-3.61) 0.01 (0.43) 0.05 0.22 
SGP 0.38 (2.23) -0.14 (-4.34) 0.00 (0.06) 0.01 0.02 
SWE 0.51 (2.93) -0.08 (-2.28) 0.06 (1.21) 0.02 0.05 
USA 0.50 (5.12) -0.12 (-5.37) 0.04 (2.23) 0.06 0.11 
WOR 0.39 (4.32) -0.14 (-6.51) 0.02 (3.01) 0.10 0.20 
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Table 5 
Conditional Cash Flow- and Discount Rate Risk 
This table reports results from evaluation of different equity strategies in the conditional CAPM. We regress quarterly  
excess returns of different factors on the shock to the market portfolio, the conditional discount-rate-risk factor and 
the conditional cash-flow-risk factor. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the conditional risk beta multiplied by the risk premium on the 
conditional risk factor. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics are reported below the parameter estimates and 
statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The U.S. sample runs from 1964-2015. The global sample 
runs from 1986-2015.  
 SMB HML RMW CMA UMD  BAB  COMP 
        
Panel A: U.S. Sample        
Alpha 0.77 1.00 0.68 0.78 2.15 2.59 1.43  
(1.38) (1.85) (1.78) (2.29) (3.05) (3.44) (4.37) 
Market beta 0.28 -0.31 -0.17 -0.21 -0.16 0.04 -0.15 
 
(1.83) (-1.98) (-1.45) (-2.06) (-0.69) (0.17) (-1.63) 
Conditional cash flow beta 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
 
(-0.06) (-1.12) (-1.20) (-2.15) (0.24) (-0.10) (-1.04) 
Conditional discount rate beta -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.05 
 (-1.32) (1.34) (2.41) (1.95) (0.76) (1.98) (2.12) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.18  
       
Panel B: Global Sample        
Alpha 0.35 1.02 0.43 0.64 1.73 1.75 1.07  
(0.66) (1.54) (1.03) (1.67) (1.75) (2.05) (2.73) 
Market beta 0.03 -0.27 -0.19 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.14 
 
(0.29) (-1.46) (-1.95) (-0.99) (-0.30) (-0.23) (-1.25) 
Conditional cash flow beta 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 
 
(-0.12) (0.02) (-0.82) (-0.93) (-0.87) (0.57) (-0.71) 
Conditional discount rate beta -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.03 
 (-0.58) (1.37) (2.07) (1.65) (0.12) (1.55) (1.86) 
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 86 102 
Adjusted R2 -0.02 0.17 0.21 0.17 -0.01 0.15 0.20 
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Table 6 
Conditional Risk in Time-Series Strategies 
This table reports results from evaluation of different time-series strategies in the conditional CAPM. We regress the 
monthly excess returns of different factors on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor and 
evaluate returns in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸ൣ𝑟௧ାଵ
௜ ൧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
௜  is the excess return to the strategy i, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, 
and 𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. We consider two strategies: Volatility Managed Portfolios (Morreira and Muir, 
2017) and Time-Series Momentum (Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen, 2012). “Compensation for conditional risk” is 
the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics are reported below the parameter estimates and 
statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. Standard errors are bootstrapped to account for generated 
regressors. The U.S. and global samples run from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.  
          
 Volatility Managed Portfolios Time Series Momentum  
 USA USA WOR WOR USA USA WOR WOR  
Alpha 0.13 -0.03 0.19 -0.01 0.41 0.34 0.13 -0.07   
(0.95) (-0.22) (0.99) (-0.06) (2.81) (2.12) (0.56) (-0.25) 
 
Market beta 0.57 0.57 0.63 0.63 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.13  
 
(16.83) (16.80) (11.31) (11.11) (-0.22) (-0.21) (1.70) (1.69) 
 
Conditional risk beta  0.10  0.05  0.04  0.04  
 
(3.30) (1.98) (2.86) (2.40) 
 
Compensation for conditional risk  0.17  0.22  0.07  0.20  
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk 
 0.89  1.00  0.16  1.52  
Observations 623 623 354 354 623 623 348 348  
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.55 0.45 0.51 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.06  
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Table 7 
Conditional Risk in Volatility Managed Portfolios around the World 
This table reports results from evaluation of volatility managed portfolios (VMP) in the conditional CAPM across 
different exchanges. For each exchange, we regress the monthly excess returns of VMP on the shock to the market 
factor and the conditional risk factor for the given exchange. For each exchange, we evaluate returns in the following 
two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵ
௏ெ௉] = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
௏ெ௉ is the excess return to VMP, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, and 𝜆௠ 
and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics are reported below the parameter estimates 
and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. Standard errors are bootstrapped to account for 
generated regressors. The U.S. and global samples runs from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.   
Exchange Alpha Market Beta 
Conditional Risk 
Beta 
Compensation 
for conditional 
risk 
Fraction of 
alpha explained 
by conditional 
risk 
AUS -0.11 (-0.34) 0.75 (10.13) 0.22 (2.01) 0.28 1.61 
AUT 0.31 (0.84) 0.71 (8.03) 0.06 (1.80) 0.23 0.43 
BEL 0.10 (0.40) 0.71 (7.71) 0.07 (0.56) 0.11 0.52 
CAN -0.11 (-0.38) 0.75 (8.24) 0.03 (0.51) 0.17 2.90 
CHE 0.13 (0.55) 0.72 (12.00) 0.04 (0.69) 0.14 0.52 
DEU 0.11 (0.44) 0.70 (12.15) 0.04 (0.88) 0.21 0.66 
DNK 0.32 (1.39) 0.64 (9.34) 0.07 (2.74) 0.29 0.48 
ESP 0.65 (0.71) 1.14 (3.35) -0.10 (-0.55) -0.86 4.02 
FIN 0.31 (1.14) 0.54 (10.78) 0.07 (0.87) 0.44 0.58 
FRA 0.16 (0.66) 0.63 (12.00) 0.10 (0.94) 0.16 0.50 
GBR 0.20 (1.07) 0.68 (13.09) 0.07 (1.75) 0.15 0.43 
HKG 0.45 (1.22) 0.61 (8.76) 0.10 (2.84) 0.44 0.49 
IRL 0.54 (1.48) 0.55 (6.57) 0.06 (1.66) 0.15 0.22 
ISR -0.25 (-0.66) 0.70 (10.69) 0.09 (1.54) 0.30 6.07 
ITA 0.49 (1.35) 0.74 (11.27) 0.05 (0.43) 0.11 0.19 
JPN -0.21 (-0.72) 0.76 (11.31) 0.13 (1.01) 0.04 -0.25 
NLD 0.07 (0.32) 0.64 (11.60) 0.07 (2.17) 0.33 0.81 
NOR 0.30 (0.91) 0.71 (9.04) 0.01 (0.37) 0.08 0.22 
NZL 0.05 (0.15) 0.86 (12.46) 0.09 (2.59) 0.29 0.86 
PRT 0.51 (1.43) 0.55 (9.35) 0.02 (0.20) 0.17 0.25 
SGP -0.34 (-0.85) 0.60 (8.38) 0.02 (0.56) 0.50 3.05 
SWE 0.32 (1.09) 0.69 (12.77) 0.18 (0.99) 0.07 0.18 
USA -0.03 (-0.22) 0.57 (16.80) 0.10 (3.30) 0.16 1.26 
WOR -0.01 (-0.06) 0.63 (11.11) 0.05 (1.98) 0.21 1.07 
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Table 8 
Conditional Risk in Time Series Momentum Portfolios around the World 
This table reports results from evaluation of time series momentum (TSMOM) in the conditional CAPM across 
different exchanges. For each exchange, we regress the monthly excess returns of TSMOM on the shock to the market 
factor and the conditional risk factor for the given exchange. For each exchange, we evaluate returns in the following 
two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵ
்ௌெைெ] = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
்ௌெைெ is the excess return to TSMOM, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, 
and 𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics are reported below the parameter 
estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. Standard errors are bootstrapped to account 
for generated regressors. The U.S. and global samples runs from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.   
Exchange Alpha Market Beta 
Conditional Risk 
Beta 
Compensation 
for conditional 
risk 
Fraction of alpha 
explained by 
conditional risk 
AUS 0.09 (0.27) 0.13 (1.53) 0.17 (1.92) 0.21 0.69 
AUT -0.03 (-0.07) 0.12 (1.35) 0.09 (2.82) 0.36 1.08 
BEL 0.48 (1.35) 0.07 (0.54) -0.01 (-0.06) -0.01 -0.02 
CAN 0.60 (1.65) 0.09 (0.68) 0.03 (1.05) 0.21 0.26 
CHE 0.08 (0.29) 0.12 (1.57) 0.06 (1.56) 0.22 0.73 
DEU 0.06 (0.19) 0.13 (1.57) 0.03 (0.62) 0.13 0.68 
DNK 0.14 (0.52) 0.13 (1.74) 0.07 (2.93) 0.31 0.69 
ESP -0.06 (-0.05) -0.52 (-1.17) 0.16 (0.93) 1.45 1.04 
FIN 0.25 (0.67) 0.13 (2.11) 0.09 (1.54) 0.51 0.67 
FRA 0.34 (1.16) 0.06 (0.91) 0.06 (0.83) 0.09 0.21 
GBR -0.08 (-0.32) -0.01 (-0.14) 0.06 (1.76) 0.14 2.41 
HKG 1.01 (2.39) 0.15 (2.01) 0.05 (1.75) 0.22 0.18 
IRL 0.84 (2.01) 0.05 (0.63) 0.11 (3.22) 0.27 0.24 
ISR -0.06 (-0.12) 0.15 (1.73) 0.06 (1.18) 0.22 1.36 
ITA 0.04 (0.09) 0.08 (0.84) 0.16 (1.90) 0.35 0.89 
JPN 0.54 (1.57) 0.06 (0.65) 0.06 (0.59) 0.02 0.03 
NLD 0.13 (0.47) 0.11 (1.42) 0.04 (1.34) 0.18 0.58 
NOR -0.02 (-0.04) 0.00 (-0.02) 0.11 (3.56) 0.93 1.02 
NZL -0.36 (-0.94) 0.33 (3.70) 0.07 (2.03) 0.22 -1.59 
PRT 1.57 (3.70) 0.09 (1.43) 0.02 (0.32) 0.16 0.09 
SGP 0.27 (0.46) 0.09 (1.09) 0.03 (1.09) 0.69 0.71 
SWE 0.20 (0.58) 0.04 (0.56) 0.03 (0.20) 0.01 0.05 
USA 0.34 (2.12) -0.01 (-0.21) 0.04 (2.86) 0.06 0.16 
WOR -0.07 (-0.25) 0.13 (1.69) 0.04 (2.40) 0.19 1.51 
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Table 9 
Arbitrage Trading and Conditional Risk 
Panel A reports the results of a regression of the price of risk (bt) on the net speculative demand (NSDt). Net 
speculative demand is calculated as the difference in commercial long and short positions in S&P 500 futures dividend 
by open interest at time t. Panel B reports the results of a regression of the returns to the composite risk factor on the 
shock to the market portfolio and the product of the shock and the ex ante NSD. Panel C reports the results of a 
regression of the composite risk factor on the conditional risk factor and the product of the conditional risk factor and 
the ex ante intermediary leverage as defined by He, Kelly, and Manela (2017). t-statistics are reported below the 
parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The t-statistics in Panel A are 
based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. The table considers both the U.S. and global (WOR) sample. 
        
Panel A: Correlation between the price of risk (bt) and net speculative demand (NSD)   
 Dependent variable Intercept 𝑁𝑆𝐷௧ Obs R2 Correlation 
 
U.S. 𝑏௧ 2.80 6.42 358 0.04 0.21 
 
  (8.27) (1.96)     
WOR 𝑏௧ 3.06 13.46 354 0.07 0.26 
 
  (5.49) (2.06)     
       
 
Panel B: The composite factor has higher market beta when NSD is higher 
 
 
 Dependent variable Intercept  ?̃?௧ାଵ
௠   ?̃?௧ାଵ
௠ × 𝑁𝑆𝑃௧  Obs R2 
 
U.S. 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௧ାଵ  0.46 -0.16 1.05 358 0.20 
 
  (4.98) (-7.80) (5.04)    
WOR 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௧ାଵ 0.42 -0.14 0.71 354 0.21 
 
  (5.72) (-8.88) (4.79)    
       
 
Panel C: The composite factor has higher beta to the conditional risk factor when leverage is higher  
 Dependent variable Intercept 𝑐௧ାଵ 𝑐௧ାଵ × 𝐿𝐸𝑉௧ Obs R2 
 
U.S. 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௧ାଵ 0.48 -0.04 1.17 550 0.17 
 
  (6.94) (-3.32) (7.33)    
WOR 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௧ାଵ 0.36 -0.03 0.56 354 0.13 
 
  (4.56) (-2.37) (4.60)   
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Table 10 
Expected Factor Return and Conditional Risk Loading 
This table reports results from the following regression of the composite risk factor on the conditional risk factor and 
the conditional risk factor interacted with the value spread of the composite risk factor: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௧ାଵ = 𝛾଴ + 𝛾ଵ 𝑐௧ାଵ + 𝛾ଶ ൫𝑐௧ାଵ × 𝑉𝑆௧ ൯ + 𝜖௧ାଵ 
where 𝑉𝑆௧  is the average value spread at time t of the five factors in 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 . The composite factor 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 is the 
average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, and BAB. t-statistics are reported below the parameter estimates and 
statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. Standard errors are bootstrapped to account for generated 
regressors. The U.S. and global samples runs from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.   
Exchange 𝛾଴
௞ 𝛾ଵ
௞  𝛾ଶ
௞ Observations Adjusted R2 
AUS 0.70 (5.74) -0.04 (-1.23) 0.19 (1.95) 306 0.05 
AUT 0.34 (2.22) -0.01 (-0.83) 0.11 (1.65) 282 0.00 
BEL 0.34 (2.59) 0.01 (0.43) 0.00 (0.04) 294 0.00 
CAN 0.78 (5.23) -0.03 (-0.80) 0.09 (0.99) 354 0.01 
CHE 0.40 (3.21) 0.00 (0.25) 0.00 (0.04) 294 -0.01 
DEU 0.62 (3.44) -0.01 (-0.28) 0.15 (0.74) 294 0.09 
DNK 0.35 (2.26) 0.02 (2.58) 0.07 (2.00) 294 0.06 
ESP 0.31 (2.18) 0.00 (0.05) 0.07 (0.63) 294 0.02 
FIN 0.07 (0.24) -0.01 (-0.21) 0.10 (0.82) 294 0.10 
FRA 0.44 (3.10) -0.06 (-1.19) 0.24 (1.19) 294 0.04 
GBR 0.48 (5.22) -0.01 (-0.63) 0.12 (1.29) 342 0.09 
HKG 0.40 (2.38) 0.00 (-0.00) -0.01 (-0.36) 294 0.00 
IRL 0.76 (2.61) 0.00 (-0.15) 0.13 (1.45) 246 0.01 
ISR 0.61 (3.51) -0.01 (-0.42) 0.07 (0.71) 234 0.00 
ITA 0.17 (1.29) -0.01 (-0.62) 0.12 (1.06) 282 0.05 
JPN 0.21 (2.42) -0.01 (-0.31) 0.13 (0.82) 318 0.00 
NLD 0.43 (3.08) 0.00 (0.38) 0.06 (0.82) 294 0.02 
NOR 0.54 (3.07) -0.01 (-0.72) 0.05 (1.15) 294 0.01 
NZL 0.39 (2.88) 0.00 (-0.23) 0.12 (1.87) 294 0.03 
PRT 0.16 (0.88) 0.01 (0.30) -0.02 (-0.14) 222 0.00 
SGP 0.26 (1.37) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.06) 294 -0.01 
SWE 0.41 (2.41) -0.16 (-1.31) 0.49 (1.85) 294 0.09 
USA 0.45 (4.78) -0.01 (-0.88) 0.16 (2.05) 623 0.13 
WOR 0.37 (4.08) -0.03 (-1.50) 0.14 (1.78) 354 0.15 
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Table 11 
Conditional Risk in Equity Factors Pre and Post 1994 
This table reports results from evaluation of different equity strategies in the conditional CAPM. We regress the 
monthly excess returns of different factors on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor and 
evaluate returns in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸ൣ𝑟௧ାଵ
௜ ൧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
௜  is the excess return to the risk factor i, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, 
and 𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped to account for generated regressors. Panel A shows the U.S. sample from 1994-2015 and 
Panel B shows the U.S. sample from 1964-1993.  
 SMB HML RMW CMA UMD  BAB  COMP         
Panel A: U.S. Sample Post 1994        
Alpha 0.00 0.13 0.55 0.25 0.73 0.97 0.53  
(-0.02) (0.86) (3.03) (2.45) (2.43) (4.02) (3.83) 
Market beta 0.19 -0.12 -0.28 -0.11 -0.34 -0.29 -0.23 
 
(4.74) (-2.79) (-8.74) (-4.51) (-4.32) (-4.13) (-7.60) 
Conditional risk beta 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.06 
 
(0.47) (1.99) (2.07) (2.05) (1.60) (2.57) (2.52) 
Compensation for conditional risk 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.09 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk 
1.53 0.36 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.14 
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.32 
        
Panel B: U.S. Sample Pre 1994        
Alpha 0.25 0.50 0.18 0.30 0.84 1.03 0.57  
(1.71) (3.82) (2.50) (2.88) (4.34) (8.19) (8.82) 
Market beta 0.22 -0.19 0.00 -0.17 0.02 0.13 -0.04 
 
(6.37) (-6.15) (-0.25) (-9.56) (0.43) (3.28) (-2.62) 
Conditional risk beta -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(-1.57) (1.36) (-1.57) (2.52) (0.30) (0.89) (0.98) 
Compensation for conditional risk -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk 
-0.10 0.03 -0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Observations 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.03 
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Figure 1 
The Conditional Price of Risk 
This figure plots the time series of the conditional price of risk minus the unconditional price of risk. Panel A plots 
the price of risk in the U.S. sample and Panel B plots the price of risk in the global sample. 
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Panel A: U.S. conditional price of risk (bt-b)
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Panel B: Global conditional price of risk (bt-b)
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Figure 2 
Rolling Realizations of the Conditional-Risk Factor 
This figure plots the two-year rolling realizations of the conditional-risk factor together with the two-year rolling 
CAPM alpha to the composite risk factor (Panel B). Shaded bars indicate NBER recessions. The conditional-risk 
factor is the unexpected return to the market portfolio multiplied by the difference between the conditional and 
unconditional price of risk. The composite risk factor is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, and BAB. 
The figure shows the U.S. sample.  
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Figure 3 
Compensation for Conditional Risk in the Cross-Section of Equity Returns 
This figure shows how many percentage point of return conditional risk justifies for portfolios sorted on aggregate 
characteristics. Each month, we sort stocks into ten portfolios based on the aggregate size, book-to-market, 
profitability, investment, momentum, and beta characteristic. We measure characteristics in cross-sectional 
percentiles and chose signs such that higher characteristics are associated with higher returns. In the U.S., we use 
NYSE breakpoints for the portfolios sorts. In the international sample, we use calculate breakpoints based on the 20% 
largest firms. Portfolios are value-weighted, refreshed, and rebalanced monthly. The figure shows “compensation for 
conditional risk”, which is the conditional risk beta multiplied by the risk premium on the conditional risk factor. The 
U.S. sample runs from 1964-2015. The global sample runs from 1986-2015.  
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Figure 4 
Conditional Risk in the Cross-Section of Equity Returns around the World 
This figure plots how many percent of the unconditional CAPM alpha to the composite risk factor that can be 
explained by conditional risk. The composite risk factor is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, and 
BAB.  
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Figure 5 
The Composite Factor has Larger Conditional Risk When it has Higher Expected Return 
This figure plots 𝛾ଶ
௞ from the following regression of the composite risk factor on the conditional risk factor and the 
conditional risk factor interacted with the value spread of the composite risk factor: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௧ାଵ
௞ = 𝛾଴
௞ + 𝛾ଵ
௞𝑐௧ାଵ
௞ + 𝛾ଶ
௞(𝑐௧ାଵ
௞ × 𝑉𝑆௧
௞) + 𝜖௧ାଵ
௞  
where k denotes country and 𝑉𝑆௧
௞ is the average value spread in country k at time t of the five factors in 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௞. The 
composite factor 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௞is the average return in country k to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, and BAB. 
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Table A1 
Robustness: Conditional Risk Using Campbell and Thompson (2008) 
This reports robustness analysis where the market risk premium used in the conditional-risk factor is measured using 
the dividend to price ratio of the market portfolio as in Campbell and Thompson (2008). We regress the monthly 
excess returns of different factors on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor and evaluate returns 
in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸ൣ𝑟௧ାଵ
௜ ൧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
௜  is the excess return to the risk factor i, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, 
and 𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The U.S. 
and global samples run from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.  
 SMB HML RMW CMA UMD  BAB  COMP 
        
Panel A: U.S. Sample         
Alpha 0.13 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.79 1.01 0.55  
(1.08) (3.39) (3.66) (4.31) (4.76) (7.46) (8.69) 
Market beta 0.21 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 -0.05 -0.12 
 
(7.80) (-7.35) (-6.47) (-9.71) (-3.38) (-1.67) (-8.71) 
Conditional risk beta 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.30) (4.43) (0.19) (4.39) (0.18) (1.34) (3.11) 
Compensation for conditional risk 
0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.12 
        
Panel B: Global Sample        
Alpha 0.08 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.79 0.77 0.48  
(0.73) (2.85) (3.86) (3.82) (4.04) (4.85) (6.50) 
Market beta 0.05 -0.10 -0.18 -0.08 -0.21 -0.15 -0.14 
 
(2.12) (-4.10) (-9.99) (-5.31) (-4.98) (-4.27) (-8.68) 
Conditional risk beta -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.02 
 
(-1.07) (6.01) (1.29) (3.70) (-1.27) (2.14) (2.78) 
Compensation for conditional risk -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.02 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk -0.16 0.16 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.04 
Observations 359 359 359 359 359 306 359 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.12 0.22 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.18 
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Table A2 
Robustness: Conditional Risk Using Dividend to Price Ratio from Campbell and 
Thompson (2008) 
This table reports robustness analysis where the market risk premium used in the conditional-risk factor is measured 
using the dividend to price ratio of the market portfolio as in Campbell and Thompson (2008). For each exchange, 
we regress the monthly excess returns COMP on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor for the 
given exchange. For each exchange, we evaluate returns in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵ
஼ைெ௉] = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
େ୓୑୔ is the excess return to COMP, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, and 
𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The U.S. 
and global samples runs from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.  
Exchange Alpha Market Beta 
Conditional Risk 
Beta 
Compensation 
for conditional 
risk 
Fraction of alpha 
explained by 
conditional risk 
AUS 0.74 (6.32) -0.06 (-3.16) 0.01 (0.97) 0.01 0.02 
AUT 0.39 (2.74) -0.07 (-2.88) 0.06 (1.18) 0.01 0.01 
BEL 0.43 (3.74) -0.11 (-5.26) 0.10 (4.57) 0.03 0.06 
CAN 0.86 (6.82) -0.13 (-5.50) 0.01 (1.39) 0.03 0.04 
CHE 0.49 (4.23) -0.10 (-4.19) 0.01 (0.74) 0.01 0.01 
DEU 0.76 (5.46) -0.20 (-7.58) 0.11 (4.03) 0.03 0.04 
DNK 0.52 (3.91) -0.11 (-4.50) 0.05 (3.24) 0.04 0.07 
ESP 0.44 (3.78) -0.10 (-6.07) 0.04 (1.80) 0.01 0.03 
FIN 0.47 (2.16) -0.21 (-8.18) 0.03 (2.88) 0.13 0.22 
FRA 0.52 (4.03) -0.13 (-5.64) 0.07 (3.80) 0.03 0.06 
GBR 0.52 (5.80) -0.05 (-2.88) 0.02 (1.67) 0.01 0.02 
HKG 0.46 (3.82) -0.10 (-6.02) 0.01 (0.74) 0.01 0.02 
IRL 0.84 (3.15) -0.14 (-4.05) 0.03 (0.64) 0.01 0.01 
ISR 0.65 (3.92) -0.05 (-1.81) 0.00 (-0.18) 0.00 0.00 
ITA 0.24 (1.90) -0.02 (-0.87) -0.03 (-0.54) 0.00 -0.01 
JPN 0.21 (2.57) -0.05 (-3.54) -0.01 (-0.78) 0.00 -0.02 
NLD 0.53 (4.48) -0.09 (-3.98) 0.03 (2.08) 0.02 0.03 
NOR 0.59 (3.75) -0.05 (-2.17) -0.01 (-0.66) -0.01 -0.02 
NZL 0.47 (4.05) -0.02 (-0.78) 0.01 (0.41) 0.00 0.01 
PRT 0.25 (1.62) -0.09 (-4.33) 0.05 (0.95) 0.00 0.02 
SGP 0.40 (3.10) -0.14 (-7.93) -0.01 (-0.76) -0.01 -0.03 
SWE 0.52 (3.23) -0.08 (-3.27) 0.03 (1.15) 0.01 0.02 
USA 0.55 (8.69) -0.12 (-8.71) 0.02 (3.11) 0.02 0.03 
WOR 0.48 (6.50) -0.14 (-8.68) 0.02 (2.78) 0.02 0.04 
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Table A3 
Robustness: Conditional Risk Using Earnings to Price Ratio from Campbell and 
Thompson (2008) 
This reports robustness analysis where the market risk premium used in the conditional-risk factor is measured using 
the earnings to price ratio of the market portfolio as in Campbell and Thompson (2008). For each exchange, we 
regress the monthly excess returns COMP on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor for the 
given exchange. For each exchange, we evaluate returns in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵ
஼ைெ௉] = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
େ୓୑୔ is the excess return to COMP, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, and 
𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The U.S. 
and global samples runs from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.  
Exchange Alpha Market Beta 
Conditional Risk 
Beta 
Compensation 
for conditional 
risk 
Fraction of alpha 
explained by 
conditional risk 
AUS 0.73 (6.21) -0.06 (-3.21) 0.01 (1.63) 0.03 0.03 
AUT 0.39 (2.73) -0.07 (-2.91) 0.10 (1.97) 0.01 0.02 
BEL 0.43 (3.71) -0.11 (-5.22) 0.09 (4.14) 0.03 0.06 
CAN 0.86 (6.81) -0.12 (-5.46) 0.01 (1.88) 0.04 0.04 
CHE 0.48 (4.16) -0.10 (-4.17) 0.01 (1.02) 0.01 0.02 
DEU 0.76 (5.45) -0.20 (-7.61) 0.12 (4.43) 0.03 0.04 
DNK 0.51 (3.87) -0.11 (-4.54) 0.04 (3.10) 0.04 0.07 
ESP 0.44 (3.76) -0.10 (-6.08) 0.04 (1.86) 0.01 0.03 
FIN 0.63 (2.68) -0.20 (-8.01) 0.00 (-1.04) -0.10 -0.19 
FRA 0.51 (3.96) -0.13 (-5.58) 0.04 (2.65) 0.03 0.05 
GBR 0.52 (5.77) -0.05 (-2.89) 0.02 (1.47) 0.01 0.02 
HKG 0.46 (3.79) -0.10 (-6.04) 0.01 (1.06) 0.01 0.03 
IRL 0.83 (3.15) -0.14 (-4.06) 0.16 (2.57) 0.03 0.03 
ISR 0.64 (3.91) -0.05 (-1.82) 0.00 (0.08) 0.00 0.00 
ITA 0.24 (1.91) -0.02 (-0.88) -0.02 (-0.71) 0.00 -0.01 
JPN 0.21 (2.56) -0.05 (-3.54) -0.01 (-0.58) 0.00 -0.01 
NLD 0.53 (4.47) -0.09 (-4.05) 0.03 (2.15) 0.02 0.03 
NOR 0.55 (3.30) -0.04 (-2.00) 0.00 (0.36) 0.02 0.04 
NZL 0.47 (4.06) -0.01 (-0.75) 0.00 (0.22) 0.00 0.00 
PRT 0.25 (1.59) -0.09 (-4.36) 0.08 (1.71) 0.01 0.03 
SGP 0.40 (3.10) -0.14 (-7.96) -0.01 (-0.73) -0.01 -0.03 
SWE 0.48 (3.06) -0.08 (-3.28) 0.07 (3.03) 0.03 0.06 
USA 0.55 (8.73) -0.12 (-8.68) 0.02 (2.75) 0.02 0.03 
WOR 0.48 (6.50) -0.14 (-8.69) 0.02 (2.66) 0.02 0.04 
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Table A4 
Robustness: Conditional Risk Using Book to Market Ratio from Campbell and Thompson 
(2008) 
This reports robustness analysis where the market risk premium used in the conditional-risk factor is measured using 
the book-to-market ratio of the market portfolio as in Campbell and Thompson (2008). For each exchange, we regress 
the monthly excess returns COMP on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor for the given 
exchange. For each exchange, we evaluate returns in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵ
஼ைெ௉] = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
େ୓୑୔ is the excess return to COMP, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, and 
𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The U.S. 
and global samples runs from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.  
Exchange Alpha Market Beta 
Conditional Risk 
Beta 
Compensation 
for conditional 
risk 
Fraction of alpha 
explained by 
conditional risk 
AUS 0.74 (6.30) -0.06 (-3.21) 0.01 (0.86) 0.02 0.02 
AUT 0.39 (2.72) -0.07 (-2.91) 0.10 (2.22) 0.01 0.02 
BEL 0.43 (3.72) -0.12 (-5.32) 0.11 (5.13) 0.03 0.07 
CAN 0.87 (6.95) -0.13 (-5.58) 0.01 (1.08) 0.02 0.02 
CHE 0.49 (4.24) -0.10 (-4.26) 0.00 (0.30) 0.00 0.01 
DEU 0.76 (5.43) -0.20 (-7.56) 0.09 (3.85) 0.03 0.04 
DNK 0.51 (3.89) -0.11 (-4.50) 0.04 (3.32) 0.04 0.08 
ESP 0.44 (3.78) -0.10 (-6.08) 0.04 (1.77) 0.01 0.03 
FIN 0.43 (1.45) -0.13 (-5.63) 0.00 (0.90) 0.17 0.28 
FRA 0.49 (3.89) -0.13 (-5.73) 0.07 (5.50) 0.07 0.12 
GBR 0.53 (5.87) -0.05 (-2.88) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 0.00 
HKG 0.47 (3.87) -0.10 (-6.06) 0.00 (0.35) 0.00 0.01 
IRL 0.89 (3.33) -0.15 (-4.24) -0.02 (-1.12) -0.05 -0.06 
ISR 0.63 (3.84) -0.04 (-1.70) 0.00 (0.31) 0.01 0.01 
ITA 0.23 (1.86) -0.02 (-0.84) 0.05 (0.98) 0.00 0.01 
JPN 0.21 (2.61) -0.05 (-3.54) -0.01 (-1.09) -0.01 -0.04 
NLD 0.55 (4.54) -0.09 (-3.94) 0.01 (0.65) 0.01 0.01 
NOR 0.57 (3.51) -0.05 (-2.28) 0.00 (0.41) 0.02 0.03 
NZL 0.46 (4.00) -0.02 (-0.79) 0.02 (1.18) 0.01 0.02 
PRT 0.25 (1.63) -0.09 (-4.35) 0.07 (1.30) 0.01 0.02 
SGP 0.40 (3.11) -0.14 (-7.90) -0.01 (-0.92) -0.01 -0.03 
SWE 0.47 (2.91) -0.07 (-3.09) 0.01 (1.58) 0.05 0.09 
USA 0.55 (8.73) -0.12 (-8.65) 0.01 (1.38) 0.01 0.01 
WOR 0.49 (6.51) -0.14 (-8.71) 0.02 (2.53) 0.02 0.04 
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Table A5 
Robustness: Conditional Risk Using Constant Expected Returns 
This reports robustness analysis where the market risk premium is assumed to be constant. We regress the monthly 
excess returns of different factors on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor and evaluate returns 
in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸ൣ𝑟௧ାଵ
௜ ൧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
௜  is the excess return to the risk factor i, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, 
and 𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The U.S. 
and global samples run from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.  
 SMB HML RMW CMA UMD  BAB  COMP         
Panel A: U.S. Sample         
Alpha 0.12 0.39 0.30 0.32 0.74 0.99 0.55  
(1.04) (3.76) (3.56) (4.65) (4.65) (7.49) (8.96) 
Market beta 0.21 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 -0.05 -0.12 
 
(7.91) (-7.43) (-6.57) (-9.67) (-3.57) (-1.69) (-9.09) 
Conditional risk beta 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.14 0.08 
 
(0.73) (-0.04) (4.00) (0.33) (6.33) (5.36) (6.77) 
Compensation for conditional risk 
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.04 
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.17 
        
Panel B: Global Sample        
Alpha 0.08 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.71 0.80 0.49  
(0.70) (3.33) (3.93) (4.06) (3.81) (4.97) (6.64) 
Market beta 0.05 -0.10 -0.18 -0.08 -0.22 -0.13 -0.14 
 
(2.19) (-4.00) (-9.85) (-5.25) (-5.35) (-3.72) (-8.81) 
Conditional risk beta -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.04 0.05 
 
(-1.30) (-1.09) (0.70) (0.94) (6.20) (1.47) (3.88) 
Compensation for conditional risk 
-0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.02 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk -0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.03 
Observations 359 359 359 359 359 306 359 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.20 
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Table A6 
Robustness: Conditional Risk Using Constant Expected Returns 
This reports robustness analysis where the market risk premium is assumed to be constant. For each exchange, we 
regress the monthly excess returns COMP on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor for the 
given exchange. For each exchange, we evaluate returns in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵ
஼ைெ௉] = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
େ୓୑୔ is the excess return to COMP, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, and 
𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The U.S. 
and global samples runs from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.  
Exchange Alpha Market Beta 
Conditional Risk 
Beta 
Compensation 
for conditional 
risk 
Fraction of alpha 
explained by 
conditional risk 
AUS 0.73 (6.32) -0.06 (-3.26) 0.04 (2.56) 0.02 0.03 
AUT 0.36 (2.52) -0.07 (-2.94) 0.07 (2.89) 0.02 0.06 
BEL 0.40 (3.46) -0.12 (-5.30) 0.06 (4.25) 0.04 0.09 
CAN 0.87 (7.03) -0.13 (-5.57) 0.04 (2.79) 0.03 0.04 
CHE 0.48 (4.16) -0.10 (-4.28) 0.05 (2.32) 0.01 0.03 
DEU 0.78 (5.63) -0.20 (-7.59) 0.20 (4.15) 0.02 0.02 
DNK 0.53 (4.00) -0.11 (-4.50) 0.05 (3.15) 0.03 0.06 
ESP 0.44 (3.69) -0.10 (-6.07) 0.01 (0.69) 0.01 0.01 
FIN 0.55 (2.67) -0.22 (-8.81) 0.12 (4.55) 0.07 0.11 
FRA 0.53 (4.11) -0.13 (-5.66) 0.08 (3.22) 0.02 0.04 
GBR 0.52 (5.78) -0.05 (-2.93) 0.05 (3.05) 0.02 0.03 
HKG 0.45 (3.71) -0.10 (-6.01) 0.02 (1.83) 0.02 0.05 
IRL 0.79 (3.00) -0.14 (-4.05) 0.11 (2.56) 0.04 0.05 
ISR 0.66 (3.96) -0.04 (-1.80) 0.08 (0.98) 0.00 0.00 
ITA 0.22 (1.81) -0.02 (-0.90) 0.09 (2.48) 0.01 0.04 
JPN 0.20 (2.49) -0.05 (-3.49) 0.09 (1.65) 0.00 0.01 
NLD 0.54 (4.54) -0.09 (-4.14) 0.05 (2.40) 0.02 0.03 
NOR 0.58 (3.71) -0.05 (-2.13) 0.02 (0.68) 0.01 0.01 
NZL 0.46 (3.99) -0.01 (-0.74) 0.05 (2.28) 0.01 0.03 
PRT 0.25 (1.64) -0.09 (-4.35) 0.08 (1.23) 0.00 0.02 
SGP 0.36 (2.83) -0.14 (-7.89) 0.00 (-0.33) 0.00 -0.01 
SWE 0.48 (3.07) -0.08 (-3.41) 0.08 (3.22) 0.03 0.06 
USA 0.55 (8.96) -0.12 (-9.09) 0.08 (6.77) 0.02 0.04 
WOR 0.49 (6.64) -0.14 (-8.81) 0.05 (3.88) 0.02 0.03 
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Table A7 
Robustness: Conditional Risk Using Constant Variance 
This reports robustness analysis where the market variance is assumed to be constant. We regress the monthly excess 
returns of different factors on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor and evaluate returns in 
the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸ൣ𝑟௧ାଵ
௜ ൧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
௜  is the excess return to the risk factor i, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, 
and 𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The U.S. 
and global samples run from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.  
 SMB HML RMW CMA UMD  BAB  COMP 
        
Panel A: U.S. Sample         
Alpha 0.15 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.72 0.90 0.50  
(1.25) (3.36) (3.05) (4.17) (4.39) (6.93) (8.32) 
Market beta 0.21 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 -0.05 -0.12 
 
(7.78) (-7.17) (-6.53) (-9.36) (-3.59) (-1.71) (-9.10) 
Conditional risk beta -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.04 
 
(-1.16) (3.44) (6.00) (3.82) (3.48) (7.44) (8.81) 
Compensation for conditional risk 
-0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.06 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk -0.13 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.11 
Observations 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.20 
        
Panel B: Global Sample        
Alpha 0.09 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.75 0.70 0.42  
(0.76) (2.28) (3.14) (3.29) (3.77) (4.50) (5.82) 
Market beta 0.06 -0.09 -0.18 -0.08 -0.22 -0.13 -0.14 
 
(2.31) (-4.16) (-9.88) (-5.19) (-5.05) (-3.88) (-8.93) 
Conditional risk beta -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.03 
 
(-0.90) (8.20) (3.21) (4.88) (-0.25) (5.20) (5.95) 
Compensation for conditional risk 
-0.02 0.13 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.07 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk -0.22 0.35 0.13 0.18 -0.01 0.15 0.13 
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 306 354 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.24 
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Table A8 
Robustness: Conditional Risk Using Constant Variance 
This reports robustness analysis where the market variance is assumed to be constant. For each exchange, we regress 
the monthly excess returns COMP on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor for the given 
exchange. For each exchange, we evaluate returns in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵ
஼ைெ௉] = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
େ୓୑୔ is the excess return to COMP, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, and 
𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The U.S. 
and global samples runs from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.  
Exchange Alpha Market Beta 
Conditional Risk 
Beta 
Compensation 
for conditional 
risk 
Fraction of alpha 
explained by 
conditional risk 
AUS 0.76 (6.49) -0.06 (-3.23) 0.05 (1.94) 0.01 0.01 
AUT 0.39 (2.69) -0.08 (-3.24) 0.00 (0.11) 0.00 0.00 
BEL 0.46 (3.80) -0.11 (-4.84) -0.01 (-0.59) -0.01 -0.01 
CAN 0.91 (6.86) -0.13 (-5.28) 0.01 (0.71) 0.01 0.01 
CHE 0.50 (4.25) -0.11 (-4.49) 0.00 (-0.10) 0.00 0.00 
DEU 0.67 (4.78) -0.18 (-7.02) 0.04 (5.27) 0.13 0.16 
DNK 0.53 (3.97) -0.11 (-4.66) 0.02 (2.35) 0.05 0.08 
ESP 0.45 (3.80) -0.11 (-6.24) 0.01 (1.53) 0.02 0.05 
FIN 0.55 (2.56) -0.23 (-8.82) 0.02 (1.65) 0.06 0.11 
FRA 0.55 (4.16) -0.12 (-5.25) 0.02 (1.37) 0.02 0.03 
GBR 0.52 (5.69) -0.05 (-2.68) 0.02 (2.21) 0.02 0.04 
HKG 0.51 (4.24) -0.10 (-5.85) -0.03 (-2.83) -0.03 -0.07 
IRL 0.86 (3.21) -0.14 (-3.92) 0.02 (0.74) 0.02 0.03 
ISR 0.64 (3.91) -0.05 (-1.96) 0.00 (-0.13) 0.00 0.00 
ITA 0.22 (1.72) -0.02 (-0.97) 0.01 (1.31) 0.02 0.08 
JPN 0.21 (2.60) -0.05 (-3.40) 0.02 (1.31) 0.01 0.03 
NLD 0.50 (4.06) -0.10 (-4.34) 0.01 (2.49) 0.07 0.13 
NOR 0.55 (3.48) -0.05 (-2.35) 0.02 (1.93) 0.05 0.08 
NZL 0.45 (3.92) -0.02 (-0.77) 0.02 (1.94) 0.02 0.04 
PRT 0.23 (1.46) -0.10 (-4.53) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 0.00 
SGP 0.37 (2.82) -0.14 (-7.73) 0.00 (0.65) 0.02 0.04 
SWE 0.53 (3.31) -0.08 (-3.15) 0.01 (0.33) 0.00 0.01 
USA 0.50 (8.32) -0.12 (-9.10) 0.04 (8.81) 0.06 0.11 
WOR 0.42 (5.82) -0.14 (-8.93) 0.03 (5.95) 0.07 0.13 
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Table A9 
Robustness: Conditional Risk Using Bollerslev et al (2009) and SVIX 
This reports robustness analysis where the market variance used in the conditional-risk factor is measured using either 
Bollerslev, Tauchen, Zhou (2009) or the SVIX measure of risk neutral variance (Martin, 2017). For each exchange, 
we regress the monthly excess returns COMP on the shock to the market factor and the conditional risk factor for the 
given exchange. We evaluate returns in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸[𝑟௧ାଵ
஼ைெ௉] = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
େ୓୑୔ is the excess return to COMP, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, and 
𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The sample 
is the U.S. sample from 1990-2015 (Panel A) and 1996-2015 (Panel B). 
 SMB HML RMW CMA UMD  BAB  COMP         
Panel A: Bollerslev et. al (2009)        
Alpha 0.00 0.16 0.48 0.25 0.79 0.99 0.53  
(-0.01) (1.05) (3.47) (2.42) (2.95) (4.58) (5.17) 
Market beta 0.18 -0.13 -0.25 -0.13 -0.30 -0.26 -0.21 
 
(4.43) (-3.72) (-8.22) (-5.77) (-4.91) (-5.44) (-9.28) 
Conditional risk beta 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 
 
(0.44) (2.86) (2.88) (3.55) (2.48) (4.64) (5.55) 
Compensation for conditional risk 
0.01 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.10 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk 1.17 0.32 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.16 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.27 
        
Panel B: SVIX        
Alpha 0.05 0.15 0.56 0.25 0.76 1.04 0.55  
(0.21) (0.80) (3.33) (2.12) (2.27) (4.00) (4.42) 
Market beta 0.20 -0.12 -0.29 -0.12 -0.35 -0.31 -0.24 
 
(4.05) (-3.19) (-7.94) (-4.55) (-4.92) (-5.50) (-8.87) 
Conditional risk beta 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.07 
 
(0.95) (3.68) (3.00) (3.77) (1.71) (4.28) (5.31) 
Compensation for conditional risk 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.06 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk 0.30 0.31 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.10 
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.08 0.23 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.31 
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Table A10 
Robustness: Index of Expected Return 
This reports robustness analysis where the market risk premium used in the conditional-risk factor is measured as the 
average of estimators by: the Campbell and Thompson (2008), Kelly and Pruitt (2013), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), 
and Martin (2017). We regress the monthly excess returns of different factors on the shock to the market factor and 
the conditional risk factor and evaluate returns in the following two-factor model from Proposition 1: 
𝐸ൣ𝑟௧ାଵ
௜ ൧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௠𝜆௠ + 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠   
where 𝑟௧ାଵ
௜  is the excess return to the risk factor i, 𝛽௠ and 𝛽௖
௠ are the beta for the market- and conditional-risk factor, 
and 𝜆௠ and 𝜆௖
௠ are their risk premia. The composite factor COMP is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, 
and BAB. “Compensation for conditional risk” is the product 𝛽௖
௠𝜆௖
௠. All alphas are in monthly percent. t-statistics 
are reported below the parameter estimates and statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated in bold. The U.S. 
and global samples run from 1964-2015 and 1986-2015.  
 SMB HML RMW CMA UMD  BAB  COMP         
Panel A: Bollerslev et. al (2009)        
Alpha 0.17 0.36 0.26 0.29 0.69 0.93 0.51  
(1.46) (3.50) (3.17) (4.20) (4.25) (7.13) (8.32) 
Market beta 0.21 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 -0.05 -0.12 
 
(7.87) (-7.32) (-6.60) (-9.57) (-3.53) (-1.68) (-9.07) 
Conditional risk beta -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.05 
 
(-0.89) (0.44) (3.91) (1.36) (5.67) (6.69) (7.40) 
Compensation for conditional risk 
-0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.04 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk -0.06 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.08 
Observations 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.18 
        
Panel B: SVIX        
Alpha 0.08 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.64 0.68 0.42  
(0.72) (2.66) (3.23) (3.39) (3.31) (4.48) (5.90) 
Market beta 0.06 -0.10 -0.18 -0.08 -0.22 -0.12 -0.14 
 
(2.26) (-4.06) (-10.05) (-5.37) (-5.26) (-3.47) (-9.36) 
Conditional risk beta 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 
 
(-0.43) (5.44) (2.04) (4.97) (3.59) (6.04) (7.48) 
Compensation for conditional risk -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.06 
Fraction of alpha explained by 
conditional risk -0.08 0.20 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.13 
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 306 354 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.11 0.23 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.28 
                
 128
Figure A1 
Conditional Risk in Volatility Managed Portfolios around the World 
This figure the loading of volatility managed portfolios on the conditional risk factor around the world. 
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Figure A2 
Conditional Risk in Time Series Momentum around the World 
This figure the loading of time-series momentum portfolios on the conditional risk factor around the world.   
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Figure A3 
Conditional Risk in Cross-Sectional Risk Factors around the World 
This figure shows the compensation for conditional risk is in different cross-sectional strategies in different countries. 
The composite risk factor is the average return to HML, RMW, CMA, UMD, and BAB.  
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Abstract:
We test whether the low-risk e↵ect is driven by (a) leverage constraints and thus risk should
be measured using beta vs. (b) behavioral e↵ects and thus risk should be measured by id-
iosyncratic risk. Beta depends on volatility and correlation, where only volatility is related
to idiosyncratic risk. Hence, the new factor betting against correlation (BAC) is particu-
larly suited to di↵erentiating between leverage constraints vs. lottery explanations. BAC
produces strong performance in the US and internationally, supporting leverage constraint
theories. Similarly, we construct the new factor SMAX to isolate lottery demand, which also
produces positive returns. Consistent with both leverage and lottery theories contributing
to the low-risk e↵ect, we find that BAC is related to margin debt while idiosyncratic risk
factors are related to sentiment and casino profits.
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1 Introduction
The relation between risk and expected return is a central issue in finance with broad impli-
cations for investment behavior, corporate finance, and market e ciency. One of the major
stylized facts on the risk-return relation, indeed in empirical asset pricing more broadly, is
the observation that assets with low risk have high alpha, the so-called “low-risk e↵ect”
(Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972).1 However, the literature o↵ers di↵erent views on the
underlying economic drivers of the low-risk e↵ect and the best empirical measures. In short,
the debate is whether (a) the low-risk e↵ect is driven by leverage constraints and risk should
be measured using systematic risk vs. (b) the low-risk e↵ect is driven by behavioral e↵ects
and risk should be measured using idiosyncratic risk.2 This paper seeks to test these the-
ories using broad global data, controlling for more existing factors, using measures of the
economic drivers, and using new factors that we call betting against correlation (BAC) and
scaled MAX (SMAX) that help solve the problem that the existing low-risk factors are
highly correlated.
The theory of leverage constraints for the low-risk e↵ect was proposed by Black (1972)
and extended by Frazzini and Pedersen (2011, 2014) who study an extensive set of global
stocks, bonds, credits, and derivatives based on their betting against beta (BAB) factor.
Hence, the systematic low-risk e↵ect is based on a rigorous economic theory and has sur-
vived more than 40 years of out of sample evidence. Further, a number of papers docu-
ment evidence consistent with the underlying economic mechanism of leverage constraints:
Jylha¨ (2018) finds that exogenous changes in margin requirements influence the slope of the
security market line, Boguth and Simutin (2017) show that funding constraints as proxied
by mutual fund beta predict BAB, Malkhozov, Mueller, Vedolin, and Venter (2016) show
that international illiquidity predict BAB, and Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) document a
strong link between the return to BAB and financial intermediary leverage.3
The alternative view is that the low-risk e↵ect stems from behavioral biases leading to
1We use the standard term “low-risk e↵ect” to refer to the (risk-adjusted) return spread between low-
and high-risk stocks (i.e., it does not just refer to low-risk stocks).
2A related but distinct debate is whether other factors subsume low-risk factors or vice versa (see, for
instance, Novy-Marx, 2014 and Fama and French, 2016) and we also address this debate herein as discussed
below. We note however, that BAB and BAC are based on equilibrium theories of asset pricing while the
other factors are ad hoc empirical specifications.
3See also the related evidence on corporate finance and banking (Baker and Wurgler, 2015, 2016),
benchmark constraints (Brennan, 1993; Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler, 2011) and leverage constraints and
di↵erences of opinion (Hong and Sraer, 2015).
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a preference for lottery-like returns (Barberis and Huang, 2008; Brunnermeier, Gollier, and
Parker, 2007) and therefore the focus should be on idiosyncratic risk. Indeed, Ang, Hodrick,
Xing, and Zhang (2006, 2009) find that stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) have
high risk-adjusted returns in the U.S. and internationally. In a similar vein, Bali, Cakici,
and Whitelaw (2011) consider stocks sorted on the maximum return (MAX) over the past
month, finding that low MAX is associated with high risk-adjusted returns,4 and Bali,
Brown, Murray, and Tang (2017) argue that the low-risk e↵ect is driven by idiosyncratic
risk rather than systematic risk. Also, Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan (2017) argue that the
low-risk e↵ect is driven by idiosyncratic risk and only appears among over-priced stocks.
The challenge with the existing literature is that it seeks to run a horse race between
factors that are, by construction, highly correlated since risky stocks are usually risky in
many ways. Indeed, the reason that all these factors are known under the umbrella term
“the low-risk e↵ect” is that they are so closely related. Hence, the most powerful way to
credibly distinguish these theories is to construct a new factor that captures one theory
while at the same being relatively unrelated to factors capturing the alternative theory. To
accomplish this, we decompose BAB into two factors: betting against correlation (BAC)
and betting against volatility (BAV). BAC goes long stocks that have low correlation to the
market and shorts those with high correlation, while seeking to match the volatility of the
stocks that are bought and sold. Likewise, BAV goes long and short based on volatility,
while seeking to match correlation. This decomposition of BAB creates a component that is
relatively unrelated to the behavioral factors (BAC) and a closely related component (BAV).
To see that BAC is relatively unrelated to the behavioral-based factors, we note that the
long and short sides of BAC have similar average volatility, skewness, and MAX.5 At the
same time, sorting on ex ante market correlation successfully creates a BAC factor that is
long stocks with low ex post market correlations (and short stocks with high ones).
Since stocks with low market correlation have low market betas, the theory of leverage
constraints implies that BAC has positive risk-adjusted returns, just like BAB. Empirically,
we find that BAC is about as profitable as the BAB factor and BAC has a highly significant
CAPM alpha as predicted by the theory of leverage constraints. This evidence thus supports
the theory of leverage constraints and is clearly separate from the behavioral factors. To
address the findings of Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan (2017), we double-sort on their measure
4See also the measure related to idiosyncratic skewness studied by Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2009).
5See also the measure related to idiosyncratic skewness studied by Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2009).
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of each stock’s “mispricing” and our measure of each stock’s correlation with the market,
finding that low-correlation stocks deliver higher risk-adjusted returns in each quintile of
mispricing, providing further evidence that the low-risk e↵ect is not just about idiosyncratic
risk or its interaction with mispricing.
Another challenge to the low-risk e↵ect, both with systematic and idiosyncratic risk, is
posed by Fama and French (2016) who argue that that a five-factor model of the market
(MKT), size (SMB), value (HML), profitability (RMW), and investment (CMA) explains
the low-risk e↵ect (and the majority of the cross-section of returns more broadly, except for
momentum). While they don’t test BAB explicitly, they suggest that there is no relationship
between alpha and systematic risk once controlling for the five factors. We study this
question explicitly and, further, we also control for short-term reversal (REV), which is
particularly relevant for the idiosyncratic risk factors (due to their high turnover as discussed
below). We find significant alpha for BAB and BAC for a variety of combinations of control
factors in the US and globally. For example, BAC has a five-factor alpha of 0.62
Turning to the behavioral theory, we next consider the factors that go long stocks with
low MAX return (LMAX) or low idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). We sign all factors such
that they are long low-risk stocks (even though the literature is not always consistent in this
regard).6 Since IVOL is already based on decomposing volatility into its systematic and
idiosyncratic parts, we do not further decompose IVOL. For LMAX, however, we can again
create a new factor that helps di↵erentiate alternative hypotheses by removing the common
component (namely, volatility). Just like we created BAC to remove the e↵ect of volatility
from beta (which left us with correlation), we can remove the e↵ect of volatility from MAX:
We construct a scaled-MAX (SMAX) factor that goes long stocks with low MAX return
divided by ex ante volatility and shorts stocks with the opposite characteristic. This factor
captures lottery demand in a way that is not as mechanically related to volatility as it is
more purely about the shape of the return distribution.
Behavioral theories imply that these idiosyncratic risk factors should have positive al-
phas, which we confirm in the data. In the U.S., SMAX, LMAX, and IVOL all produce
significant alphas with respect to the Fama-French five-factor model, but SMAX performs
stronger than both LMAX and IVOL. In the global sample, however, none of the factors
are robust to controlling for the five Fama-French factors and short-term reversal.
6For example, LMAX is the negative of the FMAX factor considered by Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw
(2011).
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To go beyond studying the risk-adjusted returns, we study additional predictions arising
from the di↵erent economic theories for the low-risk e↵ect. To capture the idea underlying
the theory of leverage constraints, we consider the margin debt held by customers at NYSE
member organizations (broker-dealers). To capture the behavioral e↵ects, we consider in-
vestor sentiment as suggested by Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan (2017). We find that BAB
and BAC are predicted by measures of leverage constraints, while these factors are not pre-
dicted by investor sentiment. In contrast, MAX and IVOL are related to sentiment, but not
measures of leverage constraints. This evidence is consistent with both of the alternative
theories playing a role and that the alternative factors may, to some extent, capture di↵erent
e↵ects.7
The result that sentiment predicts the idiosyncratic- risk factors supports the role of
behavioral biases, but it does not tell exactly which behavioral bias is at play. To study be-
havioral lottery demand more specifically, we consider two new measures of lottery demand:
profits earned by casinos in the U.S. and sales of lottery tickets in the UK. We find that
casino profits predict the returns to LMAX and IVOL, consistent with theories of lottery
demand. We find no evidence, however, that higher sales of lottery tickets predict higher
return to any of the lottery factors. Finally, we find that neither BAB nor BAC load on
any of the lottery demand measures, consistent with these factors being driven by leverage
constraints and not lottery demand.
Having tested the specific predictions arising from the competing theories of the lever-
age e↵ect, we next run “horseraces” between the di↵erent low-risk factors to judge their
relative importance. We regress each type of low-risk factor (systematic/idiosyncratic) on
the alternate type of low-risk factor as well as several controls (the Fama-French factors and
short-term reversal). We find that BAB and BAC are robust to controlling for LMAX in
the US and globally. Turning things around, we find that SMAX is robust to controlling for
BAB in the US, but LMAX and IVOL both have insignificant alphas when we control for
BAB (recall that the behavioral factors were insignificant globally even before we control
for BAB).
These insignificant alphas of the idiosyncratic risk factors arise because their returns are
7We also consider other alternative theories of the low-risk e↵ect. In particular, the literature also
includes so-called Money Illusion as suggested by Modigliani and Cohn (1979) and studied by Cohen, Polk,
and Vuolteenaho (2005). However, we find no evidence that inflation predicts either BAB or BAC. This
result holds despite the fact that we include the 70’s and 80’s, time periods that included large shocks to
inflation.
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captured by BAB and our control variables. Indeed, controlling for profitability lowers the
alpha as documented by Novy-Marx (2014) and so does controlling for short-term reversal
(REV), which is natural since both the IVOL and MAX characteristics are computed over
the last month like REV and, hence, may be partly driven by microstructure e↵ects. Con-
trolling for BAB further lowers their alphas, making them insignificant. These insignificant
alphas may not, however, rule out that lottery demand matters since we are controlling for
many factors, some of which could themselves capture similar e↵ects.
Finally, we address that the di↵erent factors we have considered are based on di↵erent
construction methods. BAB, BAC, and BAV are rank-weighted while the other factors are
constructed using the Fama and French (1993) methodology. Further, the LMAX, SMAX,
and IVOL characteristics are calculated over only a single month and the factors thus have
much higher turnover than typical factors that capture a more stable stock characteristic
(e.g., BAB, BAC, or the Fama-French factors). To address these di↵erences, we run apples-
to-apples regressions where we construct all factors using the same method and, in some
cases, we also slow down the turnover of the MAX characteristic by calculating it over a
longer period. We find that the systematic-risk factors are relatively robust across apples-
to-apples regressions, while the idiosyncratic-risk factors appear less robust, especially with
respect to formation periods as the alphas of LMAX and SMAX are almost exclusively
associated with the month after the characteristics is calculated.
In summary, we find that BAB and BAC are robust to controlling for a host of other fac-
tors, have survived significant out-of-sample evidence – both through time and across asset
classes and geographies – have lower turnover than many of the well-known idiosyncratic-risk
measures, making them more implementable and realistic, and are supported by rigorous
theory of leverage constraints with consistent evidence based on margin debt. Turning to
the factors based on idiosyncratic risk, we note that these are more often defined based on
a relatively short time period (high turnover) making them susceptible to microstructure
noise and making it harder to believe that they capture the idea underlying the behavioral
theory,8 they are less robust to controlling for other factors and to using a lower turnover,
and they are weaker globally. The strongest version appears to be our new SMAX factor,
which is related to measures of sentiment. The low-risk e↵ect can be driven by more than
8If behavioral investors naively look for lottery stocks, then perhaps the simplest way to do so would be
to buy stocks from industries with high skewness. However, the MAX factor does not work for industry
selection (see appendix). In contrast, Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2014) find that BAB works both
within and across industries.
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one economic e↵ect and the evidence is not inconsistent with both leverage constraints and
lottery demand playing a role.
2 Data and Methodology
Our sample consists of 58,415 stocks covering 24 countries between January 1926 and De-
cember 2015. The 24 markets in our sample correspond to the countries belonging to the
MSCI World Developed Index as of December 31, 2012. We report summary statistics in
Table I. Stock returns are from the union of the CRSP tape and the XpressFeed Global
Database. All returns are in USD and do not include any currency hedging. All excess
returns are measured as excess returns above the U.S. Treasury bill rate.
We divide stocks into a long U.S. sample and a broad global sample. The U.S. sample
consists of all available common stocks on the CRSP tape from January 1926 to December
2015. For each regression, we use the longest available sample depending on the availability
of relevant factors, where some factors are only available from 1964 and onwards.
Our broad global sample contains all available common stocks on the union of the CRSP
tape and the XpressFeed Global database. Table I contains the start date of the data in each
country, but all regressions are from July 1990, the starting data of the global Fama-French
factors, to December 2015. For companies traded in multiple markets, we use the primary
trading vehicle identified by XpressFeed.
2.1 Constructing BAC and BAV factors
We construct betting against correlation portfolios in each country in the following way. At
the beginning of each month, stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the estimate
of volatility at the end of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to one of
five quintiles. U.S. sorts are based on NYSE breakpoints. Within each quintile, stocks are
ranked based on the estimate of correlation at the end of the previous month and assigned
to one of two portfolios: low correlation and high correlation. In these portfolios, stocks
are weighted by ranked correlation (lower correlation stocks have larger weights in the low-
correlation portfolios and larger correlation stocks have larger weights in the high-correlation
portfolios), and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month. Both portfolios are
(de)levered to have a beta of one at formation. Within each volatility quintile, a self-
financing BAC portfolio is constructed to go long the low-correlation portfolio and short
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the high-correlation portfolio. Our overall BAC factor is then the equal-weighted average
of the five betting against correlation factors.
More formally, let zq be the n(q) ⇥ 1 vector of correlation ranks within each volatility
quintile q = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and z¯q = 1
0
n(q)z
q/n(q) be the average rank, where n(q) is the number
of securities in volatility quintile q and 1n(q)is an n(q) ⇥ 1 vector of ones. The portfolio
weights of the high-correlation and the low-correlation portfolios in each volatility quintile
are then given by
wqH = k
q(zq   z¯q)+
and
wqL = k
q(zq   z¯q) 
where kq is a normalizing constant kq = 2/1
0
n(q)|zq   z¯q| and x+and x  indicate the positive
and negative elements of a vector x. By construction, we have 1
0
n(q)w
q
H = 1 and 1
0
n(q)w
q
L = 1.
The excess return to BAC in each volatility quintile is then
rBAC(q)t+1 =
1
 L,qt
(rL,qt+1   rf ) 
1
 H,qt
(rH,qt+1   rf )
Here, rf is the risk-free return, rL,qt+1 = r
q0
t+1w
q
Landr
H,q
t+1 = r
q0
t+1w
q
Hare the returns of the low-
and high-correlation portfolios, and  L,qt =  
q0
t w
q
L,and  
H,q
t =  
q0
t w
q
Hare the corresponding
betas. The return to the final BAC factor is given by
rBACt+1 = 1/5
5X
q=1
rBAC(q)t+1
Betting against volatility is constructed similarly to BAC, only stocks are first sorted into
quintiles based on correlation instead of volatility:
rBAVt+1 = 1/5
5X
q=1
rBAV (q)t+1
The global BAC factors are the average of the national portfolios in the sample weighted
by their ex-ante market capitalization.
rBAC,globalt+1 =
KX
k=1
⇡ktP
j ⇡
j
t
rBAC,kt+1
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and
rBAC,globalt+1 =
KX
k=1
⇡ktP
j ⇡
j
t
rBAC,kt+1
where ⇡kt is the market capitalization of country k at time t.
To construct BAC and BAV portfolios, we need to estimate beta, correlation, and volatil-
ity for all stocks. We estimate of beta as in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014):
 ˆTSi = ⇢ˆi,m
 ˆi
ˆsigmam
where  ˆi and ˆsigmam are the estimated volatilities of stock i and the market m and ˆ⇢i,m
is the estimated correlation. To estimate correlation, we use a five-year rolling windows of
overlapping three-day9 log-returns, r3di,t =
P2
k=0 ln(1+ r
i
t+k). Volatilities are estimated using
one-year rolling windows of one-day log-returns. We require at least 750 trading days of
non-missing return data to estimate correlation and 120 trading days of non-missing return
data to estimate volatility. Finally, we shrink the time-series estimate of betas towards their
cross-sectional mean,  ˆi = wi ˆTSi +wi 
XS, with shrinkage factor wi = 0.6 and cross-sectional
mean  XS = 1. The choice of shrinkage factor does not a↵ect the sorting of the portfolios,
only the amount of leverage applied.
2.2 Constructing LMAX, SMAX, and IVOL factors
To capture the behavioral explanations of the low-risk e↵ect, we construct LMAX, SMAX,
and IVOL factors. First, we consider the LMAX factor. The LMAX factor is the negative
of the FMAX factor introduced by Bali, Brown, Murray, and Tang (2017) to ensure that all
factors are long low-risk stocks. Specifically, LMAX is long stocks with low MAX and short
stocks with high MAX, where MAX is the average of the five highest daily returns over the
last month.
We construct an LMAX factor in each country and a global LMAX factor, which is the
average of the country-specific LMAX factors weighted by each country’s market capital-
ization ⇡kt :
rLMAX,globalt+1 =
KX
k=1
⇡ktP
j ⇡
j
t
rLMAX,kt+1
The country-specific LMAX portfolios are constructed as the intersection of six value-
9We use 3-day overlapping returns to estimate correlations to account for non-synchronous trading.
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weighted portfolios formed on size and MAX. For U.S. securities, the size breakpoint is
the median NYSE market equity. For international securities, the size breakpoint is the
80th percentile by country. The MAX breakpoints are the 30th and 70th percentile. We
use unconditional sorts in the U.S. and conditional sorts in the international sample as
many countries do not have a sample size that makes unconditional sorts useful (first we
sort on size and then MAX). Portfolios are value-weighted, refreshed every calendar month,
and rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights. LMAX is the average of
the low-MAX/large-cap and low-MAX/small-cap portfolio returns minus the average of the
high-MAX/large-cap and high-MAX/small-cap portfolio returns.
Just as beta is the product of correlation and volatility, a stock can have a high MAX
because of high volatility or high positive skewness. To decompose these e↵ects, we construct
a scaled MAX (SMAX) as follows. For each stock, we compute the average of the five highest
daily returns over the last month, divided by the stock’s volatility (estimated as described
in Section 2.1). We then compute the SMAX factor exactly as above just based on this
scaled MAX characteristic rather than the standard MAX.
Lastly, we construct IVOL factors based on the characteristic used in Ang, Hodrick,
Xing, Zhang (2006). To estimate idiosyncratic volatility, we regress each firm’s daily stock
returns over the given month on the daily returns to the market, size, and value factors.
The residual volatility in this estimation is our measure of idiosyncratic volatility for the
given firm in the given month. In the U.S., we follow Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)
and use the market, size, and value portfolios of Fama and French (1993) as right-hand-side
variables and, outside the U.S., we use the factor portfolios of Asness and Frazzini (2013).
Based on these estimated characteristics, the IVOL factor is constructed in the same way
as the LMAX and SMAX factors. The IVOL factor is long low-IVOL stocks and short
high-IVOL stocks.
2.3 Explanatory variables in factor regressions
We use the Fama and French factors (1993, 2015) whenever available. In particular, we use
their 5-factor model based on the value-weighted market factor (MKT), size factor small-
minus-big (SMB), value factor high-minus-low (HML), profitability factor robust-minus-
weak (RMW), and investment factor conservative-minus-aggressive (CMA). We also use
their short-term reversal factor (REV).
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2.4 Economic variables
We construct our leverage measure based on the amount of margin debt held by customers
at NYSE member organizations (broker-dealers). The data is available from 1959-2015 and
it is published on the NYSE website.10 At the end of each month, we calculate the ratio of
margin debt to the market capitalization of NYSE stocks which constitute our margin debt
(MD) measure:
MDt =
Margin debtt
Market capitalization of NYSE firmst
To capture investor sentiment, we use the sentiment index by Baker and Wurgler (2006).
As inflation measure, we use the yearly change in the consumer price index from the FRED
database.
We introduce two new measures of lottery demand. The first measure is a measure
of casino profits in the U.S. The measure is the quarterly time-series of profits for the
Casino industry scaled by nominal GDP. The casino industry has the North American
Industry Classification Code (NAICS) 713210. We measure profits as revenue (REVTQ in
Compustat) minus cost of goods sold (COGSQ in Compustat). We correct for seasonality
using the X11 procedure.
The second measure of lottery demand is based on sales in the UK state lottery. Each
month, we aggregate the total sales in the UK state lottery, which takes place every Wednes-
day and Saturday starting in 1993. These total monthly sales divided by UK nominal GDP
constitute our UK lottery factor.11
We again correct for seasonality using the X11 procedure. Throughout the analysis, we
use UK factors on the right-hand side whenever we have the UK lottery measure on the
right hand side.
10The data can be found on http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer edition.asp?
mode=table&key=3153&category=8.
11The data can be found on http://lottery.merseyworld.com/Sales index.html.
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3 Systematic Risk: Betting Against Correlation, Volatility, and
Beta
In this section, we dissect the betting against beta factor into a betting against correlation
factor and a betting against volatility factor. The idea is to decompose BAB into two
components: one component, BAV, that is more closely linked to idiosyncratic volatility
and MAX and another component, BAC, with little relation to these alternative factors.
BAV is a pure volatility bet and BAC is a pure bet against systematic risk.
3.1 Double-sorting on correlation and volatility
Before we consider the actual factors, we consider a simple double sort of volatility and
correlation. Table II shows risk-adjusted returns for 25 portfolios sorted first on volatility
and then conditionally on correlation. In each row, all portfolios have approximately the
same volatility, but increase in correlation from the left column to the right column.
Panel A considers whether sorting on ex ante volatility and correlation successfully sorts
on ex post market beta. Indeed, as correlation is often considered more di cult to estimate
than volatility, it is important to consider whether the ex ante estimate predicts future
systematic risk. As seen in the table, ex post CAPM beta does increase with both ex ante
correlation and ex ante volatility. In fact, sorting on correlation and volatility produce
similar magnitudes of spreads in ex post betas.
Table II Panel B and C next consider the risk-adjusted returns for these portfolios. We
see that both the CAPM alpha (Panel B) and the three-factor alpha (Panel C) decrease as
correlation or volatility increase. To examine the economic and statistical significance of
these results, we consider the long/short portfolios in, respectively, the rightmost column
and the bottom row. We see that the separate e↵ects of volatility and correlation on risk-
adjusted returns are significant for many of the cases, with the e↵ect of correlation appearing
especially strong.
3.2 Decomposing BAB into BAC and BAV
We next turn to the study of the long-short factors constructed as described in Section 2.
Given that market betas can be decomposed into market correlation and volatility, we first
show how BAB can be decomposed into BAC and BAV:
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BABt = a0 + a1BACt + a2BAVt + ✏t
Table III reports the result, showing that both BAC and BAV contribute to the return of
the original BAB factor. In the U.S., BAB has a loading of 0.71 on BAC and 0.51 on BAV,
while the loadings in the global sample are 0.84 and 0.49. The R-squared of the regressions
are 85
3.3 The performance and factor loadings of BAC
We next focus on the performance of the key new factor, BAC. Table IV reports the return
and factor loadings of the BAC factor and its building blocks. Recall that we construct
betting against correlation factors within each volatility quintile and then the overall BAC
factor is the equal-weighted average of these five factors. Panel A shows the results in
the U.S., and we see that BAC has a statistically significant alpha with respect to the
Fama-French 5-factor model within each volatility quintile as well as for the overall BAC
factor.
Panel B in Table IV reports the analogous results in the global sample. We see that
the overall BAC factor has a positive and statistically significant alpha. Also, the BAC
factors within each volatility quintile have positive alphas, but they are not all statistically
significant.
Turning to the factor loadings, we see that the overall BAC factor has a beta close to
zero, suggesting that the ex-ante market hedge works as intended. Further, the overall BAC
factor loads substantially on the small-minus-big factor as firms with, for the same volatility,
low correlation often are small, undiversified firms. The BAC factor has a positive loading
on the value factor (HML), consistent with the theory of leverage constraints. Indeed,
the theory of leverage constraints predicts that safe stocks, those with low correlation and
volatility, become cheap because they are “abandoned” by leverage constrained investors,
giving rise to a positive HML loading. Lastly, we see that the loadings on RMW and CMA
also tend to be positive, especially those of RMW. This is also expected since, as noted by
Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2013), all these are measures of quality and safety. Said
di↵erently, a stock’s safety can be measured based on price data or accounting data and it
is not surprising that these measures are related.
Given that the Fama-French factors (other than the MKT) have little theoretical foun-
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dation and given that the return of these factors is consistent with the theory of leverage
constraints, controlling for these factors is arguably too stringent of a test.12 Indeed, the
theory of leverage constraints predicts that BAB and BAC produce positive CAPM alphas,
but this theory does not predict that these factors produces positive alphas relative to right-
hand-side variables that capture the same idea. All that said, it is all the more impressive
that the alpha of BAC remains significant when controlling for the 5 factors, which reflects
that these factors are su ciently di↵erent in their content and construction.
Given the positive factor loadings, we could also turn the regression around and conclude
that BAC and, more broadly, the theory of leverage constraints, could partly explain these
Fama-French factors.
The performance of BAV is less interesting for our purposes since it is close to the factors
in the literature by construction. However, for completeness, we present similar factor
regressions for the BAV factor in appendix Tables A1 and A2 (see also Table VI below).
In the U.S., BAV produces positive and statistically significant CAPM- and three-factor
alphas, but its five-factor alpha is insignificant as are the alphas in the global sample. One
striking di↵erence in factor loadings between BAC and BAV is on small-minus-big. Where
low correlation stocks, holding volatility constant, tend to be small stocks, low volatility
stocks, holding correlation constant, tend to be big stocks.
In summary, BAB – and especially its purely systematic component BAC – appears
robust across a variety specifications and control variables. In section 5, we test if the
economic drivers of this systematic part, but, before doing so, we analyze the robustness of
the idiosyncratic part of the low-risk e↵ect.
4 Idiosyncratic Risk: LMAX, SMAX, and IVOL
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the empirical observations that stocks with high
idiosyncratic volatility and lottery-like returns have low alpha. By idiosyncratic volatility,
we refer to the idiosyncratic volatility characteristic defined by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, Zhang
(2006), which is the monthly residual volatility in the Fama-French three-factor model as
12In principle if book-to-price was a perfect measure of “value” then the BAB factor would be fully
explained by HML. One interpretation based on the theory of leverage constraints, is that low beta stocks
tend to be cheaper due to leverage constraints, and because we do not have near a perfect measure of
cheapness, the beta itself helps measure it. Said another way, both low book-to-price and low beta are noisy
measures of “value.”
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explained in our methodology section. By lottery-like we again refer to the MAX character-
istic (Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw 2011), which is the mean of the five highest daily returns
over the last month as explained in our methodology section, and our new factor SMAX.
4.1 Double-sorting on MAX and volatility
A stock can have a high MAX return either because it is volatile or because its return distri-
bution is right-skewed. To draw this distinction, we consider each stock’s scaled maximum
return, that is, its MAX return divided by its ex ante volatility. This measure captures a
stock’s realized return distribution. An investor who does not face leverage constraints but
seeks lottery-like returns can apply leverage to a stock with low volatility and high scaled
MAX. Hence, scaled MAX isolates what’s di↵erent about the lottery demand.
Table V shows CAPM and three factor alphas of 25 portfolios sorted first on volatility and
then conditionally on scaled MAX. We see that scaled MAX is associated with significant
alpha, even when keeping volatility constant.
4.2 Decomposing LMAX into SMAX and BAV
We next turn to the LMAX factor that goes long stocks with low MAX returns while
shorting those with high MAX. The results in Section 4.1 suggest that LMAX gets its alpha
both from betting against high volatility and from betting against stocks with high scaled
max. Table VI formally decomposes LMAX into the factor that goes long stocks with low
scaled max (SMAX) and the factor that goes long stocks with low total volatility over the
past month (TV). Both in the U.S. and globally, the two factors combine to explain most
of the variation in LMAX; the R-squared is 90 percent in the U.S. and 97 percent globally
with insignificant intercepts.
4.3 The performance of idiosyncratic risk factors: LMAX, SMAX, and IVOL
Table VII reports the performance and factor exposures of the three idiosyncratic risk fac-
tors. The three factors have almost identical three-factor alpha and three-factor information
ratios. All three factors remain significant when we also control for RMW, CMA, and REV,
but the alpha of SMAX is statistically more robust than LMAX and IVOL in the sense that
the six-factor t-statistic is more significant for SMAX.
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Turning to the factor loadings, we see that the idiosyncratic risk factors tend to load
on the quality variables RMW and CMA. Also, LMAX and SMAX load strongly on the
short-term reversal factor REV. This reversal loading is intuitive since LMAX and SMAX
go long stocks with high returns on their best days. IVOL has little loading on REV (so
excluding REV from the right-hand side hardly changes the results; not shown).
Panel B of Table VII considers the three idiosyncratic factors in the global sample. In
the global sample, the idiosyncratic risk factors have positive and significant three-factor
alphas, but their alphas become insignificant once controlling for RMW, CMA, and REV.
In summary, the idiosyncratic risk factors LMAX, SMAX, and IVOL produce positive
alphas in the U.S., but their alphas are weak outside the U.S. In addition, our new scaled
factor SMAX appears more robust, especially in the U.S.
5 Testing the Underlying Economic Drivers
Having decomposed the low-risk e↵ect into a systematic and an idiosyncratic part, we next
analyze the economic drivers of these two parts of the low-risk e↵ect. To test the theory of
leverage constraints, we include a measure of margin debt. Similarly, to test the behavioral
theories, we consider measures of investor sentiment, casino profits, and lottery ticket sales.
Lastly, to test the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis of Money Illusion, we include inflation. For
each of these, we consider both the ex ante value and the contemporaneous change. Further,
we control for the five Fama-French factors and short-term reversal factor such that we
e↵ectively predicts each factors alpha in excess of these factors, i.e., the parts of the return
more unique to each factor.
The data sources of the economic variables are discussed in Section 2, but a brief com-
ment on the measure of leverage constraints is in order. We construct a new measure of
leverage constraints based on the amount of margin debt (MD) held against NYSE stocks
as a fraction of the total market equity of NYSE stocks. When margin debt is low, we
interpret this as tight leverage constraints, that is, we implicitly assume that the variation
in the amount of margin debt is primarily driven by changes in the supply of leverage. This
is a simplification, but, consistent with this idea, changes in margin debt are negatively cor-
related with the TED spread, VIX, noise in the term structure of U.S. government bonds as
defined by Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013), and the leverage applied by financial intermediaries
as seen Table A6 in the appendix.
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Panel A of Table VIII tests the extent to which the di↵erent low-risk factors are pre-
dicted by margin debt, sentiment, and inflation. As seen in the first four columns, both
BAC and BAB have higher future return when ex ante margin debt is low, i.e.., when
leverage constraints are high. Contemporaneous increases in margin debt are associated
with positive returns to BAB and BAC, consistent with the theory that investors shifting
their portfolios towards low-risk stocks when leverage constraints decrease. This contem-
poraneous e↵ect is statistically significant. In other words, since prices should go in the
opposite direction of expected returns, both of these findings are consistent with the theory
of leverage constraints.
Investor sentiment does not seem to have an influence on the return to BAB and BAC
consistent with the idea that these factors capture leverage constraints rather than senti-
ment. Further, the sign of inflation is wrong relative to the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis
of money illusion tested by Cohen, Polk, and Vuelteenaho (2005) so it seems unlikely that
money illusion drives the low-risk e↵ect.
We next consider the determinants of the idiosyncratic risk factors, also reported in
Panel A of Table VIII. We see that LMAX, IVOL and SMAX all have higher return when
ex ante investor sentiment is high, consistent with the factors being driven, at least partly,
by behavioral demand as suggested by Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan (2017). The e↵ect is
statistically significant for IVOL and LMAX. The e↵ect of the contemporaneous change in
sentiment is insignificant for IVOL and LMAX while it appears to go in the wrong direction
for SMAX. Finally, neither of the idiosyncratic factors LMAX, SMAX, and IVOL appear
related to margin debt, which is consistent with leverage constraints influencing the price
of systematic risk, but not the price of idiosyncratic risk.
In Panel B we test if the predictive power of sentiment comes directly from lottery
demand. We find that when casino profits are larger, the returns to the idiosyncratic low-risk
factors are higher. We also find that an increase in casino profits causes contemporaneously
lower returns to the idiosyncratic low-risk factors. These results are consistent with lottery
demand partly driving the idiosyncratic part of the low-risk e↵ect. However, we find no
statistically significant e↵ect of lottery tickets on the idiosyncratic low-risk factors. We note
that the idiosyncratic low-risk factors are not very profitable in the first place in UK, which
is the sample for our lottery ticket regressions.
To further address the hypothesis that BAB and BAC might be driven by demand for
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lottery, we also test if the lottery measures predicts these factors. We find no evidence
for this hypothesis. Neither BAB nor BAC load on either of the two lottery measures.
This result is again consistent with the notion that lottery demand might influence the
idiosyncratic low-risk factors, but not the systematic low-risk factors.
The last test on the economic drivers addresses whether the low-risk e↵ect is present
among all stocks or only among the overpriced stocks. Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan (2017)
argue that the betting-against-beta phenomenon is only present among overpriced stocks
based on the idea that the low-risk e↵ect is a symptom of limited arbitrage. One of their
main pieces of evidence is a double sort on beta and the mispricing measure of Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2015). Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan (2017) report that, when keeping mispric-
ing constant, the relationship between beta and alpha only exist among overpriced stocks.
The result echoes the finding in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), who find that among
overpriced stocks, higher IVOL leads to lower alpha, but among underpriced stocks, higher
IVOL leads to higher alpha.
There are two potential issues with the analysis of Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan (2017)
as a test of the theory of leverage constraints. First, the theory of leverage constraints
predicts that high-beta stocks endogenously become over-priced (relative to the standard
CAPM) so the theory does not make clear predictions for the alpha-beta relation when
controlling for over-pricing (i.e., controlling for over-pricing could “throw the baby out with
the bathwater”). Second, their finding related to idiosyncratic volatility could confound the
alpha-beta relation to the extent that there are multiple drivers of the low-risk e↵ect.
To get a cleaner test of the alpha-beta relation when controlling for overpricing (and
address at least the second issue mentioned above), we proceed as follows. We sort stocks
first by mispricing and then by correlation. By sorting on correlation instead of beta,
we pick up the e↵ect of systematic risk without also picking up the e↵ect of idiosyncratic
volatility. Panel C in Table VIII reports the results. Consistent with the leverage constraints
explanation, higher correlation leads to lower alpha irrespective of the degree of over- or
underpricing. Indeed, in all five mispricing quintiles, higher correlation leads to a lower
alpha. The size of the alpha is also similar across mispricing quintiles. This provides further
evidence of the theory of leverage constraints.
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6 Horserace
The analysis so far suggests that the low-risk e↵ect is driven by both systematic and id-
iosyncratic risk due to, respectively, leverage constraints and lottery demand. Our analysis
suggests that the competing explanations share an element related to volatility, but also
have separate elements related to, respectively, correlation and the shape of the return
distribution. To further judge whether both explanations have separate power and their
relative importance in the low-risk e↵ect, we now run a “horserace.”
6.1 Horserace based on published factors
We first consider a horserace between the various factors constructed as in the papers where
they were first considered (as we have also done in the previous analysis). Table IX shows
the results of regressing each systematic/idiosyncratic risk factor on a competing factor
(BAB or LMAX) as well as several controls, namely the five Fama-French factors and the
reversal factor REV.
Panel A of Table IX reports our findings for US factors. The BAB factor in the U.S.
has a positive and significant alpha (t-statistic of 3.0) when controlling for LMAX, the five
Fama-French factors, and REV. Further, we see that BAC has an even more significant
alpha when controlling for these factors: BAC has an alpha of 0.6 percent per month with
a t-statistic of 4.8. The higher alpha of BAC is likely due to the fact that it is constructed
to be less correlated to other factors. Indeed, BAC has a much smaller factor loading on
LMAX than BAB, although both are significantly positive. Collectively, these findings are
evidence that the low-risk e↵ect is not simply explained by a combination of idiosyncratic
risk and the five Fama-French factors.
Finally, we see in Panel A of Table IX that BAV is not robust to controlling for LMAX,
the five Fama-French factors, and REV. This finding is not surprising since BAV captures the
part of BAB that is most closely connected to the idiosyncratic risk factors such as LMAX.
When we have similar variables on the left-hand side and right-hand side, the intercept is
naturally insignificant. Indeed, recall that BAV has significant excess returns, 1-factor, and
3-factor alpha, so its alpha only turns insignificant when we control for all other factors,
which could simply reflect that the collection of right-hand-side variables already capture
e↵ects of leverage constraints (as discussed above).
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We next turn our attention to the idiosyncratic factors in Table IX. We see that LMAX
and IVOL have insignificant alphas in these regressions where we control for BAB, the five
Fama-French factors, and REV. Given our earlier results, this finding reflects that BAB
drives the alpha of these factors to zero. However, SMAX has a positive and significant
alpha. The fact that SMAX is the only idiosyncratic risk factor that retains its alpha
may be because it is constructed to be more exclusively focused on idiosyncratic skewness,
making it less correlated to BAB (and perhaps the other factors).
Panel B of Table VI shows the same factor regressions in the global sample. Again, we
see that BAB and BAC have significant alphas, highlighting the importance of systematic
risk in the global low-risk e↵ect. None of the idiosyncratic factors has significant alpha in
the global sample.
6.2 Turnover and alpha decay
So far, we have followed the literature and considered factors constructed as in the papers
that first developed these factors, but these methodologies di↵er across factors. In particular,
BAB (and, likewise, BAC and BAV) are rank-weighted while the others are based on the
Fama-French methodology. Further, the factors have di↵erent turnover: LMAX, SMAX,
and IVOL are based on monthly characteristics that change quickly, and thus have high
turnover relative to BAB and the Fama-French factors that are more stable. We address
both of these issues in order to make apples-to-apples comparisons.
We first consider turnover. Table X shows that LMAX and IVOL have much faster
turnover than BAB, BAC, and BAV. Indeed, LMAX and IVOL have a monthly turnover
of about 2 dollars. Said di↵erently, an idiosyncratic volatility factor that goes long $1
and shorts $1 has an annual turnover of about 12 ⇥ $2 = $24. In contrast, the FF and
BAB-type factors have about six times lower turnover (e.g., BAC has a monthly turnover of
$0.35). This large di↵erence in turnover is partly explained by the length of the time periods
over which the characteristics are estimated: MAX and IVOL are both estimated over the
previous month, whereas the characteristics used for the BAB-type factors are estimated
over one to five years. Further, the characteristics of correlation and volatility may simply
be more stable economic characteristics than variables such as MAX. The high turnover of
the MAX and IVOL factors makes them more di cult to interpret, for instance because
it may be more di cult for behavioral investors to keep track of such transient properties.
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Further, the high turnover means that these factors are more sensitive to microstructure
issues, noise, and trading cost. To capture one element of these issues, we have included
the factor REV, but constructing more stable characteristics is a much more direct way to
address the turnover issue.
We introduce a new one-year MAX characteristic that calculates max returns over the
last year rather than the last month and a corresponding factor that we denote LMAX(1Y).
The characteristic is simply the average return on the 20 highest return days. Similarly,
we construct the factor SMAX(1Y) based on volatility-scaled MAX returns over the 1-year
look-back period.
As can be seen in Table X, the idiosyncratic risk factors with 1-year lookback period,
namely LMAX(1Y) and SMAX(1Y), have substantially lower turnover than their monthly
counterparts. Nevertheless, these factors still have higher turnover than the BAB and Fama-
French factors.
Table XI shows the return to LMAX(1Y) and SMAX(1Y). We see that LMAX(1Y) has
significant three-factor alpha, but the alpha is driven out when controlling for RMW, CMA,
and REV. For SMAX(1Y), the situation is worse. The factor has insignificant three-factor
alpha, and significantly negative alpha once controlling for RMW, CMA, and REV. These
results suggest that the factors get much of their alphas from the high turnover.
Another way to illustrate the importance of turnover is to consider how quickly the alpha
decays after portfolio formation. To illustrate the alpha decay of the various factors, Figure
1 plots the cumulative alpha in event time, relative to the portfolio formation period. Panel
A of Figure 1 plots the 3-factor alphas while Panel B plots 5-factor alphas.
As can be seen in Panel A, the cumulative alphas of the BAB and BAC factors grow
continually over the year after the portfolio formation period. To understand what happens,
note that low-beta stocks typically remain low-beta stocks over the following 12 months and,
therefore, they continue to earn positive alphas. Likewise, the cumulative 3-factor alphas
of LMAX and LMAX-1-year gradually rise over the next 12 months, although these curves
flatten out. The cumulative alpha of SMAX is striking: It flattens out after 1 month,
meaning that all of the three-factor alpha associated with the monthly SMAX characteristic
is earned in the first month – holding SMAX for longer does not give any additional alpha.
Panel B of figure 5 shows cumulative five-factor alpha in event time, that is, the same
as Panel A except that we now also control for the quality factors RMW and CMA. For
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BAB and BAC, the results are similar to those of Panel A, reflecting that the BAB and
BAC factors continue to earn alpha, whether the 3-factor or 5-factor model is used, over
the 12 months following portfolio formation. However, now all of the idiosyncratic risk
factors have flat cumulative alpha curves, looking similar to the flat alpha curve for SMAX
in Panel A. In other words, as for SMAX, LMAX and even the version with 1-year-lookback
now only earn alpha in the month following portfolio formation and holding it for longer
hardly contributes with additional alpha. This di↵erence in the persistence of three-factor
and five-factor alpha for LMAX is due to the loading of LMAX on the quality factors
(profitability and investment). Indeed, it seems that LMAX picks up a slow-moving return
pattern captured by RMW and CMA, but, once we control for RMW and CMA, the e↵ect
disappears and only a transient return component remains.
6.3 All factors constructed based on Fama-French methodology
We next run a horserace where all factors are constructed based on the Fama-French method-
ology. In particular, all factors are constructed by double sorting on size and the charac-
teristic in question, creating value-weighted portfolios, and going long a small and a big
one and shorting a small and a big one (as described in Section 2). For BAC and BAV,
we continue to create volatility (correlation) neutral editions of the factors. That is, within
each volatility (correlation) quintile, we create a Fama-French-type factor based on stocks’
correlation (volatility) characteristic, and then finally take an equal-weighted average of
these five factors.
The results are reported in Table XII. As is seen in the table, BAB, BAC, and BAV
have positive and significant alphas when controlling for the five Fama-French factors and
REV. These results thus reject the claim by Fama and French (2016) that the low-risk
e↵ect is explained by the five-factor model. The alpha for BAB and BAC, however, become
insignificant once also controlling for LMAX, but the alpha of BAV is robust to controlling
for LMAX. Looking at idiosyncratic risk factors, SMAX is the only factor with significant
alpha. In the global sample, only BAV produce significant alpha.
6.4 All factors constructed based on rank-weighting-BAB methodology
We next run a horserace where all factors are rank-weighted. Since some of the Fama and
French characteristics, such as book-to-price, are highly correlated with size, we make all
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the rank-weighted factors size neutral. For each factor we, similarly to Fama and French
(1993), first assign stocks into two groups based on the median NYSE size and then create
a rank-weighted factor within each size group. Each factor is then the average return to the
two rank-weighted factors. That is, for HML for instance, the return is given by
HMLRankt+1 = 0.5HML
Rank,small
t+1 + 0.5HML
Rank,large
t+1
where the rank-weighted returns are calculated using the method of Frazzini and Pedersen
(2014) such that the portfolios are hedged ex-ante to have a beta of zero. We also construct
new editions of BAB, BAC, and BAV using the above method.
Table XIII shows the results for the rank-weighted portfolios. As we already knew, BAB
and BAC work well with rank weights and the factors thus have large Sharpe ratios. What
is new in Table XIII, however, is that their alphas are robust to using rank-weighted factors
on the right hand side. Indeed, the alpha for BAB is essentially the same as when we use
the traditional Fama-French factors on the right hand side in Table IX. The alpha for BAC
is a little lower than in Table IX but it remains highly significant.
The alphas for the idiosyncratic risk factors are generally not robust to using rank
weights. Only the six-factor alpha of SMAX is statistically significant, but this alpha be-
comes insignificant once controlling for BAB. It is worth noting that using rank weights
actually also “works” for the idiosyncratic in the sense that these rank-weighted factors
have larger Sharpe ratios than their Fama-French-type counterparts. The reason that the
rank-weighted idiosyncratic risk factors nevertheless have negative alphas is that the rank-
weighted right-hand-side factors are even more e↵ective in explaining them.
7 Conclusion
The low-risk e↵ect has profound implications for investors, firms, and capital markets. Can
investors benefit from low-risk stocks if they learn to overcome their biases? Or, are their
hands tied by leverage constraints? These questions are not just academic as most assets
are controlled by institutional investors where leverage constraints are in principle directly
observable – and changeable! – e.g., for many pension funds and mutual funds. Likewise,
if professional asset managers really su↵er from sentiment-based lottery demand such that
they change their preference for stocks based on the returns over the past month then
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perhaps this bias can be alleviated by education.
Further, the low-risk e↵ect impacts firms’ cost of capital and, hence, possibly their
investment decisions and other corporate behavior. Should firms try to undertake lottery-
like real investments to lower their cost of capital? Or should they simply add some debt to
their balance sheet (relative to what they would do in the absence of the low-risk e↵ect)?
We contribute to the literature that seeks to address these questions in four ways. First,
we present new evidence consistent specifically with the theory of leverage constraints by
showing that low-correlation stocks have high risk-adjusted returns that cannot be explained
by other low-risk factors. Both in the U.S. and internationally, our BAC factor produces
statistically significant six-factor alpha that is close to orthogonal to other low-risk factors.
Second, we present a new factor SMAX that captures the returns to betting against
stocks with lottery-like return distributions. SMAX has positive risk-adjusted returns in
the US, but not globally – as is the case for other idiosyncratic risk factors.
Third, we show that the tightness of margin constraints predicts the return to systematic
low-risk factors, but not that of the idiosyncratic low-risk factors. On the other hand,
investor sentiment and casino profits predict the return to some of the idiosyncratic low-risk
factors, but not that of the systematic factors BAB and BAC.
Fourth, in horseraces between the low-risk factors, we find that systematic low-risk fac-
tors tend to outperform idiosyncratic low-risk factors. The outperformance of the systematic
low-risk factors becomes even more pronounced once all the low-risk factors are put on a
level playing field in terms of turnover since the idiosyncratic risk factors derive much of
their alphas from a short-term e↵ect.
In conclusion, our results suggest that both leverage constraints and lottery demand play
a role for the low-risk e↵ect. The results are stronger for leverage constraints, especially
outside the US, consistent with the underlying equilibrium theory and the fact that these
constraints are observable for many investors.
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Table I 
Summary Statistics 
This table shows summary statistics as of June of each year. The sample includes all U.S. common stocks (CRSP 
“shrcd” equal to 10 or 11) and all global stocks (“tcpi” equal to 0) in the merged CRSP/Xpressfeed global databases.  
 
 
  
Country Total number of 
stocks
Average number 
of stocks
Firm size  
(Billion-USD) 
Weight in global 
portfolio
 Start Year End Year
Australia 3,286                 1,027                 0.61 0.018 1985 2015
Austria 217                    84                      0.82 0.002 1986 2015
Belgium 445                    147                    1.90 0.009 1986 2015
Canada 2,106                 576                    1.20 0.022 1982 2015
Switzerland 596                    226                    3.72 0.024 1986 2015
Germany 2,414                 850                    3.09 0.071 1986 2015
Denmark 411                    156                    1.01 0.004 1986 2015
Spain 415                    147                    3.65 0.015 1986 2015
Finland 307                    117                    1.32 0.004 1986 2015
France 1,932                 641                    2.35 0.044 1986 2015
United Kingdom 6,371                 2,013                 1.63 0.102 1986 2015
Greece 425                    186                    0.40 0.002 1988 2015
Hong Kong 2,510                 816                    1.50 0.030 1986 2015
Ireland 157                    53                      1.52 0.002 1986 2015
Israel 724                    282                    0.39 0.003 1994 2015
Italy 686                    245                    2.34 0.018 1986 2015
Japan 5,309                 3,053                 1.21 0.188 1986 2015
Netherlands 423                    173                    3.58 0.020 1986 2015
Norway 719                    185                    0.85 0.004 1986 2015
New Zealand 349                    112                    1.04 0.003 1986 2015
Portugal 157                    63                      1.56 0.002 1988 2015
Singapore 1,259                 474                    0.71 0.011 1986 2015
Sweden 1,201                 309                    1.44 0.012 1986 2015
United States 24,218               3,328                 1.21 0.389 1926 2015
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Table II 
Correlation vs. Volatility: Beta and Risk-Adjusted Returns 
This table shows properties of 25 portfolios of U.S. stocks from 1926 to 2015. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks 
are sorted first on ex ante volatility and then conditionally on ex ante correlation. Specifically, the stocks are assigned to one of 
five volatility quintiles based on NYSE breakpoints. Within each quintile, stocks are assigned to one of five correlation quintile 
portfolios based on NYSE breakpoints. Portfolios are value-weighted, refreshed every calendar month, and rebalanced every 
calendar month to maintain value weights.  The long-short portfolios are self-financing portfolios that are long $1 in the portfolio 
with highest correlation (volatility) within each volatility (correlation) quintile and short $1 in the portfolio with lowest correlation 
(volatility) within the same volatility (correlation) quintiles. Panel A reports CAPM betas and Panel B reports CAPM alphas, i.e., 
respectively the slope and intercept in a regression of monthly excess return on excess returns to the CRSP value-weighted market 
portfolio (MKT). Panel B reports three-factor alphas, i.e., the intercept in a regression of monthly excess return on MKT, size 
(SMB), and value (HML) factors of Fama and French (1993). Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis below the coefficient estimates and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
US 1930-2015
Panel A: CAPM beta
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 LS
(low) (high)
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.4
(24.9)
0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.5
(26.2)
0.7 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 0.7
(27.1)
0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.6 0.8
(24.3)
0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 0.8
(15.3)
LS 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7
(8.3) (12.6) (15.3) (17.0) (21.1)
US 1930-2015
Panel B: CAPM alpha
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 LS
(low) (high)
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.3
(5.6) (3.9) (3.2) (2.1) (2.3) (-3.6)
0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3
(3.3) (2.1) (1.6) (0.7) (-0.7) (-3.0)
0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.6
(4.1) (2.8) (0.6) (-0.2) (-2.3) (-4.4)
0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7
(3.3) (2.3) (0.3) (-1.0) (-2.2) (-4.2)
0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8
(1.4) (0.2) (0.4) (-1.7) (-2.7) (-3.3)
LS -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6
(-0.5) (-1.0) (-0.8) (-2.2) (-3.0)
So
rt
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n 
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ti
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ty
P1 (low)
P2
P3
P4
P5 (high)
P4
P5 (high)
Conditional sort on correlation
Conditional sort on correlation
So
rt
 o
n 
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ti
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ty
P1 (low)
P2
P3
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Table II 
Correlation vs. Volatility: Beta and Risk-Adjusted Returns (Continued) 
 
  
US 1930-2015
Panel C: Three-factor alpha
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 LS
(low) (high)
0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.3
(5.2) (3.3) (2.6) (1.8) (2.9) (-3.3)
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3
(2.6) (1.1) (0.8) (-0.6) (-1.6) (-3.0)
0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6
(3.4) (1.5) (-1.4) (-2.4) (-4.2) (-4.9)
0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8
(2.4) (1.1) (-1.5) (-2.9) (-4.4) (-4.5)
0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8
(0.4) (-0.9) (-1.1) (-3.9) (-4.5) (-3.2)
LS -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9
(-1.4) (-2.1) (-2.0) (-4.0) (-4.9)
Conditional sort on correlation
So
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n 
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la
ti
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ty
P1 (low)
P2
P3
P4
P5 (high)
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Table III 
Betting Against Beta as Betting Against Correlation and Volatility 
This table shows the results of regressions of the monthly return to betting against beta (BAB) on the monthly return to betting 
against correlation (BAC) and betting against volatility (BAV). Panel A reports results in the U.S. sample and panel B reports the 
results in the global sample. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates and 5% statistical significance is 
indicated in bold.  
 
  
Panel A: Long U.S. Sample (1930-2015) Panel B: Global sample (1990-2015)
BAB BAB
Intercept 0.00 Intercept 0.00
(-1.56) (-0.02)
BAC 0.71 BAC 0.84
(63.00) (66.77)
BAV 0.51 BAV 0.49
(60.33) (58.52)
R2 0.85 R2 0.96
Num 1020 306
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Table IV 
Betting Against Correlation 
This table shows returns to the betting against correlation (BAC) factor in each volatility quintile, along with the equal-weighted 
average of these factors, which constitute our overall BAC factor. Panel A reports the BAC performance in the U.S. sample and 
panel B reports the performance in the global sample. At the beginning of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order based 
on the estimated of volatility at the end of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to one of five quintiles. U.S. sorts 
are based on NYSE breakpoints. Within each quintile, stocks are assigned to one of two portfolios: low correlation and high 
correlation. In these portfolios, stocks are rank-weighted by correlation (lower correlation stocks have larger weights in the low-
correlation portfolios and larger correlation stocks have larger weights in the high-correlation portfolios), and the portfolios are 
rebalanced every calendar month. The portfolios are (de)levered to have a beta of one at formation. Within each volatility quintile, 
a self-financing BAC portfolio is made that is long the low-correlation portfolio and short the high-correlation portfolio. We form 
one set of portfolios in each country and compute global portfolios by weighting each country’s portfolio by the country’s total 
(lagged) market capitalization. Alpha is the intercept in a regression of monthly excess return. The explanatory variables are the 
monthly excess return to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio and the monthly returns to the SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA 
factors of Fama and French (2015). Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown in parenthesis below the 
coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. ‘$ long’ and ‘$ short’ measures how many dollars the 
betting against correlation portfolio is long and short. Sharpe ratios and information ratios are annualized. 
 
  
Volatility quintile 1 2 3 4 5 BAC
Excess return 0.55 0.86 0.92 1.03 1.48 0.97
(4.32) (6.52) (6.31) (5.88) (5.78) (6.74)
Alpha 0.39 0.63 0.57 0.68 1.25 0.70
(3.56) (5.50) (4.26) (4.08) (4.96) (5.45)
MKT -0.14 -0.05 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.02
(-5.1) (-1.9) (1.5) (2.2) (2.14) (0.5)
SMB 0.62 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.60
(16.6) (15.7) (12.7) (10.1) (7.1) (13.6)
HML 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.22
(2.3) (3.2) (4.0) (3.9) (1.9) (3.5)
RMW 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.16 -0.28 0.02
(0.4) (0.9) (2.5) (1.9) (-2.2) (0.3)
CMA 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.08
(1.0) (0.9) (1.9) (0.4) (0.0) (0.8)
SR 0.60 0.90 0.87 0.81 0.80 0.93
IR 0.52 0.80 0.62 0.59 0.72 0.79
R2 0.34 0.31 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.27
# obs 630 630 630 630 630 630
Panel A: U.S. Sample (1963-2015)
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Table IV 
Betting Against Correlation (continued) 
  
Volatility quintile 1 2 3 4 5 BAC
Excess return 0.27 0.64 0.64 0.70 1.15 0.68
(2.08) (4.57) (3.98) (3.95) (4.55) (4.48)
Alpha 0.11 0.41 0.27 0.24 0.81 0.37
(0.99) (3.19) (1.84) (1.48) (3.39) (2.77)
MKT 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.12
(0.4) (2.0) (3.7) (4.1) (3.27) (3.5)
SMB 0.65 0.71 0.75 0.85 1.11 0.81
(11.9) (11.5) (10.6) (10.8) (9.6) (12.6)
HML 0.10 0.14 0.26 0.23 0.05 0.16
(1.4) (1.9) (2.9) (2.4) (0.4) (1.9)
RMW 0.18 0.31 0.49 0.71 0.41 0.42
(2.2) (3.3) (4.6) (6.0) (2.3) (4.3)
CMA 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.10
(1.2) (0.9) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (1.0)
SR 0.41 0.90 0.79 0.78 0.90 0.89
IR 0.21 0.69 0.40 0.32 0.73 0.60
R2 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.23 0.35
# obs 306 306 306 306 306 306
Panel B: Global Sample (1990-2015)
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Table V 
SMAX vs. Volatility: Risk-Adjusted Returns 
This table shows the risk adjusted returns to 25 portfolios sorted first on volatility and then conditionally on SMAX in the U.S. 
from 1926 to 2015. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the estimate of 
volatility at the end of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to one of five quintiles based on NYSE breakpoints. 
Within each quintile, stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the estimate of SMAX at the end of the previous month and 
assigned to one of five quintile portfolios based on NYSE breakpoints. Portfolios are value-weighted, refreshed every calendar 
month, and rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights.  The long-short portfolios are self-financing portfolios 
that are long $1 in the portfolio with highest SMAX (volatility) within each volatility (SMAX) quintile and short $1 in the portfolio 
with lowest SMAX (volatility) within the same volatility (SMAX) quintiles. SMAX is the average of the five highest daily returns 
for a stock over the previous month dividend by its volatility. Volatility is estimated as daily volatility over the previous month. 
Panel A reports CAPM alphas, Panel B reports three-factor alphas (Mkt, SMB, HML), and Panel C reports five-factor alpha 
(MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA). Alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient 
estimates and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
US 1930-2015
Panel A: CAPM alpha
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 LS
(low) (high)
0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.3
(5.4) (3.2) (1.4) (2.0) (1.1) (-3.4)
0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.5
(3.8) (2.5) (1.6) (0.1) (-2.7) (-5.0)
0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7
(3.6) (1.7) (-1.3) (-1.3) (-3.8) (-5.5)
0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.9
(3.5) (1.1) (-0.9) (-2.1) (-3.7) (-6.2)
0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -1.2
(2.0) (-0.0) (-0.8) (-2.6) (-3.8) (-5.5)
LS 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.9
(0.2) (-1.0) (-1.0) (-2.8) (-3.7)
US 1930-2015
Panel B: Three-factor alpha
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 LS
(low) (high)
0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.3
(5.4) (3.3) (1.1) (1.9) (1.0) (-3.4)
0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5
(3.1) (1.8) (0.9) (-0.9) (-3.9) (-5.1)
0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7
(2.8) (0.3) (-3.1) (-2.9) (-5.4) (-5.7)
0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.9
(3.0) (-0.3) (-2.4) (-3.9) (-5.6) (-6.3)
0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.8 -1.0 -1.3
(2.3) (-0.9) (-1.9) (-4.3) (-5.2) (-6.2)
LS 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 -1.0
(0.3) (-2.0) (-2.0) (-4.4) (-5.1)
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P1 (low)
P2
P3
P4
P5 (high)
Conditional sort on SMAX
So
rt
 o
n 
vo
la
ti
li
ty
P1 (low)
P2
P3
P4
P5 (high)
Conditional sort on SMAX
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Table VI 
LMAX as SMAX and BAV 
This table shows the results of regressions of the monthly return to the factor going long stocks with low maximum return over 
the past month (LMAX) on the monthly returns to the factor going long stocks with low maximum return scaled by volatility 
(SMAX) and the monthly return to the factor going long stocks with low total volatility (TV). Total volatility is total daily volatility 
measured over the previous month. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates and 5% statistical 
significance is indicated in bold.  
 
  
Panel A: Long U.S. Sample (1930-2015) Panel B: Global sample (1990-2015)
LMAX LMAX
Intercept 0.00 Intercept 0.00
(1.33) (1.24)
SMAX 0.34 SMAX 0.23
(16.16) (9.09)
TV 0.75 TV 0.80
(83.92) (81.26)
R2 0.90 R2 0.97
Num 1020 Num 306
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Table VII 
The Idiosyncratic Factors: LMAX, SMAX, and IVOL 
This table shows regression results for monthly returns to the factor going long stocks with low maximum return over the past 
month (LMAX), the factor going long stocks with low maximum return scaled by volatility (SMAX), and the factor going long 
stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). Panel A reports the results from the U.S. sample and Panel B reports the results 
from the global sample. Total volatility is total daily volatility measured over the previous month. The intercept alpha is in monthly 
percent. The control variables are the monthly excess return to the market portfolio (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML), profitability 
(RMW), investment (CMA), and short-term reversal (REV). t-statistics are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates, 
and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. The Sharpe ratio (SR) and information ratio (IR) are annualized. 
 
 
  
SMAX SMAX SMAX LMAX LM AX LMAX IVOL IVOL
Alpha 0.44 0.38 0.25 0.58 0.31 0.24 0.53 0.22
(5.60) (4.78) (3.69) (5.81) (3.34) (2.64) (5.27) (2.46)
MKT -0.04 -0.02 -0.09 -0.42 -0.35 -0.39 -0.44 -0.35
(-2.0) (-1.2) (-5.4) (-17.8) (-15.8) (-17.40) (-18.2) (-16.2)
SMB -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.48 -0.35 -0.37 -0.65 -0.50
(-0.7) (0.3) (-1.1) (-14.3) (-11.2) (-12.0) (-19.7) (-16.8)
HM L 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.45 0.24 0.20 0.41 0.18
(2.8) (1.1) (-0.9) (12.6) (5.5) (4.8) (11.4) (4.4)
RMW 0.12 0.12 0.57 0.57 0.68
(3.0) (3.6) (12.3) (12.7) (15.5)
CMA 0.08 0.16 0.46 0.50 0.49
(1.4) (3.4) (6.9) (7.8) (7.8)
REV 0.36 0.19 -0.01
(16.9) (6.6) (-0.5)
SR 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.22
IR 0.79 0.70 0.54 0.82 0.49 0.39 0.74 0.36
R2 0.03 0.04 0.34 0.64 0.71 0.73 0.69 0.78
# obs 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630
Panel A: U.S. FMAX Sample (1963-2015)
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Table VII 
The Idiosyncratic Factors: LMAX, SMAX, and IVOL (continued) 
 
  
SMAX SMAX SMAX LMAX LM AX LMAX IVOL IVOL
Alpha 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.45 0.02 -0.01 0.46 -0.01
(1.97) (1.01) (0.63) (3.71) (0.16) (-0.12) (3.76) (-0.09)
MKT -0.07 -0.03 -0.10 -0.56 -0.35 -0.39 -0.51 -0.30
(-3.1) (-1.1) (-4.5) (-20.2) (-11.9) (-13.60) (-18.4) (-10.3)
SMB -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.49 -0.26 -0.25 -0.68 -0.43
(-0.5) (0.5) (1.0) (-8.4) (-5.0) (-5.1) (-11.6) (-8.5)
HM L 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.57 0.18 0.14 0.56 0.11
(4.2) (2.2) (1.2) (10.7) (2.8) (2.3) (10.5) (1.7)
RMW 0.19 0.22 0.83 0.85 0.86
(2.5) (3.9) (10.4) (11.2) (11.2)
CMA 0.05 0.14 0.61 0.66 0.72
(0.7) (2.3) (7.2) (8.2) (8.7)
REV 0.39 0.21 0.07
(14.6) (6.0) (2.0)
SR 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35
IR 0.40 0.22 0.14 0.75 0.03 -0.03 0.76 -0.02
R2 0.09 0.10 0.48 0.69 0.78 0.81 0.68 0.80
# obs 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306
Panel B: Global Sample (1990-2015)
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Table VIII 
Economic Drivers of the Low-Risk Effect 
This table reports results on the economic drivers of the low-risk effect. The dependent variables are the excess returns to betting 
against beta (BAB), betting against correlation (BAC), betting against volatility (BAV), the factor going long stocks with low 
maximum return over the past month (LMAX), the factor going long stocks with low maximum return scaled by volatility 
(SMAX), and the factor going long stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). The independent are MD, SENT, INF, Casino, 
and Lottery. MD is the amount of margin debt on NYSE firms held at dealer-brokers divided by the market capitalization of NYSE 
firms. SENT is the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. INF is the average 
change in the consumer price index over the last year. Casino is the profits in the casino industry in the previous quarter dividend 
by GDP. Lottery is the total sale of lottery tickets in UK over the previous month divided by GDP. We include as control variables 
the monthly excess return to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio and the monthly returns to the SMB, HML, RMW, and 
CMA factors of Fama and French (2015) and the short-term reversal factor from Ken French’s data library. We use UK factors in 
all regressions where the Lottery measure is on the right-hand side. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  
 
 
 
  
BABt;t+1 BABt;t+1 BACt;t+1 BACt;t+1 LMAXt;t+1 LMAXt;t+1 SMAXt;t+1 SMAXt;t+1 IVOLt;t+1 IVOLt;t+1
MDt -0,31 -0,60 -0,36 -0,76 0,18 -0,03 0,14
(-1,69) (-2,78) (-1,87) (-3,30) (1,14) (-0,22) (0,91)
MDt+1-MDt 6,18 5,74 10,45 9,30 -2,03 0,88 -1,96
(3,55) (3,17) (5,63) (4,83) (-1,51) (0,86) (-1,49)
SENTt 0,13 -0,06 0,21 0,17 0,09 0,07 0,24 0,24
(1,09) (-0,46) (2,35) (1,85) (1,35) (1,03) (2,79) (2,69)
SENTt+1-SENTt 1,07 1,24 0,55 0,69 1,03 1,03 0,00 0,11
(1,33) (1,44) (0,91) (1,14) (2,27) (2,24) (0,01) (0,19)
INFt -0,10 -0,16 -0,03 -0,03 0,03
(-2,03) (-3,14) (-0,75) (-1,18) (0,77)
INFt+1-INFt -0,30 -0,19 -0,65 -0,17 -0,42
(-1,00) (-0,58) (-2,90) (-0,98) (-1,89)
Controls
Mkt 0,16 0,16 0,12 0,11 -0,38 -0,41 -0,09 -0,08 -0,35 -0,37
(4,6) (4,4) (3,3) (2,9) (-16,8) (-15,5) (-5,0) (-4,0) (-15,8) (-14,4)
SMB 0,08 0,07 0,55 0,55 -0,36 -0,36 -0,03 -0,03 -0,50 -0,50
(1,8) (1,7) (12,4) (12,0) (-11,6) (-11,4) (-1,2) (-1,4) (-16,3) (-15,9)
HML 0,28 0,29 0,24 0,23 0,21 0,22 -0,04 -0,03 0,19 0,20
(4,9) (4,9) (3,9) (3,7) (4,8) (4,9) (-1,1) (-1,0) (4,5) (4,6)
RMW 0,50 0,48 0,09 0,09 0,56 0,52 0,12 0,12 0,67 0,64
(8,2) (7,6) (1,4) (1,3) (12,2) (11,1) (3,4) (3,3) (15,0) (13,9)
CMA 0,40 0,38 0,12 0,11 0,49 0,47 0,16 0,16 0,47 0,45
(4,6) (4,3) (1,3) (1,2) (7,4) (7,1) (3,3) (3,3) (7,4) (7,1)
REV -0,06 -0,06 0,02 0,02 0,18 0,19 0,36 0,36 -0,02 -0,02
(-1,5) (-1,6) (0,6) (0,6) (6,3) (6,6) (16,4) (16,5) (-0,6) (-0,6)
Adjusted R2 0,24 0,25 0,31 0,32 0,74 0,74 0,34 0,34 0,78 0,78
# obs 684 684 684 684 684 684 684 684 684 684
Panel A: Margin Debt and Sentiment
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Table VIII 
Economic Drivers of the Low-Risk Effect (continued)
 
  
BABt;t+1 BABt;t+1 BACt;t+1 BACt;t+1 LMAXt;t+1 LMAXt;t+1 SMAXt;t+1 SMAXt;t+1 IVOLt;t+1 IVOLt;t+1
Casinot -0,47 -0,43 0,49 -0,05 0,04
(-0,83) (-0,65) (1,74) (-0,28) (0,11)
Casinot+1 - Casinot -1,84 -0,79 -2,68 -0,59 -2,42
(-1,28) (-0,48) (-3,75) (-1,37) (-2,86)
Lotteryt 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
(0,50) (0,48) (0,91) (1,02) (-0,31)
Lotteryt+1 - Lottery t 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
(1,29) (1,52) (0,62) (0,42) (1,94)
Controls
Mkt 0,27 0,21 0,14 0,19 -0,32 0,50 -0,02 0,18 -0,29 0,48
(3,4) (4,1) (1,6) (4,1) (-8,1) (12,9) (-0,8) (6,2) (-6,2) (11,9)
SMB 0,25 0,67 0,80 0,88 -0,26 0,21 0,03 -0,03 -0,40 0,49
(2,0) (9,8) (5,4) (14,3) (-4,2) (4,1) (0,9) (-0,7) (-5,3) (9,0)
HML 0,47 0,16 0,19 0,10 0,22 -0,23 0,01 -0,17 0,22 -0,28
(3,3) (2,0) (1,2) (1,4) (3,1) (-3,9) (0,3) (-3,8) (2,7) (-4,6)
RMW 0,51 0,46 -0,12 0,16 0,79 -0,46 0,09 -0,16 0,91 -0,46
(3,8) (4,6) (-0,8) (1,7) (11,9) (-6,2) (2,3) (-2,7) (11,6) (-5,8)
CMA 0,19 0,06 0,21 0,05 0,41 -0,03 0,04 0,03 0,46 -0,08
(0,9) (0,5) (0,9) (0,5) (4,0) (-0,3) (0,7) (0,5) (3,7) (-0,9)
REV -0,15 0,06 -0,01 0,03 0,11 0,34 0,25 0,40 -0,03 0,19
(-1,4) (0,9) (-0,1) (0,5) (2,2) (6,5) (7,9) (9,9) (-0,4) (3,3)
Adjusted R2 0,29 0,29 0,25 0,48 0,83 0,61 0,34 0,38 0,82 0,65
# obs 142 254 142 254 142 254 142 254 142 254
Panel C: CAPM alpha for portfolios sorted on mispricing and correlation 
Conditional sort on correlation
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 LS
(low) (high)
P1 (low) 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,1 -0,5
(5,5) (5,2) (4,6) (3,8) (1,8) (-3,2)
P2 0,4 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,0 -0,4
(3,8) (5,0) (3,2) (2,0) (-0,4) (-2,9)
P3 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,1 -0,1 -0,4
(3,4) (2,7) (1,1) (1,7) (-0,8) (-2,8)
P4 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,0 -0,3 -0,6
(2,8) (2,1) (2,1) (0,3) (-3,6) (-4,2)
P5 (high) -0,1 -0,3 -0,3 -0,4 -0,7 -0,6
(-1,1) (-2,1) (-3,1) (-2,9) (-5,8) (-3,1)
LS -0,8 -0,8 -0,8 -0,7 -0,9
(-6,3) (-5,6) (-5,6) (-4,6) (-5,3)
So
rt
 o
n 
m
is
pr
ic
in
g
Panel B: Lottery Sales and Casino Profits
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Table IX 
Horserace: Factors as Published 
This table reports the result of regressing one low-risk factor on another, as well as control variables. Panel A reports the results 
for the U.S. sample and panel B reports the results for the global sample. The dependent variables are the monthly excess returns 
to betting against beta (BAB), betting against correlation (BAC), betting against volatility (BAV), the factor going long stocks 
with low maximum return over the past month (LMAX), the factor going long stocks with low maximum return scaled by volatility 
(SMAX), and the factor going long stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). The intercept alpha is in monthly percent. The 
control variables are the monthly excess return to the market portfolio (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML), profitability (RMW), 
investment (CMA), and short-term reversal (REV). t-statistics are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates, and 5% 
statistical significance is indicated in bold. The Sharpe ratio (SR) and information ratio (IR) are annualized. 
 
 
  
BAB BAC BAV LMAX SMAX IVOL
Alpha 0.31 0.60 -0.20 0.05 0.18 0.08
(3.00) (4.76) (-1.54) (0.64) (2.69) (1.02)
MKT 0.37 0.17 0.43 -0.42 -0.10 -0.38
(11.8) (4.5) (10.8) (-22.2) (-6.4) (-18.6)
SMB 0.37 0.75 -0.17 -0.41 -0.04 -0.53
(9.5) (15.9) (-3.3) (-15.7) (-1.9) (-19.2)
HML 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.10 -0.07 0.11
(2.5) (2.1) (2.6) (2.7) (-2.2) (2.7)
RMW 0.05 -0.21 0.64 0.39 0.05 0.55
(0.9) (-3.0) (8.6) (9.9) (1.6) (13.1)
CMA 0.02 -0.12 0.05 0.35 0.11 0.38
(0.3) (-1.3) (0.5) (6.4) (2.2) (6.5)
REV -0.19 -0.05 -0.26 0.21 0.37 0.00
(-5.6) (-1.3) (-6.0) (8.6) (18.0) (0.1)
BAB 0.39 0.15 0.28
(15.4) (7.0) (10.3)
LMAX 0.71 0.41 0.82
(15.4) (7.4) (13.9)
SR 0.90 0.93 0.27 0.34 0.78 0.22
IR 0.44 0.70 -0.23 0.10 0.40 0.15
R2 0.43 0.33 0.62 0.81 0.39 0.81
# obs 630 630 630 630 630 630
Panel A: U.S. Sample (1963 - 2015)
168 
 
Table IX 
Horserace: Factors as Published (continued) 
 
BAB BAC BAV LMAX SMAX IVOL
Alpha 0.21 0.37 -0.16 -0.11 0.02 -0.09
(1.98) (2.89) (-1.27) (-1.33) (0.24) (-1.02)
MKT 0.43 0.27 0.40 -0.44 -0.11 -0.34
(11.3) (5.9) (8.7) (-19.4) (-5.4) (-13.6)
SMB 0.73 0.91 -0.14 -0.50 -0.04 -0.64
(13.5) (14.2) (-2.1) (-11.7) (-1.1) (-13.6)
HML 0.16 0.10 0.23 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(2.5) (1.2) (2.9) (0.2) (0.3) (-0.1)
RMW 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.42 0.08 0.49
(2.1) (0.9) (0.8) (6.3) (1.3) (6.7)
CMA -0.20 -0.14 -0.20 0.49 0.09 0.57
(-2.1) (-1.2) (-1.8) (7.7) (1.5) (8.1)
REV -0.23 -0.05 -0.31 0.24 0.40 0.10
(-6.1) (-1.0) (-6.6) (8.7) (15.5) (3.2)
BAB 0.47 0.15 0.41
(14.0) (4.9) (10.8)
LMAX 0.84 0.38 1.06
(14.0) (5.3) (14.6)
SR 0.92 0.89 0.33 0.34 0.43 0.35
IR 0.43 0.63 -0.28 -0.29 0.05 -0.22
R2 0.64 0.40 0.73 0.88 0.51 0.85
# obs 306 306 306 306 306 306
Panel B: Global Sample (1990 - 2015)
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Table X 
Turnover 
This table reports the turnover of the different trading strategies considered in the paper. We measure turnover as the amount of 
dollars that has to be traded in each trading strategy on a monthly basis. BAC and BAV: At the beginning of each month stocks 
are ranked in ascending order based on the estimate of volatility (correlation) at the end of the previous month. The ranked stocks 
are assigned to one of five quintiles. U.S. sorts are based on NYSE breakpoints. Within each quintile, stocks are assigned to one 
of two portfolios: low correlation (volatility) and high correlation (volatility). In these portfolios, stocks are weighted by ranked 
correlation (volatility) (lower correlation (volatility) stocks have larger weights in the low-correlation (volatility) portfolios and 
larger correlation (volatility) stocks have larger weights in the high-correlation (volatility) portfolios), and the portfolios are 
rebalanced every calendar month. The portfolios are (de)levered to have a beta of one at formation. Within each volatility 
(correlation) quintile, a self-financing portfolio is made that is long the low-correlation (volatility) portfolio and short the high-
correlation (volatility) portfolio. Betting against correlation (volatility) is the equal-weighted average of these five portfolios. This 
table shows regression results for monthly returns to LMAX, SMAX, and IVOL. Panel A reports the results from the U.S. sample 
and Panel B reports the results from the global sample. LMAX (SMAX, IVOL) is constructed as the intersection of six value-
weighted portfolios formed on size and MAX (SMAX, IVOL). For U.S. securities, the size breakpoint is the median NYSE market 
equity. For International securities, the size breakpoint is the 80th percentile by country. The MAX (SMAX, IVOL) breakpoints 
are the 30th and 70th percentile. We use unconditional sorts in the U.S. and conditional sorts in the international sample (first we 
sort on size and then MAX (SMAX, IVOL)). Firms are assigned to one of six portfolios based on these breakpoints. Portfolios are 
value-weighted, refreshed every calendar month, and rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights. LMAX (SMAX, 
IVOL) is then the average return to the two low-MAX (SMAX, IVOL) portfolios minus the average return to the two high-MAX 
(SMAX, IVOL) portfolios. We form one set of portfolios in each country and compute global portfolios by weighting each 
country’s portfolio by the country’s lagged total market capitalization. MAX is the sum of the five highest returns over the previous 
month. SMAX is the MAX characteristic divided by one-year daily volatility. The IVOL factor is based on the characteristics 
defined by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). The U.S. sample is form 1926-2015.  
 
  
HML BAB BAB BAB BAC BAV LMAX SMAX IVOL LMAX(1Y) SMAX(1Y)
Method
FF: june 
update
FF: june 
update
FF: 
monthly 
Rank 
weights
Rank 
weights
Rank 
weights
FF: 
monthly 
FF: 
monthly 
FF: 
monthly 
FF: 
monthly 
FF: 
monthly 
Turnover 0.24 0.21 0.41 0.34 0.35 0.36 2.06 2.77 1.76 0.46 1.14
NA 1 to 5 
years
1 to 5 
years
1 to 5 
years
1 to 5 
years
1 to 5 
years
1 month 1 to 12 
months
1 month 1 year 1 yearPeriod over which 
the characteristics 
are calculated
Portfolio
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Table XI 
MAX Factors Based on Yearly Look-Back Periods 
This table shows regression results for monthly returns to LMAX and SMAX factors that are produced based on yearly estimates 
of MAX. Panel A reports the results from the long U.S. sample and Panel B reports the results from the global sample. LMAX 1-
year (SMAX 1-year) is constructed as the intersection of six value-weighted portfolios formed on size and MAX 1-year (SMAX 
1-year). For U.S. securities, the size breakpoint is the median NYSE market equity. For International securities, the size breakpoint 
is the 80th percentile by country. The MAX 1-year (SMAX 1-year) breakpoints are the 30th and 70th percentile. We use 
unconditional sorts in the U.S. and conditional sorts in the international sample (first we sort on size and then MAX 1-year (SMAX 
1-year)). Firms are assigned to one of six portfolios based on these breakpoints. Portfolios are value-weighted, refreshed every 
calendar month, and rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value weights. LMAX 1-year (SMAX 1-year) is then the 
average return to the two low- MAX 1-year (SMAX 1-year) portfolios minus the average return to the two high-MAX (SMAX 1-
year) portfolios. We form one set of portfolios in each country and compute global portfolios by weighting each country’s portfolio 
by the country’s lagged total market capitalization. MAX 1-year is the sum of the 20 highest returns over the previous year. SMAX 
1-year is the MAX 1-year characteristic divided by one-year daily volatility. The explanatory variables are monthly excess to the 
value-weighted market portfolio and the monthly returns for the SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, REV, and BAB factor. SMB, HML, 
RMW, and CMA are from Fama and French (2015). BAB is from Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). Returns and alphas are in monthly 
percent, t-statistics are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
Sharpe ratios and information ratios are annualized. 
 
  
LMAX(1Y) LMAX(1Y) LMAX(1Y) SMAX(1Y) SMAX(1Y) SMAX(1Y)
Alpha 0.40 0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.25 -0.23
(3.73) (0.89) (-1.26) (-1.67) (-3.57) (-3.25)
MKT -0.50 -0.43 -0.47 0.00 -0.05 -0.04
(-19.6) (-17.5) (-21.9) (0.0) (-2.6) (-2.4)
SMB -0.67 -0.54 -0.59 -0.23 -0.21 -0.21
(-18.8) (-16.0) (-19.9) (-9.1) (-8.8) (-8.6)
HML 0.36 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.18
(9.2) (2.3) (-0.1) (5.8) (4.8) (5.1)
RMW 0.61 0.42 0.17 0.19
(12.3) (9.4) (4.8) (5.2)
CMA 0.52 0.37 -0.07 -0.05
(7.4) (5.9) (-1.3) (-1.0)
REV 0.04 0.06 0.25 0.25
(1.2) (2.3) (10.9) (10.8)
BAB 0.41 -0.04
(14.5) (-1.8)
SR 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22
IR 0.53 0.13 -0.19 -0.24 -0.52 -0.48
R2 0.68 0.75 0.81 0.18 0.34 0.34
# obs 630 630 630 630 630 630
Panel A: U.S. Sample (1963 - 2015)
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Table XI 
MAX Factors Based on Yearly Look-Back Periods (continued) 
 
LMAX(1Y) LMAX(1Y) LMAX(1Y) SMAX(1Y) SMAX(1Y) SMAX(1Y)
Alpha 0.34 -0.15 -0.26 -0.19 -0.29 -0.27
(2.57) (-1.32) (-2.93) (-2.08) (-3.40) (-3.26)
MKT -0.63 -0.40 -0.45 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
(-20.9) (-12.5) (-18.3) (-0.4) (-1.9) (-1.6)
SMB -0.57 -0.31 -0.59 -0.28 -0.24 -0.21
(-9.1) (-5.7) (-12.6) (-6.5) (-6.0) (-4.8)
HML 0.49 0.05 -0.10 0.22 0.23 0.24
(8.6) (0.7) (-1.9) (5.5) (4.4) (4.7)
RMW 0.92 0.44 0.20 0.26
(10.9) (6.0) (3.3) (3.7)
CMA 0.69 0.50 -0.07 -0.04
(7.7) (7.1) (-1.0) (-0.7)
REV 0.04 0.07 0.28 0.27
(1.0) (2.4) (9.7) (9.6)
BAB 0.54 -0.06
(14.4) (-1.7)
SR 0.17 0.17 0.17 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27
IR 0.52 -0.29 -0.64 -0.42 -0.74 -0.71
R2 0.68 0.79 0.87 0.21 0.42 0.42
# obs 306 306 306 306 306 306
Panel B: Global Sample (1990 - 2015)
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Figure I 
Cumulative Alpha for Longer Holding Periods 
This figure shows cumulative alpha for trading strategies in event time. The event time is months after the 
characteristics were last refreshed.   
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Table A1 
Betting Against Volatility – Three Factor Alphas 
This table shows returns to the betting against volatility factor in each correlation quintile, along with the equal-weighted average 
of these factors, which constitute our overall BAV factor. Panel A reports the BAV performance in the U.S. sample and panel B 
reports the performance in the global sample. At the beginning of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the 
estimate of correlation at the end of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to one of five quintiles. U.S. sorts are 
based on NYSE breakpoints. Within each quintile, stocks are assigned to one of two portfolios: low volatility and high volatility. 
In these portfolios, stocks are weighted by ranked volatility (lower volatility stocks have larger weights in the low- volatility 
portfolios and larger volatility stocks have larger weights in the high- volatility portfolios), and the portfolios are rebalanced every 
calendar month. The portfolios are (de)levered to have a beta of one at formation. Within each correlation quintile, a self-financing 
BAC portfolio is made that is long the low-correlation portfolio and short the high-correlation portfolio. We form one set of 
portfolios in each country and compute global portfolios by weighting each country’s portfolio by the country’s total (lagged) 
market capitalization. Alpha is the intercept in a regression of monthly excess return. The explanatory variables are the monthly 
excess return to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio and the monthly returns to the SMB and HML factors of Fama and 
French (2015). Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates, 
and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. ‘$ long’ and ‘$ short’ measures how many dollars the betting against correlation 
portfolio is long and short. Sharpe ratios and information ratios are annualized. 
 
 
Correlation quintile 1 2 3 4 5 BAV
Excess return -0.10 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.30 0.40
(-0.31) (2.68) (2.76) (3.20) (1.93) (1.99)
Alpha 0.07 0.57 0.54 0.55 0.30 0.40
(0.23) (2.65) (2.90) (3.74) (2.51) (2.40)
MKT -0.16 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(-2.3) (1.3) (1.0) (0.4) (0.03) (-0.2)
SMB -0.97 -0.67 -0.69 -0.65 -0.65 -0.73
(-10.2) (-9.3) (-11.1) (-13.3) (-16.5) (-12.9)
HML 0.49 0.60 0.61 0.53 0.50 0.55
(4.8) (7.8) (9.1) (9.9) (11.9) (9.0)
SR -0.04 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.27 0.27
IR 0.03 0.37 0.41 0.53 0.35 0.34
R2 0.22 0.21 0.27 0.34 0.44 0.32
# obs 630 630 630 630 630 630
Correlation quintile 1 2 3 4 5 BAV
Excess return -0.06 0.53 0.58 0.52 0.35 0.38
(-0.18) (2.08) (2.44) (2.51) (1.98) (1.68)
Alpha -0.16 0.41 0.48 0.48 0.31 0.31
(-0.57) (1.98) (2.62) (2.97) (2.30) (1.73)
MKT -0.27 -0.21 -0.26 -0.29 -0.25 -0.26
(-4.2) (-4.4) (-6.3) (-7.8) (-8.21) (-6.4)
SMB -1.04 -0.68 -0.62 -0.54 -0.45 -0.67
(-7.8) (-6.8) (-7.0) (-7.0) (-7.1) (-7.9)
HML 0.85 0.79 0.77 0.62 0.56 0.72
(6.9) (8.6) (9.5) (8.8) (9.5) (9.3)
SR -0.04 0.41 0.48 0.50 0.39 0.33
IR -0.12 0.40 0.53 0.60 0.46 0.35
R2 0.33 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.42
# obs 306 306 306 306 306 306
Panel A: U.S. Sample (1963-2015)
Panel B: Global Sample (1990-2015)
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Table A2 
Betting Against Volatility – Five Factor Alphas 
This table shows returns to the betting against volatility factor in each correlation quintile, along with the equal-weighted average 
of these factors, which constitute our overall BAV factor. Panel A reports the BAV performance in the U.S. sample and panel B 
reports the performance in the global sample. At the beginning of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the 
estimate of correlation at the end of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to one of five quintiles. U.S. sorts are 
based on NYSE breakpoints. Within each quintile, stocks are assigned to one of two portfolios: low volatility and high volatility. 
In these portfolios, stocks are weighted by ranked volatility (lower volatility stocks have larger weights in the low- volatility 
portfolios and larger volatility stocks have larger weights in the high- volatility portfolios), and the portfolios are rebalanced every 
calendar month. The portfolios are (de)levered to have a beta of one at formation. Within each correlation quintile, a self-financing 
BAC portfolio is made that is long the low-correlation portfolio and short the high-correlation portfolio. We form one set of 
portfolios in each country and compute global portfolios by weighting each country’s portfolio by the country’s total (lagged) 
market capitalization. Alpha is the intercept in a regression of monthly excess return. The explanatory variables are the monthly 
excess return to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio and the monthly returns to the SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA factors 
of Fama and French (2015). Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient 
estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. ‘$ long’ and ‘$ short’ measures how many dollars the betting against 
correlation portfolio is long and short. Sharpe ratios and information ratios are annualized. 
 
 
 
 
  
Correlation quintile 1 2 3 4 5 BAV
Excess return -0.10 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.30 0.40
(-0.31) (2.68) (2.76) (3.20) (1.93) (1.99)
Alpha -0.48 0.04 0.06 0.17 -0.03 -0.05
(-1.77) (0.18) (0.35) (1.26) (-0.32) (-0.34)
MKT -0.05 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.09
(-0.7) (3.9) (3.6) (3.0) (3.02) (2.6)
SMB -0.65 -0.39 -0.43 -0.44 -0.48 -0.48
(-7.0) (-5.8) (-7.4) (-9.7) (-13.3) (-9.3)
HML 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.34 0.30 0.31
(2.2) (3.0) (4.5) (5.3) (6.0) (4.4)
RMW 1.43 1.23 1.17 0.94 0.76 1.11
(10.5) (12.3) (13.8) (14.0) (14.2) (14.6)
CMA 0.41 0.67 0.51 0.40 0.42 0.48
(2.1) (4.7) (4.3) (4.2) (5.6) (4.5)
SR -0.04 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.27 0.27
IR -0.26 0.03 0.05 0.18 -0.05 -0.05
R2 0.33 0.36 0.44 0.50 0.58 0.49
# obs 630 630 630 630 630 630
Panel A: U.S. Sample (1963-2015)
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 Table A2 (continued) 
Betting Against Volatility – Five Factor Alphas 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Correlation quintile 1 2 3 4 5 BAV
Excess return -0.06 0.53 0.58 0.52 0.35 0.38
(-0.18) (2.08) (2.44) (2.51) (1.98) (1.68)
Alpha -0.62 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.19 -0.19
(-2.16) (-0.23) (-0.07) (-0.46) (-1.67) (-1.12)
MKT -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.8) (-0.0) (-0.7) (-0.8) (-0.63) (-0.6)
SMB -0.80 -0.44 -0.35 -0.25 -0.18 -0.40
(-5.7) (-4.3) (-4.1) (-3.5) (-3.3) (-4.9)
HML 0.56 0.46 0.39 0.21 0.20 0.37
(3.2) (3.6) (3.6) (2.4) (2.9) (3.6)
RMW 0.97 0.93 0.99 1.09 1.01 1.00
(4.6) (6.0) (7.4) (10.1) (11.8) (8.0)
CMA 0.41 0.49 0.58 0.61 0.53 0.52
(1.8) (3.0) (4.1) (5.3) (5.8) (4.0)
SR -0.04 0.41 0.48 0.50 0.39 0.33
IR -0.47 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.36 -0.24
R2 0.37 0.42 0.51 0.58 0.63 0.53
# obs 306 306 306 306 306 306
Panel B: Global Sample (1990-2015)
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Table A6 
Correlation Between MD and Other Measures of Liquidity 
 
 
 
US. 1963-2013 (quarterly)
dMD TED VIX NOISE LEV
dMD 1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.21 0.08
TED -0.02 1 0.29 0.54 0.73
VIX -0.01 0.29 1 0.56 0.30
NOISE -0.21 0.54 0.56 1 0.14
LEV 0.08 0.73 0.30 0.14 1
MEAN 0.00 0.58 20.26 3.56 30.61
N obs 182 78 94 106 182
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